This chapter explores the intersection of artificial intelligence (AI) and dispute system design (DSD), emphasising AI’s dual role in both generating and resolving civil disputes. It begins with the notion of civil justice, then introduces a general analytic framework for DSD, detailing how conflicts – ranging from neighbourhood disputes to campus tensions – can be managed through facilitative and adjudicative processes, both online and offline. The chapter examines AI’s potential as a third and fourth party in dispute resolution, discussing its applications in predicting conflicts, enhancing negotiation, and designing conflict management systems. Through case studies in social networking, community disputes, and student conflicts, the chapter highlights AI’s ability to analyse data, provide mediation services, and improve accessibility, while also addressing concerns of fairness, accountability, and privacy in technologically driven dispute resolution.

On 15 January 2021, Malaysia requested consultations with the European Union, France and Lithuania pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), Article 14 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and Article 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) regarding the measures and claims set out below.

This chapter explores the evolving role of artificial intelligence (AI) in the justice system. AI tools are increasingly used across legal domains – from document generation and case management to assisting in negotiation and even supporting judicial decisions. While earlier AI applications focused on automating routine tasks, today’s large language models (LLMs) demonstrate capabilities once considered distinctly human, such as legal reasoning, persuasive communication, and emotional sensitivity. We review recent empirical studies examining public perceptions of AI in legal settings. These findings reveal a nuanced picture: human decision-makers are often preferred for their empathy and discretion, while AI is valued for consistency, efficiency, and neutrality – especially in low-stake disputes. Interestingly, there is growing acceptance of AI even in roles that require managing interpersonal dynamics, such as facilitating agreement or moderating emotionally charged interactions. As AI capabilities continue to expand, the boundary between automated and human-driven legal processes is becoming less distinct. Perceptions of fairness, trust, and legitimacy will shape how legal actors and the public respond to AI’s presence in justice systems. We conclude by raising critical questions about what is gained and lost as technology becomes more deeply embedded in dispute resolution and legal decision-making.

Copyright misuse is a defence to enforcement of a valid copyright. It applies when a copyright owner either licenses or enforces its copyright in an unacceptable matter. For example, a paradigmatic case of misuse involves a copyright owner who uses a copyright license to prevent the licensee from developing competing works. A rightsholder who has committed misuse is barred from enforcing its copyright against others – including third parties who were not the direct victims of the acts of misuse – while the acts of misuse continue. This chapter explores how the misuse defence might apply in cases of upcycling involving copyright-protected materials. Although the defence of copyright misuse as such exists mainly in the US, the analysis in the chapter can also prove relevant for other countries. First, the US misuse doctrine bears considerable similarity to the general notion of abuse of rights. Second, the US misuse doctrine also borrows heavily from monopoly (anti-trust) law. While there are important differences between US anti-trust law and monopoly laws in other countries, many of the basic situations are treated the same. The discussion of the US misuse doctrine can therefore inform countries that might want to deal with upcycling situations.

This chapter analyzes upcycling from the perspective of copyright infringement. Upcycling should be encouraged, especially as it makes recycling an attractive and exciting option for consumers. IP rights (IPRs) can however be seen as a barrier for such utilization of raw material. This is because traditional IP doctrines do not fully recognize these kinds of interests, despite sustainability’s fundamental relevance in society and in the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU. The chapter develops a new doctrinal standpoint to consider copyright infringements in these specific cases as a part of introducing a more general ‘sustainable lifespan’ principle in IPRs regulation.

The importance of copyright law is generally not reflected in media law and policy. Recent legislative initiatives, such as the European Media Freedom Act, have failed to address the chilling effects of restrictive copyright rules on media activities. New forms and platforms for digital journalism and the increasing role of artificial intelligence require adaptation of the legal framework. A holistic legal approach is needed to address threats to values such as freedom of expression and of the press. The role of the media as ‘public watchdog’ creates constitutional imperatives, derived from European human rights instruments, to enable them to use subject matter protected by copyright. This chapter argues that the emerging theory of digital constitutionalism can help to develop a common framework for media and copyright law. It identifies copyright limitations and exceptions as the most appropriate mechanisms to enable this. The chapter proposes reforms of copyright exceptions to remove the chilling effects created by exclusive rights and to facilitate the media’s use of information in their role as democracy’s Fourth Estate. The chapter proposes further concretising of digital constitutionalism, placing media and copyright law within a broad regulatory framework for constitutionally protected values in the digital space.

The Television Without Frontiers Directive, introduced in 1989, was the EU’s first regulatory instrument under the audiovisual media policy, aiming to facilitate the circulation of television services throughout the Union. Since then, the audiovisual landscape has evolved significantly, with technological advancements and market shifts prompting revisions of the directive. In 2007, the scope of the directive was expanded to include video-on-demand services (e.g. Netflix), transforming the directive into the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). In the years that followed years, influencers – creators of user-generated content on video-sharing platforms such as YouTube and TikTok – became established sources of audiovisual entertainment, information, education, and commercial communication. Today, they are in effective competition with traditional television and video-on-demand platforms. The most recent revision of the AVMSD in 2018 acknowledged this by no longer automatically excluding user-generated videos from the directive‘s scope. Despite this update, the regulatory framework remains deeply rooted in the twentieth-century media ecosystem, which was characterised by spectrum scarcity and television broadcasters as gatekeepers. This leads to challenges in applying and interpreting the AVMSD, hindering its ability to effectively achieve its policy goals.