We extend Burt, Burzynska, and Opper's cross-sectional network prediction of relative success among Chinese entrepreneurs by predicting which ventures are still active five years later. The cross-sectional analysis is corroborated in three ways (despite the vicissitudes of a national anti-corruption campaign): (1) Businesses run in 2012 by CEOs with a network rich in structural holes are more likely to be active five years later, in 2017. (2) Survival odds are improved if the large, open network around a CEO in 2012 was initially a supportive ‘cocoon’ closed network when the business was founded. (3) Both results are contingent on capturing the guanxi ties valuable early in the history of the business. The two network effects disappear when the network around a CEO is limited to his or her currently valued contacts. Beyond corroboration, we find that advantage is concentrated in ventures that began well and had become successful. Network advantage here does not compensate for weakness – it is a mechanism for cumulative advantage, amplifying the success of businesses already doing well.

Masulis and Mobbs (2014), (2015) find that independent directors with multiple directorships allocate their monitoring efforts unequally based on a directorship’s relative prestige. We investigate whether bank loan contract terms reflect such unequal allocation of directors’ monitoring effort. We find that bank loans of firms with a greater proportion of independent directors for whom the board is among their most prestigious have lower spreads, longer maturities, fewer covenants, lower syndicate concentration, lower likelihood of collateral requirement, lower annual loan fees, and higher bond ratings. Our evidence indicates that independent directors’ attention is associated with lower cost of borrowing.

Estimating difference-in-differences models on a comprehensive data set of Italian companies, we provide novel insights into the literature on political uncertainty and firm investment. We first establish that local political uncertainty leads to declining investment. Next, we show that family control neutralizes this effect: Family firms are more likely than other firms to invest during politically uncertain times, especially when operating in industries dependent on public spending and/or managed by family members. Finally, we document that this investment resilience of family firms under political uncertainty translates into significantly greater profitability and growth.

We propose a market-based framework that exploits time-varying parameter vector autoregressions to estimate the dynamic network of financial spillover effects. We apply it to financials in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index and estimate interconnectedness at the sectoral and institutional levels. At the sectoral level, we uncover two main events in terms of interconnectedness: the Long-Term Capital Management crisis and the 2008 financial crisis. After these crisis events, we find a gradual decrease in interconnectedness, not observable using the classical rolling-window approach. At the institutional level, our framework delivers more stable interconnectedness rankings than other comparable market-based measures.

This article examines how identities are constructed and performed by a sample of Muslim women in the Canadian workplace. This research will provide new insights on how Muslim women disclose or ‘perform’ their identities in different contexts. This study will build upon previous research on identity construction of ethnic minorities in the workplace and intersectionality and the workplace experiences of Muslim women by conducting interviews with 23 professional Muslim women in Canada. The findings have important implications for understanding Muslim women’s identity work in broader contexts of discrimination, as well as accommodation and inclusion in organizations.

Private information imposes a severe trading disadvantage on uninformed traders while at the same time providing firms with valuable signals for investment adjustment. The two forces have opposite impacts on the cost of capital, and the net effect depends on which force dominates. We show that stocks of firms with low flexibility in investment adjustment (“value firms”) command an information premium, whereas stocks of firms with high flexibility in investment adjustment (“growth firms”) deliver an information discount. These results are consistent with the findings that growth firms exhibit stronger investment sensitivity to information in stock prices than value firms.

In the original publication of this article, co-author Monsol Yang's surname was incorrect. The original has since been updated.

The author and publisher regret this error.