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In this final chapter, we explain a new equilibrium concept called correlated equilibrium that is more general than Nash equilibrium. It allows for randomized actions of the players that depend on an external signal (like a traffic light) that is observed by the players (typically in different ways) so that their actions can be correlated.
Zero-sum games are games of two players where the interests of the players are directly opposed: One player’s loss is the other player’s gain. Competitions between two players in sports or in parlor games can be thought of as zero-sum games.
In a non-cooperative game, every outcome is associated with a payoff to each player that the player wants to maximize. The payoff represents the player’s preference for the outcome. The games considered so far often have a pure-strategy equilibrium, where the preference applies to deterministic outcomes and is usually straightforward.
As we showed in Section 6.5, Nash (1951) proved the existence of a mixed equilibrium in a finite game with the help of Brouwer’s fixed-point Theorem 6.4. Fixed-point theorems are powerful tools for proving the existence of many equilibrium concepts in economics. Brouwer’s theorem is the first and most important of these.
This chapter is about the geometric structure of equilibria in two-player games in strategic form. It shows how to quickly identify equilibria with qualitative “best-response diagrams”.
This chapter considers game trees, the second main way for defining a non-cooperative game in addition to the strategic form. In a game tree, players move sequentially and (in the case of perfect information studied in this chapter) are aware of the previous moves of the other players. In contrast, in a strategic-form game players move simultaneously. In this “dynamic” setting, a play means a specific run of the game given by a sequence of actions of the players.
Combinatorial game theory is about perfect-information two-player games, such as Checkers, Go, Chess, or Nim, which are analyzed using their rules. It tries to answer who will win in a game position (assuming optimal play on both sides), and to quantify who is ahead and by how much. The topic has a rich mathematical theory that relates to discrete mathematics, algebra, and (not touched here) computational complexity, and highly original ideas specific to these games.
This chapter presents models of bargaining. Bargaining occurs in real life between the buyer and seller of a house, for example. This is a game-theoretic problem because it is useful to think about the situation of the other player. Both players have something to gain by reaching an agreement.
A game in strategic form does not always have an equilibrium in which each player chooses her strategy deterministically. As we describe in this chapter, Nash (1951) showed that any finite strategic-form game has an equilibrium if players are allowed to use mixed strategies.
It is well known that the height profile of a critical conditioned Galton–Watson tree with finite offspring variance converges, after a suitable normalisation, to the local time of a standard Brownian excursion. In this work, we study the distance profile, defined as the profile of all distances between pairs of vertices. We show that after a proper rescaling the distance profile converges to a continuous random function that can be described as the density of distances between random points in the Brownian continuum random tree. We show that this limiting function a.s. is Hölder continuous of any order $\alpha<1$, and that it is a.e. differentiable. We note that it cannot be differentiable at 0, but leave as open questions whether it is Lipschitz, and whether it is continuously differentiable on the half-line $(0,\infty)$. The distance profile is naturally defined also for unrooted trees contrary to the height profile that is designed for rooted trees. This is used in our proof, and we prove the corresponding convergence result for the distance profile of random unrooted simply generated trees. As a minor purpose of the present work, we also formalize the notion of unrooted simply generated trees and include some simple results relating them to rooted simply generated trees, which might be of independent interest.
Paul Erdős published more papers during his lifetime than any other mathematician, especially in discrete mathematics. He had a nose for beautiful, simply-stated problems with solutions that have far-reaching consequences across mathematics. This captivating book, written for students, provides an easy-to-understand introduction to discrete mathematics by presenting questions that intrigued Erdős, along with his brilliant ways of working toward their answers. It includes young Erdős's proof of Bertrand's postulate, the Erdős-Szekeres Happy End Theorem, De Bruijn-Erdős theorem, Erdős-Rado delta-systems, Erdős-Ko-Rado theorem, Erdős-Stone theorem, the Erdős-Rényi-Sós Friendship Theorem, Erdős-Rényi random graphs, the Chvátal-Erdős theorem on Hamilton cycles, and other results of Erdős, as well as results related to his work, such as Ramsey's theorem or Deza's theorem on weak delta-systems. Its appendix covers topics normally missing from introductory courses. Filled with personal anecdotes about Erdős, this book offers a behind-the-scenes look at interactions with the legendary collaborator.
A long-standing conjecture of Erdős and Simonovits asserts that for every rational number $r\in (1,2)$ there exists a bipartite graph H such that $\mathrm{ex}(n,H)=\Theta(n^r)$. So far this conjecture is known to be true only for rationals of form $1+1/k$ and $2-1/k$, for integers $k\geq 2$. In this paper, we add a new form of rationals for which the conjecture is true: $2-2/(2k+1)$, for $k\geq 2$. This in turn also gives an affirmative answer to a question of Pinchasi and Sharir on cube-like graphs. Recently, a version of Erdős and Simonovits$^{\prime}$s conjecture, where one replaces a single graph by a finite family, was confirmed by Bukh and Conlon. They proposed a construction of bipartite graphs which should satisfy Erdős and Simonovits$^{\prime}$s conjecture. Our result can also be viewed as a first step towards verifying Bukh and Conlon$^{\prime}$s conjecture. We also prove an upper bound on the Turán number of theta graphs in an asymmetric setting and employ this result to obtain another new rational exponent for Turán exponents: $r=7/5$.
A set S of permutations is forcing if for any sequence $\{\Pi_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ of permutations where the density $d(\pi,\Pi_i)$ converges to $\frac{1}{|\pi|!}$ for every permutation $\pi \in S$, it holds that $\{\Pi_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ is quasirandom. Graham asked whether there exists an integer k such that the set of all permutations of order k is forcing; this has been shown to be true for any $k\ge 4$. In particular, the set of all 24 permutations of order 4 is forcing. We provide the first non-trivial lower bound on the size of a forcing set of permutations: every forcing set of permutations (with arbitrary orders) contains at least four permutations.
We prove an analogue of Alon’s spectral gap conjecture for random bipartite, biregular graphs. We use the Ihara–Bass formula to connect the non-backtracking spectrum to that of the adjacency matrix, employing the moment method to show there exists a spectral gap for the non-backtracking matrix. A by-product of our main theorem is that random rectangular zero-one matrices with fixed row and column sums are full rank with high probability. Finally, we illustrate applications to community detection, coding theory, and deterministic matrix completion.