The attribute framing bias is a well-established phenomenon, in which an object or an event is evaluated more favorably when presented in a positive frame such as “the half full glass” than when presented in the complementary negative framing. Given that previous research showed that visual aids can attenuate this bias, the current research explores the factors underlying the attenuating effect of visual aids. In a series of three experiments, we examined how attribute framing bias is affected by two factors: (a) The display mode—verbal versus visual; and (b) the representation of the critical attribute—whether one outcome, either the positive or the negative, is represented or both outcomes are represented. In Experiment 1 a marginal attenuation of attribute framing bias was obtained when verbal description of either positive or negative information was accompanied by corresponding visual representation. In Experiment 2 similar marginal attenuation was obtained when both positive and negative outcomes were verbally represented. In Experiment 3, where the verbal description represented both positive and negative outcomes, significant attenuation was obtained when it was accompanied by a visual display that represented a single outcome, and complete attenuation, totally eliminating the framing bias, was obtained when it was accompanied by a visual display that represented both outcomes. Thus, our findings showed that interaction between the display mode and the representation of the critical attribute attenuated the framing bias. Theoretical and practical implications of the interaction between verbal description, visual aids and representation of the critical attribute are discussed, and future research is suggested.

A case study review of a formal decision analysis involving a 10 year old girl. She had just faced the death of a close adult friend, and had become filled with uncertainty and emotion while facing the decision as to whether or not to attend his funeral. The study demonstrates that formal analysis can provide the sensitivity and caring basis for such decision making, thus counteracting some of the criticisms of decision analysis.

Similar to research on risky choice, the traditional analysis of intertemporal choice takes the view that an individual behaves so as to maximize the discounted sum of all future utilities. The well-known Allais paradox contradicts the fundamental postulates of maximizing the expected value or utility of a risky option. We describe a violation of the law of diminishing marginal utility as well as an intertemporal version of the Allais paradox.

Is variety of the spice of life? The present research suggests that the answer depends on the rate of consumption. In three experiments, we find that, whereas a variety of stimuli is preferred to repetition of even a better-liked single stimulus when consumption is continuous, this preference reverses when the satiation associated with repetition is reduced by slowing down the rate of consumption. Decision makers, however, seem to under-appreciate the influence of consumption rate on preference for (and satisfaction with) variety. At high rates of consumption, they correctly anticipate their own, high, desire for variety, but at low rates of consumption people tend to overestimate their own desire for variety. These results complicate the picture presented by prior research on the “diversification bias”, suggesting that people overestimate their own desire for variety only when consumption is spaced out over time.

It is often the case that one can choose a mix of alternative options rather than have to select one option only. Such an opportunity to diversify may blunt the risk involved in all-or-none choice. Here we investigate repeated investment decisions in two-valued options that differ in their riskiness, looking for the effects of recent decisions and their outcomes on upcoming decisions. We compare these effects to those evident in all-or-none choice between the same risky options. The “state of the world”, namely, the likelihood of the high versus the low outcomes of the options, is manipulated. We find that aggregate allocation diverges from uniformity (i.e., from 1/n), and is sensitive to outcome probabilities, with the pattern of results indicating reactivity to the outcome of the previous decision. Round-to-round dynamics reveal that the outcome of the previous decision has an effect on the subsequent decision, on top of inertia; the aspects of the outcome that influence the next decision indicate an effect of a missed opportunity, if there was one, in the previous decision. Importantly, recent outcomes have a similar effect in diversification decisions and in all-or-none choice.

Excess choice has previously been shown to have detrimental effects on decisions about consumer products. As the number of options increases, people are more likely to put off making an active choice (i.e., defer) and show less satisfaction with any purchase actually made. We extend this line of enquiry to choosing a charitable organisation to volunteer for. The issue is important because the number of voluntary organisations is enormous and the impact of such a decision may be greater than for consumer decisions in terms of time commitment and benefits to the volunteer and society. Study 1 asked students to examine a real volunteering website and record how many organisations they considered, decision difficulty and whether or not they would like to sign up for a chosen organisation or prefer to defer a decision. Study 2 presented either a relatively small (10) or large (30) choice set of hypothetical organisations and measured deferment likelihood and decision difficulty. In both studies the more options considered, the greater the likelihood to defer. This effect was mediated by decision difficulty. This research is the first to find that detrimental effects of excess choice extend to volunteering. Implications for volunteer recruitment are discussed.

This paper examines conditions that do or do not lead to accurate judgments of frequency (JOF) and judgments of duration (JOD). In three experiments, duration and frequency of visually presented stimuli are varied orthogonally in a within-subjects design. Experiment 1 reveals an asymmetric judgment pattern. JOFs reflected actual presentation frequency quite accurately and were unbiased by exposure duration. Conversely, JODs were almost insensitive to actual exposure duration and were systematically biased by presentation frequency. We show, however, that a tendency towards a symmetric judgment pattern can be obtained by manipulating encoding conditions. Sustaining attention during encoding (Experiment 2) or enhancing richness of the encoded stimuli (Experiment 3) increases judgment sensitivity in JOD and yields biases in both directions (JOF biased by exposure duration, JOD biased by presentation frequency). The implications of these findings for underlying memory mechanisms are discussed.

Everyone faces uncertainty on a daily basis. Two kinds of probability expressions, verbal and numerical, have been used to characterize the uncertainty that we face. Because our cognitive concept of living things differs from that of non-living things, and distinguishing cognitive concepts might have linguistic markers, we designed four studies to test whether people use different probability expressions when faced with animate or inanimate uncertainty. We found that verbal probability is the preferred way to express animate uncertainty, whereas numerical probability is the preferred way to express inanimate uncertainty. The “verbal-animate” and “numerical-inanimate” associations were robust enough to persist when tested with forced-choice response patterns regardless of the information (e.g., equally likely outcomes, frequencies, or personal beliefs) used to construct probabilities of events. When the response pattern was changed to free-responses, the associations were evident unless the subjects were asked to write their own probability predictions for vague uncertainty. Given that the world around us consists of both animate (i.e., living) and inanimate (i.e., non-living) things, “verbal-animate” and “numerical-inanimate” associations may play a major role in risk communication and may otherwise be useful for practitioners and consultants.

The present study was conducted to validate the Chinese version of the Adult Decision-Making Competence scale. 364 college students were recruited from four universities in China. The results indicate the Chinese Adult Decision-Making Competence subscales have good internal consistency and the two-factor structure in the study of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) was confirmed. Gender differences were found in Resistance to Sunk Cost. Differences of Applying Decision Rules and Consistency in Risk Perception were found between participants with different education background. Overall, the Chinese Adult Decision-Making Competence scale is validated in China.

We propose a constructed-choice model for general decision making. The model departs from utility theory and prospect theory in its treatment of multiple goals and it suggests several different ways in which context can affect choice.

It is particularly instructive to apply this model to protective decisions, which are often puzzling. Among other anomalies, people insure against non-catastrophic events, underinsure against catastrophic risks, and allow extraneous factors to influence insurance purchases and other protective decisions. Neither expected-utility theory nor prospect theory can explain these anomalies satisfactorily. To apply this model to the above anomalies, we consider many different insurance-related goals, organized in a taxonomy, and we consider the effects of context on goals, resources, plans and decision rules.

The paper concludes by suggesting some prescriptions for improving individual decision making with respect to protective measures.

Oppenheimer and Monin (2009) recently found that subjectively rare events are taken to indicate a longer preceding sequence of unobserved trials than subjectively common events, an effect which they refer to as the retrospective gambler’s fallacy. The current paper extends this idea to the situation where participants judge the likelihood of streak continuation. Participants were told about a streak produced by a random process (coin flips) or human performance (basketball shots), and either predicted the next outcome or inferred the immediately preceding outcome. For the coin scenarios, participants tended to expect streak termination – the gambler’s fallacy — and this effect was the same for predictions and retrospective inferences. In the basketball scenarios, no overall bias was found in either prospective or retrospective judgments. The results support Oppenheimer and Monin’s suggestion that reconstruction of the past entails the same heuristics as prediction of the future; they also support the idea that the nature of the data-generating process is a key determinant of whether people fall into the gambler’s fallacy. It is suggested that the term retrospective gambler’s fallacy be used to describe situations where a streak is taken to indicate that the preceding unobserved outcome was of the opposite type, and that the phenomenon discovered by Oppenheimer and Monin be referred to as retrospective representativeness, or a retrospective belief in the law of small numbers.

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death.

People who possess greater mathematical skills (i.e., numeracy) are generally more accurate in interpreting numerical data than less numerate people. However, recent evidence has suggested that more numerate people may use their numerical skills to interpret data only if their initial interpretation conflicts with their worldview. That is, if an initial, intuitive (but incorrect) interpretation of data appears to disconfirm one’s beliefs, then numerical skills are used to further process the data and reach the correct interpretation, whereas numerical skills are not used in situations where an initial incorrect interpretation of the data appears to confirm one’s beliefs (i.e., motivated numeracy). In the present study, participants were presented with several data problems, some with correct answers confirming their political views and other disconfirming their views. The difficulty of these problems was manipulated to examine how numeracy would influence the rate of correct responses on easier vs. more difficult problems. Results indicated that participants were more likely to answer problems correctly if the correct answer confirmed rather than disconfirmed their political views, and this response pattern did not depend on problem difficulty or numerical skill. Although more numerate participants were more accurate overall, this was true both for problems in which the correct answer confirmed and disconfirmed participants’ political views.

This paper describes a theory of the variability of risky choice that describes empirical properties of choice data, including sequential effects and systematic violations of response independence. The Markov True and Error (MARTER) model represents the formation and fluctuation of true preferences produced by stochastic variation of parameters over time, which produces changing true preference patterns. This model includes a probabilistic association between true preferences and overt responses due to random error. Computer programs have been developed to simulate data according to this model, to fit data to the TE model, and to test and analyze violations of iid (independent and identical distributions) that are predicted by the model. Data simulated from MARTER models show properties that are characteristic of real data, including violations of iid similar to those observed in previous empirical research. This paper also illustrates how methods based on analysis of binary response proportions do not and in many cases cannot correctly diagnose what model was used to generate the data. The MARTER model is extremely general and neutral with respect to models of risky decision making. For example, the transitive transfer of attention exchange (TAX) model and intransitive Lexicographic Semiorder (LS) models can both be represented as special cases of MARTER, and they can be tested against each other, even when binary choice proportions cannot discriminate which model was used to simulate the data. Software to simulate data according to this model, and to fit data to this model, to test this model, and to compare special case theories are included or linked to this article.

One major challenge to behavioral decision research is to identify the cognitive processes underlying judgment and decision making. Glöckner (2009) has argued that, compared to previous methods, process models can be more efficiently tested by simultaneously analyzing choices, decision times, and confidence judgments. The Multiple-Measure Maximum Likelihood (MM-ML) strategy classification method was developed for this purpose and implemented as a ready-to-use routine in STATA, a commercial package for statistical data analysis. In the present article, we describe the implementation of MM-ML in R, a free package for data analysis under the GNU general public license, and we provide a practical guide to application. We also provide MM-ML as an easy-to-use R function. Thus, prior knowledge of R programming is not necessary for those interested in using MM-ML.

Backward magical contagion describes instances in which individuals (sources) express discomfort or pleasure when something connected to them (medium; e.g., hair, a diary) falls into the possession of a negatively- or positively-perceived individual (recipient). The reaction seems illogical, since it is made clear that the source will never experience the object again, and the psychological effect appears to reverse the standard forward model of causality. Backward magical contagion was originally believed to be a belief held only within traditional cultures. Two studies examined negative backward contagion in adult Americans in online surveys. Study 1 indicated that backward contagion effects occur commonly, particularly when a recipient knows of the medium’s source. Study 2 showed that backward contagion effects tend to be neutralized when the recipient burns the object, as opposed to just possessing it or discarding it. Ironically, in traditional cultures, burning is a particularly potent cause of backward contagion.

The strategy method is a powerful method for eliciting conditional cooperation instrategic interactions. Theoretically, players’ cooperation conditionalon a specific level of others’ cooperation using the strategy methodshould be equal to their unconditional cooperation given an equivalent beliefabout others’ cooperation. However, using the Prisoner’s Dilemma,we show that decisions using the strategy method are more selfish than decisionsunder a simultaneous decision protocol predicted from players’ beliefs.This is driven entirely by lower cooperation among conditional cooperators withlow expectations about others’ cooperation. We further show that relativeto simultaneous choice, the strategy method shifts salient norms from anegalitarian fairness norm (‘give half’) to a reciprocity norm(‘match others’ behaviour’). This undermines cooperationamong players with low beliefs about others’ cooperation. These resultsthus show that the strategy method does not merely hold beliefs constant, butalso shifts which salient norms influence choice behaviour. This has importantimplications for the use of the strategy method in eliciting socialpreferences.

Decades of research show that (i) social value orientation (SVO)is related to important behavioral outcomes such as cooperation and charitablegiving, and (ii) individuals differ in terms of SVO. Aprominent scale to measure SVO is the social value orientation slider measure(SVOSM). The central premise is that SVOSM captures a stable trait. But it isunknown how reliable the SVOSM is over repeated measurements more than one weekapart. To fill this knowledge gap, we followed a sample of N =495 over 6 months with monthly SVO measurements. We find that continuous SVOscores are similarly distributed (Anderson-Darling k-sample p =0.57) and highly correlated (r ≥ 0.66) across waves. Theintra-class correlation coefficient of 0.78 attests to a high test-retestreliability. Using multilevel modeling and multiple visualizations, wefurthermore find that one’s prior SVO score is highly indicative of SVOin future waves, suggesting that the slider measure consistently capturesone’s SVO. Our analyses validate the slider measure as a reliable SVOscale.

This study employs a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) in the health-care sector to test the loss aversion theory that is derived from reference-dependent preferences: The absolute subjective value of a deviation from a reference point is generally greater when the deviation represents a loss than when the same-sized change is perceived as a gain. As far as is known, this paper is the first to use a DCE to test the loss aversion theory. A DCE is a highly suitable tool for such testing because it estimates the marginal valuations of attributes, based on deviations from a reference point (a constant scenario). Moreover, loss aversion can be examined for each attribute separately. Another advantage of a DCE is that is can be applied to non-traded goods with non-tangible attributes. A health-care event is used for empirical illustration: The loss aversion theory is tested within the context of preference structures for maternity-ward attributes, estimated using data gathered from 3850 observations made by a sample of 542 women who had recently given birth. Seven hypotheses are presented and tested. Overall, significant support for behavioral loss aversion theories was found.