We asked whether behavioral biases are related to cognitive abilities of Malaysian youth. Frederick’s three-item Cognitive Reflection Test was used to understand the role of behavioral biases concerning behavioral economics and finance. The sample (n = 880) comprised of university students from different parts of Malaysia. We found significant CRT differences as a function of gender, race and age groups. In addition, lower scores on the CRT are correlated positively with time preference and conservatism, but not with risk preference or the conjunction fallacy.

Subjects performed a decision task (Grether, 1980) in both a well-rested and experimentally sleep-deprived state. We found two main results: 1) final choice accuracy was unaffected by sleep deprivation, and yet 2) the estimated decision model differed significantly following sleep-deprivation. Following sleep deprivation, subjects placed significantly less weight on new information in forming their beliefs. Because the altered decision process still maintains decision accuracy, it may suggest that increased accident and error rates attributed to reduced sleep in modern society stem from reduced auxiliary function performance (e.g., slowed reaction time, reduced motor skills) or other components of decision making, rather than the inability to integrate multiple pieces of information.

Two experiments examined the impact on the decoy effect of making salient thepossibility of post-decision regret, a manipulation that has been shown inseveral earlier studies to stimulate critical examination and improvement ofdecision process. Experiment 1 (N = 62) showed that making regret salienteliminated the decoy effect in a personal preference task. Experiment 2 (N =242) replicated this finding for a different personal preference task and for aprediction task. It also replicated previous findings that externalaccountability demands do not reduce, and may exacerbate, the decoy effect. Weinterpret both effects in terms of decision justification, with differentjustification standards operating for different audiences. The decoy effect, inthis account, turns on accepting a weak justification, which may be seen asadequate for an external audience or one’s own inattentive self butinadequate under the more critical review triggered by making regretpossibilities salient. Seeking justification to others (responding toaccountability demands) thus maintains or exacerbates the decoy effect; seekingjustification to oneself (responding to regret salience) reduces or eliminatesit. The proposed mechanism provides a theoretical account both of the decoyeffect itself and of how regret priming provides an effective debiasingprocedure for it.

The attraction effect in multialternative decision making reflects the context-dependent violation of rational choice axioms. This study examined the effect of concurrent divided attention in three-alternative visual choice tasks. The concurrent divided attention task is considered to consume the mental resources available for the choice task. There were three conditions: (a) the task-relevant condition, in which the auditory task should consume resources across multiple levels; (b) the task-irrelevant condition, in which the auditory stimuli should consume perceptual resources; (c) and the control condition, in which the resources should not be consumed by auditory stimuli. Thirty-three participants solved 24 hypothetical purchase problems with three alternatives that differed in terms of two attributes. The results indicated that the choice proportion of the target was significantly higher in the task-relevant condition than in the task-irrelevant and control conditions, thereby suggesting that a reduction in cognitive (and/or response) resources is critical for the attraction effect.

People are often more likely to accept risky monetary gambles with positive expected values when the gambles will be played more than once. We investigated whether this distinction between single-play and multiple-play gambles extends to medical treatments for individual patients and groups of patients. Resident physicians and medical students (n = 69) and undergraduates (n = 99) ranked 9 different flu shots and a no-flu-shot option in 1 of 4 combinations of perspective (individual patient vs. group of 1000 patients) and uncertainty frame (probability vs. frequency). The rank of the no-flu-shot option (a measure of preference for treatment vs. no treatment) was not significantly related to perspective or participant population. The main effect of uncertainty frame and the interaction between perspective and uncertainty frame approached significance (0.1 > p > 0.05), with the no-flu-shot option faring particularly poorly (treatment faring particularly well) when decisions about many patients were based on frequency information. Undergraduate participants believed that the no-flu-shot option would be less attractive (treatment would be more attractive) in decisions about many patients, but these intuitions were inconsistent with the actual ranks. These results and those of other studies suggest that medical treatments for individuals and groups are not analogous to single-play and multiple-play monetary gambles, perhaps because many people are unwilling to aggregate treatment outcomes over patients in the same way that they would compute net gains or losses over monetary gambles.

Mathematical and computational decision models are powerful tools for studyingchoice behavior, and hundreds of distinct decision models have been proposedover the long interdisciplinary history of decision making research. Theexistence of so many models has led to theoretical fragmentation and redundancy,obscuring key insights into choice behavior, and preventing consensus about theessential properties of preferential choice. We provide a synthesis of formalmodels of risky, multiattribute, and intertemporal choice, three importantdomains in decision making. We identify recurring insights discovered byscholars of different generations and different disciplines across these threedomains, and use these insights to classify over 150 existing models asinvolving various combinations of eight key mathematical and computationalproperties. These properties capture the main avenues of theoretical developmentin decision making research and can be used to understand the similarities anddifferences between decision models, aiding both theoretical analyses andempirical tests.

Using a stochastic dominance approach in an international dataset of about 10,000 Catholic subjects, we show that incentives (based on absolute belief) play a crucial role in religious practice (church attendance and prayer). Furthermore, we find that when both positive (heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former have a much stronger effect than the latter. The results are confirmed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.

New technology can be used to enhance safety by imposing costs, or taxes, on certain reckless behaviors. The current paper presents two pre-registered experiments that clarify the impact of taxation of this type on decisions from experience between three alternatives. Experiment 1 focuses on an environment in which safe choices maximize expected returns and examines the impact of taxing the more attractive of two risky options. The results reveal a U-shaped effect of taxation: some taxation improves safety, but too much taxation impairs safety. Experiment 2 shows a clear negative effect of high taxation even when the taxation eliminates the expected benefit from risk-taking. Comparison of alternative models suggests that taxing reckless behaviors backfires when it significantly increases the proportion of experiences in which a more dangerous behavior leads to better outcomes than the taxed behavior. Qualitative hypotheses derived from naïve sampling models assuming small samples were only partially supported by the data.

Measuring risk preferences using monetary incentives is costly. In the field, it might be also unfair and unsafe. The commonly used measure of Holt and Laury (2002) relies on a dozen lottery choices and payments, which make it time consuming and expensive. It also raises moral concerns as a result of the unequal payments generated by good and bad luck. Paying some but not all subjects may also create tensions between the researcher and subjects. In a pre-registered study in Honduras, Nigeria and Spain, we use a short version of Holt and Laury where we address all three concerns. We find in the field that not paying at all or paying with and without probabilistic rules makes no difference. Our hypothetical and short version makes our measurement of risk cheaper, fairer and safer.

People experience fair and unfair treatment daily, and at times may react by breaking ethical rules and lying. Here, we assess the extent to which individuals engage in dishonest behavior aimed at helping or harming others after they experience (un)fair treatment. Across three financially incentivized experiments, recipients in a dictator game received a fair or unfair amount and then could, by means of dishonesty, inflate or deflate their counterparts’ pay. Results show that dishonest helping is a common and robust behavior. Individuals lie to help others after fair, unfair, and no prior treatment. Dishonest harming, however, is less prevalent. Only after unfair treatment, some, but not all, individuals engage in dishonest harming. Dishonest harming was associated with high levels of anger and disappointment, and low levels of gratitude. Interestingly, the source of (un)fairness, whether it is intentional or not, did not attenuate peoples’ behavior, suggesting that dishonest reactions to (un)fairness were driven by the mere (un)fair treatment, and not by a motivation to reciprocate an (un)fair counterpart.

How do people make decisions between an immediate but small reward and a delayed but large one? The outcome of such decisions indicates that people discount rewards by their delay and hence these outcomes are well described by discounting functions. However, to understand irregular decisions and dysfunctional behavior one needs models which describe how the process of making the decision unfolds dynamically over time: how do we reach a decision and how do sequential decisions influence one another? Here, we present an attractor model that integrates into and extends discounting functions through a description of the dynamics leading to a final choice outcome within a trial and across trials. To validate this model, we derive qualitative predictions for the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions and for the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions that are unique to this type of model. We test these predictions in four experiments based on a dynamic delay discounting computer game where we study the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions via mouse tracking and the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions via sequentially manipulated options. We discuss how integrating decision process dynamics within and across trials can increase our understanding of the processes underlying delay discounting decisions and, hence, complement our knowledge about decision outcomes.

Research on judgment and decision making has suggested that the System 2 process of slow thinking can help people to improve their decision making by reducing well-established statistical decision biases (including base rate neglect, probability matching, and the conjunction fallacy). In a large pre-registered study with 1,706 participants and 23,292 unique observations, we compare the effects of individual differences and behavioral interventions to test the relative benefits of slow thinking on performance in canonical judgment and decision-making problems, compared to a control condition, a fast thinking condition, an incentive condition, and a condition that combines fast and slow thinking. We also draw on the rule-based reasoning literature to examine the benefits of having access to a simple form of the rule needed to solve a specific focal problem. Overall, we find equivocal evidence of a small benefit from slow thinking, evidence for a small benefit to accuracy incentives, and clear evidence of a larger cost from fast thinking. The difference in performance between fast-thinking and slow-thinking interventions is comparable to a one-scale point difference on the 4-point Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Inferential rules contribute unique explanatory power and interact with individual differences to support the idea that System 2 benefits from a combination of slower processes and knowledge appropriate to the problem.

Choice Blindness is an experimental paradigm that examines the interplay between individuals’ preferences, decisions, and expectations by manipulating the relationship between intention and choice. This paper expands upon the existing Choice Blindness framework by investigating the presence of the effect in an economically significant decision context, specifically that of pension choice. In addition, it investigates a number of secondary factors hypothesized to modulate Choice Blindness, including reaction time, risk preference, and decision complexity, as well as analysing the verbal reports of non-detecting participants. The experiment was administered to 100 participants of mixed age and educational attainment. The principal finding was that no more than 37.2% of manipulated trials were detected over all conditions, a result consistent with previous Choice Blindness research. Analysis of secondary factors found that reaction time, financial sophistication and decision complexity were significant predictors of Choice Blindness detection, while content analysis of non-detecting participant responses found that 20% implied significant preference changes and 62% adhered to initial preferences. Implications of the Choice Blindness effect in the context of behavioural economics are discussed, and an agenda for further investigation of the paradigm in this context is outlined.

I describe and discuss the sometimes heated controversy surrounding the recognition heuristic (RH) as a model of inferential decision making. After briefly recapitulating the history of the RH up to its current version, I critically evaluate several specific assumptions and predictions of the RH and its surrounding framework: recognition as a memory-based process; the RH as a cognitive process model; proper conditions of testing the RH; measures of using the RH; reasons for not using the RH; the RH as a non-compensatory strategy; evidence for a Less-is-more effect (LIME); and the RH as part of the toolbox. The collection of these controversial issues may help to better understand the debate, to further sharpen the RH theory, and to develop ideas for future research.

One of the many established predictors of conspiracy beliefs is reflective thinking, but no meta-analysis so far has examined this relationship. In the current meta-analysis of published and unpublished correlational data (145 samples, 181 effect sizes), we found a significant negative association between reflective thinking and conspiracy beliefs with a medium-level effect size (r = –.189) . Similar levels of correlations were found across different types of measures (self-report vs. performance-based) and conspiracy beliefs (generic vs. specific). Further, no evidence suggested publication bias in this body of work. Suggestions for future research are discussed.

The time-saving bias describes people’s tendency to misestimate the timethey can save by increasing the speed in which they perform an activity such asdriving or completing a task. People typically underestimate time saved whenincreasing from a low speed and overestimate time saved when increasing from analready high speed. We suggest that this bias is the result of people’sfailure to recognize the curvilinear relationship between increasing speed andreducing activity time: As initial speed rises, the same speed increases willyield smaller reductions in time. We explore a new technique to de-bias thesefaulty estimations: converting measurements of speed to a pace measure (e.g.,minutes per fixed distance). Utilizing common driving scenarios, we show thatparticipants who received pace data made more accurate estimations of journeyduration at various speeds, time-savings at various speed increases and therequired speed to complete a journey.

A prosocial action typically provides a more sizable benefit when directed at those who have less as opposed to those who have more. However, not all prosocial acts have a direct bearing on socioeconomic disadvantage, nor does disadvantage necessarily imply a greater need for the prosocial outcome. Of interest here, welfare impact may depend on the number of beneficiaries but not on their socioeconomic status. Across four preregistered studies of life-saving decisions, we demonstrate that when allocating resources, many people are benevolently partial. That is, they choose to help the disadvantaged even when this transparently implies sacrificing lives. We suggest that people construct prosocial aid as an opportunity to correct morally aversive inequalities, thus making relatively more disadvantaged recipients a more justifiable target of help. Benevolent partiality is reduced when people reflect beforehand on what aspects they will prioritize in their donation decision.

Recent research suggesting that people who maximize are less happy than those who satisfice has received considerable fanfare. The current study investigates whether this conclusion reflects the construct itself or rather how it is measured. We developed an alternative measure of maximizing tendency that is theory-based, has good psychometric properties, and predicts behavioral outcomes. In contrast to the existing maximization measure, our new measure did not correlate with life (dis)satisfaction, nor with most maladaptive personality and decision-making traits. We conclude that the interpretation of maximizers as unhappy may be due to poor measurement of the construct. We present a more reliable and valid measure for future researchers to use.

This paper asks whether moral preferences in eight medical dilemmas change as a function of how preferences are expressed, and how people choose when they are faced with two equally attractive help projects. In two large-scale studies, participants first read dilemmas where they “matched” two suggested helping projects (which varied on a single attribute) so that they became equally attractive. They did this by filling in a missing number (e.g., how many male patients must Project M save in order to be equally attractive as Project F which can save 100 female patients). Later, the same participants were asked to choose between the two equally attractive projects. We found robust evidence that people do not choose randomly, but instead tend to choose projects that help female (vs. male), children (vs. adult), innocent (vs. non-innocent), ingroup (vs. outgroup) and existing (vs. future) patients, and imply no (vs. some) risk of a harmful side-effect, even when these projects have been matched as equally attractive as, and save fewer patients than the contrasting project. We also found that some moral preferences are hidden when expressed with matching but apparent when expressed with forced choice. For example, 88–95% of the participants expressed that female and male patients are equally valuable when doing the matching task, but over 80% of them helped female patients in the choice task.

Previous studies have shown that people are truth-biased in that they tend to believe the information they receive, even if it is clearly flagged as false. The truth bias has been recently proposed to be an instance of meta-cognitive myopia, that is, of a generalized human insensitivity towards the quality and correctness of the information available in the environment. In two studies we tested whether meta-cognitive myopia and the ensuing truth bias may operate in a courtroom setting. Based on a well-established paradigm in the truth-bias literature, we asked mock jurors (Study 1) and professional judges (Study 2) to read two crime reports containing aggravating or mitigating information that was explicitly flagged as false. Our findings suggest that jurors and judges are truth-biased, as their decisions and memory about the cases were affected by the false information. We discuss the implications of the potential operation of the truth bias in the courtroom, in the light of the literature on inadmissible and discredible evidence, and make some policy suggestions.