Astrotheology, the theological engagement with astrobiology and the possibility of extraterrestrial life, has primarily focused on the compatibility of scientific and religious beliefs. However, this article argues that probability and risk assessments play a larger role in the discussion than is commonly recognised, and there is need to learn from the rigour with which natural theological arguments have been evaluated. For instance, the relative urgency and style of astrotheological discourse is affected by ideas of what sort of life is likely to be out there, if any. In this article, I analyse astrotheological risk assessments from the framework of decision theory, using the discussion over Pascal’s Wager as a comparison case. Arguments over the fittingness of creating other life forms are analysed through a comparison with fine-tuning design arguments. I argue that while theological engagement with astrobiology remains important, the justification of probability and risk assessments depends on disputed philosophical and theological assumptions. Examining the compatibility of theological systems and ideas about extraterrestrial life is important. However, fostering doubt about these probabilities is also a service that theology can do for astrobiological debates.

In this paper, I argue for the Hidden Grounds thesis: in paradigmatic cases of religious hinge commitments, these commitments are rational in virtue of being implicitly based on epistemic grounds. The key intuition behind my argument draws on the work of John Henry Newman. As I understand him, Newman holds that both religious and non-religious hinges are rational because they are grounded in epistemic considerations that are largely implicit and not necessarily accessible to reflection. This, in turn, explains their epistemic stability. I begin by presenting the argument for the Hidden Grounds thesis. The subsequent sections support the premises of this argument. First, I introduce the concept of implicit basing and argue that some doxastic states are rational in virtue of being implicitly based on epistemic grounds. I then present Newman’s view on the implicit grounds of religious hinges and argue for its plausibility. I conclude by addressing several possible objections to my view.

J.L. Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness partly rests on the claim that non-resistant non-belief exists. In this paper, I take up the question of whether such non-belief is pervasive and argue that it is, in fact, relatively common. To support this claim, I present a novel argument grounded in a distinction between acquisition responsibility and maintenance responsibility. I argue that, for a non-believer to count as resistant in Schellenberg’s sense, they must be acquisition-responsible for their non-belief in God. I further contend that many non-believers lack such responsibility and therefore qualify as non-resistant. This argument has the added benefit of showing that many prominent objections to the existence of non-resistant non-belief are irrelevant or incomplete. Finally, I highlight the broader significance of this conclusion, both for Schellenberg’s argument and in light of recent shifts in the literature towards more evidential approaches.

Liturgies of Empire adopts a deliberately satirical, epistolary voice to examine the after-lives of Anglican imperialism as reconfigured in contemporary neocolonial activity. Some terms and turns of phrase assume an insider’s knowledge, and familiarity with socio-political definitions, the geographical regions and their specific religious registers and discourse would place the reader in a better position to appreciate the North/South epistemic critiques. Whilst the English narrator, recipient and institutional offices in the missive are entirely fictional, all events, statistics, and quotations are factual and have been verified against the sources cited. The memo casts an eye over three postcolonial Anglican dioceses as case studies to examine how the Anglican Realignment revives the spirit of empire through insistence on its monopoly of truth. It traces how conservative evangelical networks, under the banner of biblical warrant and “Global South” identity, reintensify imperial-era logics of propriety and paternalism. Attempting to supplant Canterbury’s more generous ecclesial disposition, these self-proclaimed guardians of truth are grounded in patriarchal authority, marked not by self-scrutiny but fixation on policing gender and sexuality. Theirs is an ecclesiology that cannot abide dissent, ambiguity, or difference, sanctifying conformity as faithfulness and exclusion as orthodoxy.

While much has been written about urban-educated women’s veiling in recent decades, the proliferation of veiling, or wearing a burqa, among ordinary rural women has received little attention. This paper is an attempt at such an inquiry in the context of Bangladesh. It juxtaposes historical, literary, and theological resources with recently collected ethnographic and interview data to show how the landscape of veiling has radically transformed in rural Bangladesh and suggests that ordinary rural women’s veiling cannot be interpreted as either their choice or an imposition on them. It illustrates how women choose to don a veil in compliance with the community’s expectations while simultaneously resisting its prescription of putting on a specific pattern of burqa. In other words, the paper shows how veiling has become a site for women’s complex negotiations with community norms, liberal women’s rights discourse, and legal regimes. This negotiation process, it argues, constructs women as distinct subjects who are neither liberal nor Islamic but are constantly in the process of self-constitution.