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Obligations to whom, obligations to what? A philosophical perspective on the objects of our obligations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Kati Kish Bar-On*
The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv Yafo, Israel, 6997801. katikish@gmail.com


Tomasello strives to understand the underlying psychology behind the human sense of obligation, but he only addresses a specific kind of obligation: to other human beings. We argue that in order to account for the psychological underpinning of human behavior, one should also consider people's sense of commitment to non-human entities, such as ideals, values, and moral principles.

Open Peer Commentary
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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