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The many faces of obligation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Michael Tomasello*
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103Leipzig, Germany Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC27708-0086michael.tomasello@duke.edu

Abstract

My response to the commentaries focuses on four issues: (1) the diversity both within and between cultures of the many different faces of obligation; (2) the possible evolutionary roots of the sense of obligation, including possible sources that I did not consider; (3) the possible ontogenetic roots of the sense of obligation, including especially children's understanding of groups from a third-party perspective (rather than through participation, as in my account); and (4) the relation between philosophical accounts of normative phenomena in general – which are pitched as not totally empirical – and empirical accounts such as my own. I have tried to distinguish comments that argue for extensions of the theory from those that represent genuine disagreement.

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Author's Response
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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