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Psychological consequences of the normativity of moral obligation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Stephen Darwall Open the ORCID record for Stephen Darwall [Opens in a new window]
Stephen Darwall*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT06520-8306. stephen.darwall@yale.eduhttps://campuspress.yale.edu/stephendarwall/
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Abstract

An adequate moral psychology of obligation must bear in mind that although the “sense of obligation” is psychological, what it is a sense of, moral obligation itself, is not. It is irreducibly normative. I argue, therefore, that the “we” whose demands the sense of obligation presupposes must be an ideal rather than an actual “we.”

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e68
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Darwall, S. (2006) The second-person standpoint: Morality, respect, and accountability. Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
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Darwall, S. (2013c) Morality, authority, and law: Essays in second-personal ethics I. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strawson, P. F. (1968) Freedom and resentment. In: Studies in the philosophy of thought and action. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar