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Conflicting obligations in human social life

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Jacob B. Hirsh
Affiliation:
Institute for Management & Innovation and Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, TorontoONM5S3E6, Canada. jacob.hirsh@utoronto.cahttp://www.jacobhirsh.com
Garriy Shteynberg
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Tennessee, KnoxvilleTN37917. gshteynb@utk.eduhttp://www.garriyshteynberg.com
Michele J. Gelfand
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD20742. mgelfand@umd.eduhttp://www.michelegelfand.com

Abstract

Tomasello describes how the sense of moral obligation emerges from a shared perspective with collaborative partners and in-group members. Our commentary expands this framework to accommodate multiple social identities, where the normative standards associated with diverse group memberships can often conflict with one another. Reconciling these conflicting obligations is argued to be a central part of human morality.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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