Hostname: page-component-6766d58669-nf276 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-15T07:49:32.464Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Feelings of obligation are valuations of signaling-mediated social payoffs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Amanda Rotella Open the ORCID record for Amanda Rotella [Opens in a new window] ,
Adam Maxwell Sparks  and
Pat Barclay Open the ORCID record for Pat Barclay [Opens in a new window]
Amanda Rotella
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, N1G 2W1, Canada. arotella@uoguelph.cabarclayp@uoguelph.cahttp://amandarotella.ca/research/http://www.patbarclay.com/
Adam Maxwell Sparks
Affiliation:
Department of Anthropology and Center for Behavior, Evolution and Culture, University of California, Los Angeles, CA90095-1553. adspar@fastmail.comhttp://adammaxwellsparks.com/
Pat Barclay
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, N1G 2W1, Canada. arotella@uoguelph.cabarclayp@uoguelph.cahttp://amandarotella.ca/research/http://www.patbarclay.com/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We extend Tomasello's framework by addressing the functional challenge of obligation. If the long-run social consequences of a decision are sufficiently costly, obligation motivates the actor to forgo potential immediate benefits in favor of long-term social interests. Thus, obligation psychology balances the downstream socially-mediated payoffs from a decision. This perspective can predict when and why obligation will be experienced.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e85
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Aktipis, A., Cronk, L., Alcock, J., Ayers, J. D., Baciu, C., Balliet, D., Boody, A. M., Curry, O. S., Krems, J. A., Muñoz, A., Sullivan, D., Sznycer, D., Wilkinson, G. S. & Winfrey, P. (2018) Understanding cooperation through fitness interdependence. Nature Human Behaviour 2(7):429.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Balliet, D., Tybur, J. M. & Van Lange, P. A. (2017) Functional interdependence theory: An evolutionary account of social situations. Personality and Social Psychology Review 21(4):361–88.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Barclay, P. (2013) Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans. Evolution & Human Behavior 34(3):164–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barclay, P. (2016) Biological markets and the effects of partner choice on cooperation and friendship. Current Opinion in Psychology 7:33–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barclay, P. & Van Vugt, M. (2015) The evolutionary psychology of human prosociality: adaptations, mistakes, and byproducts. In: Oxford handbook of prosocial behavior, ed. Schroeder, D. & Graziano, W., pp. 37–60. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Barclay, P. & Willer, R. (2007) Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 274(1610):749–53.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Feinberg, M., Willer, R. & Schultz, M. (2014) Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups. Psychological Science 25(3):656–64.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ketelaar, T. & Au, W. T. (2003) The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. Cognition and Emotion 17(3):429–53.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rotella, A., Jung, J., Chinn, C. & Barclay, P. (in preparation) Observation and moral ambiguity matter: A meta-analysis on moral licensing.Google Scholar
Schniter, E., Sheremeta, R. M. & Sznycer, D. (2012) Building and rebuilding trust with promises and apologies. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 94:242–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sylwester, K. & Roberts, G. (2010) Cooperators benefit through reputation-based partner choice in economic games. Biology Letters 6(5):659–62.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sylwester, K. & Roberts, G. (2013) Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas. Evolution and Human Behavior 34(3):201–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sznycer, D., Tooby, J., Cosmides, L., Porat, R., Shalvi, S. & Halperin, E. (2016) Shame closely tracks the threat of devaluation by others, even across cultures. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113(10):2625–30.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Sznycer, D., Xygalatas, D., Agey, E., Alami, S., An, X. F., Ananyeva, K. I., Atkinson, Q. D., Broitmam, B. R., Cotne, T.J., Flores, C., Fuskushima, S., Hitokoto, H., Kharitonov, A. N., Onyishi, C. N., Onyishi, I.E., Romero, P. P., Schrock, J. S., Snodgrass, J., Sugiyaman, L. S., Takemura, K., Townsend, C., Zhuang, J., Aktipis, C. A., Cronk, L., Cosmides, L. & Tooby, J. (2018) Cross-cultural invariances in the architecture of shame. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115(39):9702–707.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wu, J., Balliet, D. & Van Lange, P. A. (2016) Gossip versus punishment: The efficiency of reputation to promote and maintain cooperation. Scientific Reports 6:23919.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed