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The rationale of rationalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Walter Veit
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH, United Kingdom. wrwveit@gmail.comMax.Jones@bristol.ac.ukshaun.stanley@bristol.ac.uk8https://walterveit.com/http://www.maxjonesphilosophy.com/
Joe Dewhurst
Affiliation:
MCMP, LMU Munich, 80539Munich, Germany. joseph.e.dewhurst@gmail.comhttps://joedewhurst.weebly.com/
Krzysztof Dołęga
Affiliation:
Institut für Philosophie 2, Ruhr-University Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44801Bochum. krzysztof.dolega@rub.dehttps://www.krysdolega.xyz/
Max Jones
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH, United Kingdom. wrwveit@gmail.comMax.Jones@bristol.ac.ukshaun.stanley@bristol.ac.uk8https://walterveit.com/http://www.maxjonesphilosophy.com/
Shaun Stanley
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TH, United Kingdom. wrwveit@gmail.comMax.Jones@bristol.ac.ukshaun.stanley@bristol.ac.uk8https://walterveit.com/http://www.maxjonesphilosophy.com/
Keith Frankish
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Western Bank, SheffieldS10 2TN, United Kingdom. k.frankish@sheffield.ac.ukhttps://www.keithfrankish.com/
Daniel C. Dennett
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA02155. Daniel.Dennett@tufts.eduhttps://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/

Abstract

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: (1) the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and (2) the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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