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Rationalizations primarily serve reputation management, not decision making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Sacha Altay Open the ORCID record for Sacha Altay [Opens in a new window]  and
Hugo Mercier
Sacha Altay
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS, 75005Paris, France. sacha.altay@gmail.comhugo.mercier@gmail.comhttps://sites.google.com/view/sacha-altay/homehttps://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/
Hugo Mercier
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, EHESS, PSL University, CNRS, 75005Paris, France. sacha.altay@gmail.comhugo.mercier@gmail.comhttps://sites.google.com/view/sacha-altay/homehttps://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/
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Abstract

We agree with Cushman that rationalizations are the product of biological adaptations, but we disagree about their function. The data available do not show that rationalizations allow us to reason better and make better decisions. The data suggest instead that rationalizations serve reputation management goals, and that they affect our behaviors because we are held accountable by our peers.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e29
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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