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Rationalization in the pejorative sense: Cushman's account overlooks the scope and costs of rationalization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Jonathan Ellis Open the ORCID record for Jonathan Ellis [Opens in a new window]  and
Eric Schwitzgebel
Jonathan Ellis
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA95064jellis@ucsc.edujonathanellis.ucsc.edu/
Eric Schwitzgebel
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of California at Riverside, Riverside, CA92521-0201. eschwitz@ucr.edufaculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz
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Abstract

According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. We argue that this isn't the paradigmatic form of rationalization. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e35
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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