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Rationalization enables cooperation and cultural evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Neil Levy Open the ORCID record for Neil Levy [Opens in a new window]
Neil Levy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, 2109Australia; Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, OxfordOX1 1PT, United Kingdom. neil.levy@mq.edu.auhttps://mq.academia.edu/NLevy
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Abstract

Cushman argues that the function of rationalization is to attribute mental representations to ourselves, thereby making these representations available for future planning. I argue that such attribution is often not necessary and sometimes maladaptive. I suggest a different explanation of rationalization: making representations available to other agents, to facilitate cooperation, transmission, and the ratchet effect that underlies cumulative cultural evolution.

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Open Peer Commentary
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e40
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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