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Hard domains, biased rationalizations, and unanswered empirical questions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 April 2020

Stephen E. Weinberg  and
Jonathan M. Weinberg Open the ORCID record for Jonathan M. Weinberg [Opens in a new window]
Stephen E. Weinberg
Affiliation:
Department of Public Administration, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York, Albany, NY12222. sweinberg@albany.eduhttps://www.albany.edu/rockefeller/faculty/stephen-weinberg
Jonathan M. Weinberg
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ85721-0027. jmweinberg@email.arizona.edu
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Abstract

Cushman raises the intriguing possibility that rationalization accesses/constructs intuitions that are not otherwise cognitively available. However, he substantially over-reaches in arguing that rationalization is mostly right on average, based on claims that the process must have emerged adaptively. The adaptiveness of “bounded rationalization” is domain specific and is unlikely to be adaptive in a large number of important applications.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e54
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

1

Authors are listed in the order of “Mom always liked you best.”

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