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A continuity of Markov blanket interpretations under the free-energy principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Anil Seth
Affiliation:
Department of Informatics, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, UK a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk tomasz.korbak@gmail.com tschantz.alec@gmail.com
Tomasz Korbak
Affiliation:
Department of Informatics, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, UK a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk tomasz.korbak@gmail.com tschantz.alec@gmail.com
Alexander Tschantz
Affiliation:
Department of Informatics, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, UK a.k.seth@sussex.ac.uk tomasz.korbak@gmail.com tschantz.alec@gmail.com

Abstract

Bruineberg and colleagues helpfully distinguish between instrumental and ontological interpretations of Markov blankets, exposing the dangers of using the former to make claims about the latter. However, proposing a sharp distinction neglects the value of recognising a continuum spanning from instrumental to ontological. This value extends to the related distinction between “being” and “having” a model.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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