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Markov blankets do not demarcate the boundaries of the mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Richard Menary Open the ORCID record for Richard Menary [Opens in a new window]  and
Alexander J. Gillett
Richard Menary
Affiliation:
Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia richard.menary@mq.edu.au alexander.gillett@mq.edu.au
Alexander J. Gillett
Affiliation:
Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia richard.menary@mq.edu.au alexander.gillett@mq.edu.au
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Abstract

We agree with Bruineberg and colleagues' main claims. However, we urge for a more forceful critique by focusing on the extended mind debate. We argue that even once the Pearl and Friston versions of the Markov blanket have been untangled, that neither is sufficient for tackling and resolving the question of demarcating the boundaries of the mind.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e201
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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