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Does the metaphysical dog wag its formal tail? The free-energy principle and philosophical debates about life, mind, and matter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Wanja Wiese Open the ORCID record for Wanja Wiese [Opens in a new window]
Wanja Wiese*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, D-44780 Bochum, Germany wanja.wiese@rub.de https://homepage.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/wanja.wiese/
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Abstract

According to Bruineberg and colleagues, philosophical arguments on life, mind, and matter that are based on the free-energy principle (FEP) (1) essentially draw on the Markov blanket construct and (2) tend to assume that strong metaphysical claims can be justified on the basis of metaphysically innocuous formal assumptions provided by FEP. I argue against both (1) and (2).

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e216
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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