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There is no “inference within a model”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 September 2022

Marco Facchin Open the ORCID record for Marco Facchin [Opens in a new window]
Marco Facchin*
Affiliation:
Department of Human and Life Sciences, L&PIC (Linguistic and Philosophy IUSS Center), University School for Advanced Studies (IUSS) Pavia, Pavia 27100, Lombardy, Italy marco.facchin@iusspavia.it marco.facchin.marco.facchin@gmail.com
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Abstract

I argue that there is no viable development of the instrumentalist inference within a model research program. I further argue that both Friston and Pearl blankets are not the right sort of tool to settle debates on philosophical internalism and externalism. For these reasons, the inference within a model program is far less promising than the target article suggests.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e193
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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