In the literature, predicativism is connected not only with the Vicious Circle Principle but also with the idea that certain totalities are inherently potential. To explain the connection between these two aspects of predicativism, we explore some approaches to predicativity within the modal framework for potentiality developed in Linnebo (2013) and Linnebo and Shapiro (2019). This puts predicativism into a more general framework and helps to sharpen some of its key theses.

In this paper we extend to non-classical set theories the standard strategy of proving independence using Boolean-valued models. This extension is provided by means of a new technique that, combining algebras (by taking their product), is able to provide product-algebra-valued models of set theories. In this paper we also provide applications of this new technique by showing that: (1) we can import the classical independence results to non-classical set theory (as an example we prove the independence of $\mathsf {CH}$); and (2) we can provide new independence results. We end by discussing the role of non-classical algebra-valued models for the debate between universists and multiversists and by arguing that non-classical models should be included as legitimate members of the multiverse.

This paper collects and presents unpublished notes of Kurt Gödel concerning the field of many-valued logic. In order to get a picture as complete as possible, both formal and philosophical notes, transcribed from the Gabelsberger shorthand system, are included.

Zermelo’s Theorem that the axiom of choice is equivalent to the principle that every set can be well-ordered goes through in third-order logic, but in second-order logic we run into expressivity issues. In this note, we show that in a natural extension of second-order logic weaker than third-order logic, choice still implies the well-ordering principle. Moreover, this extended second-order logic with choice is conservative over ordinary second-order logic with the well-ordering principle. We also discuss a variant choice principle, due to Hilbert and Ackermann, which neither implies nor is implied by the well-ordering principle.

There exist two notions of equivalence of behavior between states of a Labelled Markov Process (LMP): state bisimilarity and event bisimilarity. The first one can be considered as an appropriate generalization to continuous spaces of Larsen and Skou’s probabilistic bisimilarity, whereas the second one is characterized by a natural logic. C. Zhou expressed state bisimilarity as the greatest fixed point of an operator $\mathcal {O}$, and thus introduced an ordinal measure of the discrepancy between it and event bisimilarity. We call this ordinal the Zhou ordinal of $\mathbb {S}$, $\mathfrak {Z}(\mathbb {S})$. When $\mathfrak {Z}(\mathbb {S})=0$, $\mathbb {S}$ satisfies the Hennessy–Milner property. The second author proved the existence of an LMP $\mathbb {S}$ with $\mathfrak {Z}(\mathbb {S}) \geq 1$ and Zhou showed that there are LMPs having an infinite Zhou ordinal. In this paper we show that there are LMPs $\mathbb {S}$ over separable metrizable spaces having arbitrary large countable $\mathfrak {Z}(\mathbb {S})$ and that it is consistent with the axioms of $\mathit {ZFC}$ that there is such a process with an uncountable Zhou ordinal.

In “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”, Reinhardt [21] famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {KF}$ ) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view $\mathrm {KF}$ as a tool for generating “the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ ”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the form $\mathrm{Tr}\ulcorner {\varphi }\urcorner $ . The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible “to justify the use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences”. This question was answered negatively by Halbach & Horsten [10] but we argue that under a more careful interpretation the question may receive a positive answer. To this end, we propose to shift attention from $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true sentences to $\mathrm {KF}$ -provably true inferences, that is, we shall identify the significant part of $\mathrm {KF}$ with the set of pairs $\langle {\Gamma , \Delta }\rangle $ , such that $\mathrm {KF}$ proves that if all members of $\Gamma $ are true, at least one member of $\Delta $ is true. In way of addressing Reinhardt’s question we show that the provably true inferences of suitable $\mathrm {KF}$ -like theories coincide with the provable sequents of matching versions of the theory Partial Kripke–Feferman ( $\mathrm {PKF}$ ).

We investigate an approach for drawing logical inference from inconsistent premisses. The main idea in this approach is that the inconsistencies in the premisses should be interpreted as uncertainty of the information. We propose a mechanism, based on Kinght’s [14] study of inconsistency, for revising an inconsistent set of premisses to a minimally uncertain, probabilistically consistent one. We will then generalise the probabilistic entailment relation introduced in [15] for propositional languages to the first order case to draw logical inference from a probabilistic set of premisses. We will show how this combination can allow us to limit the effect of uncertainty introduced by inconsistent premisses to only the reasoning on the part of the premise set that is relevant to the inconsistency.

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and Greg Restall’s bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates.

In this paper I argue for an association between impurity and explanatory power in contemporary mathematics. This proposal is defended against the ancient and influential idea that purity and explanation go hand-in-hand (Aristotle, Bolzano) and recent suggestions that purity/impurity ascriptions and explanatory power are more or less distinct (Section 1). This is done by analyzing a central and deep result of additive number theory, Szemerédi’s theorem, and various of its proofs (Section 2). In particular, I focus upon the radically impure (ergodic) proof due to Furstenberg (Section 3). Furstenberg’s ergodic proof is striking because it utilizes intuitively foreign and infinitary resources to prove a finitary combinatorial result and does so in a perspicuous fashion. I claim that Furstenberg’s proof is explanatory in light of its clear expression of a crucial structural result, which provides the “reason why” Szemerédi’s theorem is true. This is, however, rather surprising: how can such intuitively different conceptual resources “get a grip on” the theorem to be proved? I account for this phenomenon by articulating a new construal of the content of a mathematical statement, which I call structural content (Section 4). I argue that the availability of structural content saves intuitive epistemic distinctions made in mathematical practice and simultaneously explicates the intervention of surprising and explanatorily rich conceptual resources. Structural content also disarms general arguments for thinking that impurity and explanatory power might come apart. Finally, I sketch a proposal that, once structural content is in hand, impure resources lead to explanatory proofs via suitably understood varieties of simplification and unification (Section 5).

Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) is commonly thought to have attempted to develop a theory of size for infinite collections that follows the so-called part–whole principle, according to which the whole is always greater than any of its proper parts. In this paper, we develop a novel interpretation of Bolzano’s mature theory of the infinite and show that, contrary to mainstream interpretations, it is best understood as a theory of infinite sums. Our formal results show that Bolzano’s infinite sums can be equipped with the rich and original structure of a non-commutative ordered ring, and that Bolzano’s views on the mathematical infinite are, after all, consistent.

In Baghdad in the mid twelfth century Abū al-Barakāt proposes a radical new procedure for finding the conclusions of premise-pairs in syllogistic logic, and for identifying those premise-pairs that have no conclusions. The procedure makes no use of features of the standard Aristotelian apparatus, such as conversions or syllogistic figures. In place of these al-Barakāt writes out pages of diagrams consisting of labelled horizontal lines. He gives no instructions and no proof that the procedure will yield correct results. So the reader has to work out what his procedure is and whether it is correct. The procedure turns out to be insightful and entirely correct, but this paper may be the first study to give a full description of the procedure and a rigorous proof of its correctness.

This paper is dedicated to extending and adapting to modal logic the approach of fractional semantics to classical logic. This is a multi-valued semantics governed by pure proof-theoretic considerations, whose truth-values are the rational numbers in the closed interval $[0,1]$. Focusing on the modal logic K, the proposed methodology relies on three key components: bilateral sequent calculus, invertibility of the logical rules, and stability (proof-invariance). We show that our semantic analysis of K affords an informational refinement with respect to the standard Kripkean semantics (a new proof of Dugundji’s theorem is a case in point) and it raises the prospect of a proof-theoretic semantics for modal logic.

In this paper we examine various requirements on the formalisation choices under which self-reference can be adequately formalised in arithmetic. In particular, we study self-referential numberings, which immediately provide a strong notion of self-reference even for expressively weak languages. The results of this paper suggest that the question whether truly self-referential reasoning can be formalised in arithmetic is more sensitive to the underlying coding apparatus than usually believed. As a case study, we show how this sensitivity affects the formal study of certain principles of self-referential truth.

According to conciliatory views on the significance of disagreement, it’s rational for you to become less confident in your take on an issue in case your epistemic peer’s take on it is different. These views are intuitively appealing, but they also face a powerful objection: in scenarios that involve disagreements over their own correctness, conciliatory views appear to self-defeat and, thereby, issue inconsistent recommendations. This paper provides a response to this objection. Drawing on the work from defeasible logics paradigm and abstract argumentation, it develops a formal model of conciliatory reasoning and explores its behavior in the troubling scenarios. The model suggests that the recommendations that conciliatory views issue in such scenarios are perfectly reasonable—even if outwardly they may look odd.

This paper generalises an argument for probabilism due to Lindley [9]. I extend the argument to a number of non-classical logical settings whose truth-values, seen here as ideal aims for belief, are in the set $\{0,1\}$, and where logical consequence $\models $ is given the “no-drop” characterization. First I will show that, in each of these settings, an agent’s credence can only avoid accuracy-domination if its canonical transform is a (possibly non-classical) probability function. In other words, if an agent values accuracy as the fundamental epistemic virtue, it is a necessary requirement for rationality that her credence have some probabilistic structure. Then I show that for a certain class of reasonable measures of inaccuracy, having such a probabilistic structure is sufficient to avoid accuracy-domination in these non-classical settings.

We study the lattice of extensions of four-valued Belnap–Dunn logic, called super-Belnap logics by analogy with superintuitionistic logics. We describe the global structure of this lattice by splitting it into several subintervals, and prove some new completeness theorems for super-Belnap logics. The crucial technical tool for this purpose will be the so-called antiaxiomatic (or explosive) part operator. The antiaxiomatic (or explosive) extensions of Belnap–Dunn logic turn out to be of particular interest owing to their connection to graph theory: the lattice of finitary antiaxiomatic extensions of Belnap–Dunn logic is isomorphic to the lattice of upsets in the homomorphism order on finite graphs (with loops allowed). In particular, there is a continuum of finitary super-Belnap logics. Moreover, a non-finitary super-Belnap logic can be constructed with the help of this isomorphism. As algebraic corollaries we obtain the existence of a continuum of antivarieties of De Morgan algebras and the existence of a prevariety of De Morgan algebras which is not a quasivariety.

Questions concerning the proof-theoretic strength of classical versus nonclassical theories of truth have received some attention recently. A particularly convenient case study concerns classical and nonclassical axiomatizations of fixed-point semantics. It is known that nonclassical axiomatizations in four- or three-valued logics are substantially weaker than their classical counterparts. In this paper we consider the addition of a suitable conditional to First-Degree Entailment—a logic recently studied by Hannes Leitgeb under the label HYPE. We show in particular that, by formulating the theory PKF over HYPE, one obtains a theory that is sound with respect to fixed-point models, while being proof-theoretically on a par with its classical counterpart KF. Moreover, we establish that also its schematic extension—in the sense of Feferman—is as strong as the schematic extension of KF, thus matching the strength of predicative analysis.

Jean Nicod (1893–1924) is a French philosopher and logician who worked with Russell during the First World War. His PhD, with a preface from Russell, was published under the title La géométrie dans le monde sensible in 1924, the year of his untimely death. The book did not have the impact he deserved. In this paper, I discuss the methodological aspect of Nicod’s approach. My aim is twofold. I would first like to show that Nicod’s definition of various notions of equivalence between theories anticipates, in many respects, the (syntactic and semantic) model-theoretic notion of interpretation of a theory into another. I would secondly like to present the philosophical agenda that led Nicod to elaborate his logical framework: the defense of rationalism against Bergson’s attacks.

We address Steel’s Programme to identify a ‘preferred’ universe of set theory and the best axioms extending $\mathsf {ZFC}$ by using his multiverse axioms $\mathsf {MV}$ and the ‘core hypothesis’. In the first part, we examine the evidential framework for $\mathsf {MV}$, in particular the use of large cardinals and of ‘worlds’ obtained through forcing to ‘represent’ alternative extensions of $\mathsf {ZFC}$. In the second part, we address the existence and the possible features of the core of $\mathsf {MV}_T$ (where T is $\mathsf {ZFC}$+Large Cardinals). In the last part, we discuss the hypothesis that the core is Ultimate-L, and examine whether and how, based on this fact, the Core Universist can justify V=Ultimate-L as the best (and ultimate) extension of $\mathsf {ZFC}$. To this end, we take into account several strategies, and assess their prospects in the light of $\mathsf {MV}$’s evidential framework.

We show that monadic intuitionistic quantifiers admit the following temporal interpretation: “always in the future” (for $\forall $ ) and “sometime in the past” (for $\exists $ ). It is well known that Prior’s intuitionistic modal logic ${\sf MIPC}$ axiomatizes the monadic fragment of the intuitionistic predicate logic, and that ${\sf MIPC}$ is translated fully and faithfully into the monadic fragment ${\sf MS4}$ of the predicate ${\sf S4}$ via the Gödel translation. To realize the temporal interpretation mentioned above, we introduce a new tense extension ${\sf TS4}$ of ${\sf S4}$ and provide a full and faithful translation of ${\sf MIPC}$ into ${\sf TS4}$ . We compare this new translation of ${\sf MIPC}$ with the Gödel translation by showing that both ${\sf TS4}$ and ${\sf MS4}$ can be translated fully and faithfully into a tense extension of ${\sf MS4}$ , which we denote by ${\sf MS4.t}$ . This is done by utilizing the relational semantics for these logics. As a result, we arrive at the diagram of full and faithful translations shown in Figure 1 which is commutative up to logical equivalence. We prove the finite model property (fmp) for ${\sf MS4.t}$ using algebraic semantics, and show that the fmp for the other logics involved can be derived as a consequence of the fullness and faithfulness of the translations considered.