What repressive strategies do dictators use to maintain regime stability as anti-government movements rise under conditions of economic growth? We investigate the changing function of authoritarian repression and the ways in which dictators accommodated rising opposition during Taiwan’s period of authoritarian rule. Using time-series data spanning 39 years (1949–1988), this article analyses the relationship between economic development, opposition movements, and shifts in repression strategies under the Kuomintang (KMT) rule. Drawing on historical documents and statistical analysis, we argue that economic development influences patterns of repression. With economic growth, autocrats tend to adopt selective repression rather than indiscriminate violence (e.g., mass killings), as the latter risks inciting greater social unrest and endangering regime stability. Using an additive dynamic linear model (ADLM), our findings suggest that economic development, when coupled with rising social movements, compels dictators to rely on less severe yet more targeted forms of coercion. While this adaptation may temporarily bolster regime control amid economic growth and social unrest, it may ultimately undermine the foundation of long-term authoritarian resilience. This work bridges the gap between repression literature and modernisation theory by demonstrating that authoritarian decision-making in repressive policies plays a crucial role in shaping the fate of both dictatorships and opposition movements.

In an era marked by pervasive political distrust, individuals exhibit a spectrum of responses, ranging from political disengagement to assertive forms of participation, often expressed through populist movements. Drawing on data from the Japanese Electoral Studies (JES) between 2009 and 2024, this study integrates attitudinal and behavioural measures to examine why some individuals retreat from political life while others remain politically engaged under similar conditions of distrust. Focusing on economic insecurity and nationalist sentiment as moderating grievances, the analysis shows that nationalist sentiment is consistently linked to both populist attitudes and electoral participation, whereas economic insecurity displays more limited and context-dependent associations. Overall, the findings indicate that identity-based grievances are more consistently linked to politically engaged responses to distrust than material concerns. This study provides novel insights into how political discontent is expressed in contemporary Japan, demonstrating that its patterns of populist engagement, particularly those associated with nationalism, exhibit important parallels with trends observed in other advanced democracies.

With Interpretation No. 748 officially recognizing the legality of same-sex marriage in Taiwan in 2017, a referendum war between pro- and anti-LGBT groups began the following year. This article aims to analyse how Taiwan, which has long been considered LGBT-friendly, suddenly became a place where anti-LGBT sentiments surged. We argue that anti-LGBT groups successfully aroused doubts among the Taiwanese public about same-sex marriage by highlighting traditional stereotypes of gender roles and the importance of reproduction for family succession. Furthermore, by emphasizing the potential impacts on social order caused by same-sex marriage, they successfully persuaded supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party to vote against same-sex marriage. Our hypotheses are further confirmed through an analysis of the post-referendum World Values Survey data.

Recent research highlights the crisis-driven approach for regional institution-building, suggesting that crises enhance the utility of regionalism. This study questions the applicability of crisis-driven regionalism in Northeast Asia, emphasising why certain crises catalyse regionalist efforts while others do not. We clarify the working mechanisms of critical juncture approaches and identify three variables influencing the effectiveness of crisis-driven regionalism, each operating at different stages – pre-crisis, in-crisis, and post-crisis. First, exogenous crises are more likely to trigger cooperation than endogenous ones, as the latter provoke disputes over the origins and responsibilities of the crisis. Second, crises should foster collective action and shared agendas among states, rather than being confined to respective domestic efforts of individual states. Lastly, we focus on the continuity of cooperative policies in the post-crisis period. This study examines the global financial crisis, environmental pollution, and COVID-19 as three illustrative cases – including both positive and negative instances – of crisis-driven regionalism, analysing why these crises have generated, or failed to generate, substantive cooperative outcomes.

China’s growing technological power and the resulting US–China rivalry prompted various countries, including Japan, to adopt necessary countermeasures. This study examines Japan’s strategic approach to economic security and technology policy under the framework of policy emulation and vested interests. The US–China technology competition urged Japan to reformulate its technological strategies with the aim of reducing economic dependence on China. Japan’s policy reactions are characterized by policy emulation with two orientations: rational emulation to follow the US policy developments and symbolic imitation as a way of reverting to the previous industrial policy. Concurrently, Japan’s policy initiatives were constrained by vested interests to maintain stable economic relations with China and past cooperative practices formed by the Japanese business group.

Extending the concept of economic interdependence to the subnational level, this paper explores how the foreign commercial ties of non-state actors can introduce geopolitical risks to advanced democracies. We examine this phenomenon through the lens of US–China higher education partnerships. Facing budget constraints, public universities in the United States often rely on revenue from international tuition and fees. Due to trade barriers in China, American universities frequently recruit fee-paying Chinese students through joint degree programs (JDPs) established with Chinese partner institutions. These transnational partnerships create asymmetric market dependencies that the Chinese government can exploit. Using newly compiled panel data from the United States, we find that the extensive pre-existing JDP network is significantly correlated with the proliferation of Confucius Institutes (CIs) – a flagship soft power initiative of the Chinese government – on American college campuses. Preliminary evidence from other countries aligns with the patterns observed in the USA. Our findings highlight how China employs a decentralized approach to advance its soft power strategy through higher education ties.