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Two challenges for a dual system approach to temporal cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Felipe De Brigard
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Duke University, Durham, NC27708. felipe.debrigard@duke.edu Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC27708 Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC27708. kevin.oneill@duke.edu Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, NC27708. www.imclab.org
Kevin O'Neill
Affiliation:
Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC27708. kevin.oneill@duke.edu Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, NC27708. www.imclab.org

Abstract

Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) propose a two-system account of temporal cognition. We suggest that, following other classic proposals where cognitive systems are putatively independent, H&M's two-system hypothesis should, at a minimum, involve (1) a difference in the nature of the representations upon which each system operates, and (2) a difference in the computations they carry out. In this comment we offer two challenges aimed at showing that H&M's proposal does not meet the minimal requirements (1) and (2).

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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