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Limitations of Hoerl and McCormack's dual systems model of temporal consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Eve A. Isham
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ85721. eaisham@email.arizona.edueziskin@email.arizona.edumapeters@email.arizona.eduhttps://cat.lab.arizona.edu/
Elijah M. Ziskin
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ85721. eaisham@email.arizona.edueziskin@email.arizona.edumapeters@email.arizona.eduhttps://cat.lab.arizona.edu/
Mary A. Peterson
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ85721. eaisham@email.arizona.edueziskin@email.arizona.edumapeters@email.arizona.eduhttps://cat.lab.arizona.edu/

Abstract

Hoerl & McCormack's dual systems framework provides a new avenue toward the scientific investigation of temporal cognition. However, some shortcomings of the model should be considered. These issues include their reliance on a somewhat vague consideration of “systems” rather than specific computational processes. Moreover, the model does not consider the subjective nature of temporal experience or the role of consciousness in temporal cognition.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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