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Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 December 2019
Abstract
Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.
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Target article
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Author response
Temporal updating, temporal reasoning, and the domain of time