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Problems with the dual-systems approach to temporal cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

David E. Melnikoff  and
John A. Bargh Open the ORCID record for John A. Bargh [Opens in a new window]
David E. Melnikoff
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT06511. david.melnikoff@yale.edu  john.bargh@yale.comhttps://acmelab.yale.edu/
John A. Bargh
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT06511. david.melnikoff@yale.edu  john.bargh@yale.comhttps://acmelab.yale.edu/
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Abstract

Contrary to Hoerl & McCormack (H&M), we argue that the best account of temporal cognition in humans is one in which a single system becomes capable of representing time. We suggest that H&M's own evidence for dual systems of temporal cognition – simultaneous contradictory beliefs – does not recommend dual systems, and that the single system approach is more plausible.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e264
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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