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Thinking about thinking about time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2019

Jonathan Redshaw
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, QLD, Australiaj.redshaw@uq.edu.aut.suddendorf@psy.uq.edu.auhttps://psychology.uq.edu.au/profile/3271/jonathan-redshaw https://psychology.uq.edu.au/profile/2356/thomas-suddendorf
Adam Bulley
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA02138adam_bulley@fas.harvard.eduhttp://www.adambulley.org/ The University of Sydney, School of Psychology and Brain and Mind Centre, NSW2050, Australia.
Thomas Suddendorf
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Queensland, St Lucia, 4072, QLD, Australiaj.redshaw@uq.edu.aut.suddendorf@psy.uq.edu.auhttps://psychology.uq.edu.au/profile/3271/jonathan-redshaw https://psychology.uq.edu.au/profile/2356/thomas-suddendorf

Abstract

Hoerl & McCormack (H&M) discuss the possible function of meta-representations in temporal cognition but ultimately take an agnostic stance. Here we outline the fundamental role that we believe meta-representations play. Because humans know that their representations of future events are just representations, they are in a position to compensate for the shortcomings of their own foresight and to prepare for multiple contingencies.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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