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Beyond metaphors and semantics: A framework for causal inference in neuroscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Roberto A. Gulli*
Affiliation:
Mortimer B. Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY10027; Center for Theoretical Neuroscience, Columbia University, New York, NY10027; Department of Neuroscience, Columbia University, New York, NY10027r.gulli@columbia.eduhttp://robertogulli.com

Abstract

The long-enduring coding metaphor is deemed problematic because it imbues correlational evidence with causal power. In neuroscience, most research is correlational or conditionally correlational; this research, in aggregate, informs causal inference. Rather than prescribing semantics used in correlational studies, it would be useful for neuroscientists to focus on a constructive syntax to guide principled causal inference.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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