Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-dvtzq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-06T23:55:12.256Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Is information theory, or the assumptions that surround it, holding back neuroscience?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Lee de-Wit
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, CambridgeCB2 3EBUnited Kingdomlhd26@cam.ac.ukhttps://www.psychol.cam.ac.uk/people/lee-de-wit
Vebjørn Ekroll
Affiliation:
Department of Psychosocial Science, University of Bergen, 5020Bergen, NorwayVebjorn.Ekroll@uib.nohttps://www.uib.no/en/persons/Vebjørn.Ekroll
Dietrich Samuel Schwarzkopf
Affiliation:
School of Optometry & Vision Science, University of Auckland, Grafton, Auckland1023, New Zealands.schwarzkopf@auckland.ac.nzhttps://unidirectory.auckland.ac.nz/people/d-schwarzkopf Experimental Psychology, University College London, LondonWC1N 1PJ, United Kingdom
Johan Wagemans
Affiliation:
Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, University of Leuven (K.U. Leuven), B-3000Leuven, Belgiumjohan.wagemans@kuleuven.behttp://www.gestaltrevision.be/en/about-us/principal-investigator

Abstract

The challenges raised in this article are not with information theory per se, but the assumptions surrounding it. Neuroscience isn't sufficiently critical about the appropriate ‘receiver’ or ‘channel’, focuses on decoding ‘parts’, and often relies on a flawed ‘veridicality’ assumption. If these problematic assumptions were questioned, information theory could be better directed to help us understand how the brain works.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable