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Codes, functions, and causes: A critique of Brette's conceptual analysis of coding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

David Barack
Affiliation:
Jerome L. Greene Science Center, Columbia University, New York, NY10027; DeepMind, LondonN1C 4AG, United Kingdom. dbarack@gmail.comdrewjaegle@google.comwww.deepmind.com
Andrew Jaegle
Affiliation:
Jerome L. Greene Science Center, Columbia University, New York, NY10027; DeepMind, LondonN1C 4AG, United Kingdom. dbarack@gmail.comdrewjaegle@google.comwww.deepmind.com

Abstract

Brette argues that coding as a concept is inappropriate for explanations of neurocognitive phenomena. Here, we argue that Brette's conceptual analysis mischaracterizes the structure of causal claims in coding and other forms of analysis-by-decomposition. We argue that analyses of this form are permissible and conceptually coherent and offer essential tools for building and developing models of neurocognitive systems like the brain.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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