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From the “coding metaphor” to a theory of representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Jonathan Birch
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AE, United Kingdom. j.birch2@lse.ac.ukhttp://personal.lse.ac.uk/birchj1
Joulia Smortchkova
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, Radcliffe Humanities, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, University of Oxford, OxfordOX2 6GG, United Kingdom. joulia.smortchkova@philosophy.ox.ac.ukhttps://jouliasmortchkova.wordpress.com

Abstract

Brette highlights a conceptual problem in contemporary neuroscience: Loose talk of “coding” sometimes leads to a conflation of the distinction between representing and merely detecting a property. The solution is to replace casual talk of “coding” with an explicit, demanding set of conditions for neural representation. Various theories of this general type can be found in the philosophical literature.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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