Direct public funding (DPF) is a crucial resource for political parties in many of the world’s democracies. While research into the consequences of DPF has grown in prominence since the turn of the century, few efforts have been made to synthesize its findings. This article takes the first steps in doing so. Viewing DPF as an independent variable, we assess the impacts that party subsidization has on electoral competition, party organizations, party system development, and gender representation, before unpacking the intricacies of the DPF-corruption relationship. Given the inconclusive findings across these domains, the article discusses methodological challenges related to data availability and DPF operationalization, concluding with brief policy recommendations and several avenues for future research.

In the contemporary ‘age of participation’, referendums are often celebrated as cornerstones of democratic engagement. Yet political parties sometimes take the seemingly paradoxical step of calling for referendum boycotts, urging citizens to abstain from direct democratic processes. This paper investigates the conditions under which such boycott calls occur and the motivations behind them. While previous research has largely focused on single cases or experimental designs, we offer the first comprehensive, comparative study of party-led referendum boycotts across Europe since 1972. Drawing on a novel dataset of 223 referendums in 37 countries, we combine quantitative and qualitative methods to explore how regime context, institutional design, and issue type shape boycott behavior. Our regression analyses show that turnout quorum requirements, lower levels of democratic maturity, and sovereignty-related referendum issues significantly increase the likelihood of boycotts. To complement these findings, we qualitatively analyze boycott justifications and develop a typology of six motivation types: legitimacy-based, procedural unfairness, instrumental, tactical, minority interest, and ideological boycotts. These results reveal a complex interplay between democratic institutions and political strategy, challenging the assumption that referendums are universally inclusive tools. Our findings have implications for the design, interpretation, and normative evaluation of direct democratic practices across diverse political systems.

Global North countries have pledged to support Global South countries in adapting to climate change. This support can take many forms, including providing aid (in situ) or accepting immigrants (ex situ). Focusing on the Netherlands, a generous climate aid provider with a high share of immigrant population, we explore how domestic support for an overseas adaptation policy package is influenced by levels of migration and aid directed at Global South countries that vary in their location, as well as economic links with and policy proximity to the Netherlands. Using an online forced-choice conjoint experiment, we asked Dutch respondents (n = 1199) to compare two policy packages. We find that respondents support policy packages with: (1) lower numbers of immigrants, (2) lower volumes of aid, and (3) migrants from countries in geographical proximity (Albania) and shared religion (Colombia), but not Pakistan and Somalia. Moreover, they support countries that (4) import from the Netherlands and (5) have pledged to become climate-neutral earlier, a policy priority for the Netherlands.

Recent studies have drawn attention to the importance of pre-electoral coalitions in multiparty presidential democracies. Despite this, much scholarship has neglected the period during which pre-electoral coalitions turn into governing coalitions. Through a systematic cross-case analysis of Latin American cases, this paper examines why some coalition governments largely resemble the pre-electoral pacts that preceded them while others do not. The results lend credence to the legislative status granted by pre-election coalition members to the government, the low polarization among pre-electoral coalition members and the high ideological polarization in the legislature to explain the resemblance between pre- and post-electoral coalitions. Intriguingly, case-based analysis suggests that the temporal distance to government inauguration plays, at best, a marginal role in this process. These findings contribute to the still-growing literature on pre-electoral coalitions in presidential democracies by shedding light on the complex causation behind the pathway from pre-electoral bargaining to fully developed coalition governments.

This study examines the relationship between economic performance and citizens’ satisfaction with democracy (SWD), emphasizing the moderating role of clarity of responsibility (CoR)—the extent to which political institutions enable voters to identify who is accountable for policy outcomes. While prior research offers mixed empirical evidence on the economic determinants of SWD, we argue that this inconsistency can be explained by variation in institutional clarity. Drawing on insights from the economic voting literature, we develop a theoretical framework positing that the economy has a stronger impact on democratic satisfaction in contexts where responsibility is clearly assigned. Using cross-national data from 30 democracies over three decades, and a refined measure of CoR, we find that economic effects on SWD are significantly amplified in high-clarity systems. These findings highlight the importance of institutional context in shaping how citizens evaluate the functioning of democratic governance.

A central tenet of democracy is “government of the people, by the people, for the people”, implying that representatives should reflect the citizens they serve. However, ethnic minorities, young people, women, and the working class are often underrepresented in legislatures. Previous literature suggests that increasing representation of these groups can address this bias, both by advancing their interests in policymaking and by providing symbolic value by signaling more inclusive government. To examine whether working-class politicians evoke stronger feelings of symbolic representation, particularly among the working class, I conduct a factorial survey experiment in Germany, in which 1,033 respondents rate five hypothetical political candidates with differing social and political profiles. The results indicate that people favor politicians from modest backgrounds and perceive them to be better representatives of citizens’ interests, more accessible, and more trustworthy. This effect is particularly prominent among respondents self-identifying as working class.

Theoretical literature suggests at least three ways in which constitutional courts build social trust: democratic elements in the appointment of judges, technocratic qualities of the judges, and the impact of outcomes. This article contributes with empirical evidence to this theoretical debate. To do so, the article uses the case of Spain in the aftermath of the important ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. The findings of the research point at technocratic elements such as the perception of judicial independence being very relevant to explain trust in the court, unlike democratic elements such as the appointment of constitutional judges by elected politicians. Overall, the evidence presented by the article backs the general idea that de-politicization and increased technocratic qualities of constitutional courts would help them gain social trust.

Over the course of European integration, European Union (EU) institutions have gained increasing authority – but since the 1990s, this process has triggered backlash from Member State governments and citizens. We examine whether this transfer of authority has also led to greater legal contestation in cases before the Court of Justice of the EU involving Member States. Drawing on original data covering all amicus briefs in direct actions with government parties from 1954 to 2022, we find growing mobilization against EU legislation, implementation, and enforcement. While challenges to legislation became more salient without becoming more polarized, litigation over implementation decisions grew more controversial yet remained low-profile. Meanwhile, the Commission’s enforcement of EU law has faced mounting intergovernmental pushback, leading to greater restraint on the side of the Commission. These partly diverging trends reflect uneven shifts in the EU’s authority to legislate, implement, and enforce binding rules.

In recent years, many efforts have been made to bring quantitative and qualitative methods into dialogue. This article also moves in that direction. However, in contrast to most works, the present attempt does not concern the large-N/small-N issue but focuses instead on the sole single case study framework. Within this framework, two counterfactual methods, the historical counterfactual method, the qualitative one, and the synthetic control method, the quantitative one, have gained great importance without however meeting. This paper aims to advance mixed-methods research by bridging the gap between these two approaches. More precisely, it has assessed whether these two methods can be used together to understand what would have happened in a single case Z in the absence of an event X. The case study of the impact of Thatcher’s election on the UK pension system is then presented as an example of the joint use of the two methods.

In March 2020, nine EU heads of state co-signed a letter demanding a coordinated response to the pandemic and the adoption of common debt. Recent literature has shown the relevance of the European Council in the response to the pandemic, as well as the rising importance of interstate coalitions in EU policymaking. Yet, empirical understanding of these coalitions is limited, and the literature largely assumes their constitution along ‘structuralist’ logics (e.g., ‘debtors’ vs. ‘creditors’). The emergence of a ‘solidarity coalition’ proposing the ‘coronabond’ is puzzling for its contrast with the euro crisis. The aim of this paper is to explain how these countries coalesced and to understand how that relates and informs a shift in the imperatives of ‘responsible government’ in the EU. Tracing the negotiation of the letter, through interviews and discourse analysis, the paper makes a critical contribution to our understanding of the evolution in EU economic governance.