This article shows that exchange-traded funds (ETFs) “sample” their indexes, systematically underweighting or omitting illiquid index stocks. As a result, arbitrage activity between the ETF and its index has heterogeneous effects on underlying asset markets. Using an instrumental variables approach, we find that the trading activity of ETFs reduces liquidity and price efficiency and increases volatility and co-movement for liquid stocks but has no effect on illiquid stocks. Our results demonstrate that the effects of passive investing on asset markets depend on how passive funds replicate their target index.

Using firms’ online job postings, we identify economically related peer firms in the labor market. Firms’ labor peers are vastly different from their industry peers, where the overlap is about 20%. Returns of labor-linked firms strongly comove, suggesting common responses to labor market shocks on average. However, industry shocks can affect firms outside the industry through the labor network, leading to substitution effects between labor peers. Last, we show that investors do not promptly incorporate news about labor-linked firms, leading to predictable subsequent returns. A long-short strategy exploiting this delay generates an average annualized excess return of 9%.

This article investigates crash risk premiums in individual stocks using skewness swaps. These swaps involve buying a stock’s risk-neutral skewness and receiving the realized skewness as a payoff. The strategy’s returns, which measure the skewness risk premium, are found to be consistently large and positive. This suggests investors are concerned about potential crashes in individual stocks and require substantial compensation for bearing this risk. Notably, significant results are mainly observed after the 2007/2009 financial crisis, indicating changes in post-crisis option market dynamics. Cross-sectional determinants of skewness swap returns include measures of systematic crash risk and stock overvaluation.

We document a strong, negative relation between the curvature of stock price paths (i.e., price-path convexity) and future short-horizon returns at both the aggregate and firm levels. This relation obtains regardless of the cumulative return during the convexity estimation period. At the aggregate level, convexity is a better predictor of future returns than many commonly used predictors. At the firm level, this effect is not explained by known return predictors, microstructure frictions, or illiquidity. Using survey-based expectations of short-horizon returns, we show that the negative relation between convexity and future returns is driven in part by overextrapolation of past returns.

Practical real-world activities consume energy and emit thermal infrared radiation (TIR). Leveraging this physical fact, we develop a direct, real-time measure of firms’ operating activity using satellite data. Tracking 28,236 factories of Chinese listed firms, we find TIR declines significantly following operational shocks and strongly forecasts subsequent sales growth, costs, investment, employment, and profits. TIR also predicts future stock returns, especially among opaque firms and those with limited investor access, yet sophisticated investors largely ignore this information. Our findings highlight TIR as a distinctive, under-exploited indicator of corporate fundamentals.

We document significant time-series and cross-sectional momentum in 28 equity option factors. Factor momentum is distinct from a static factor portfolio, and prominent option factor models cannot fully explain its returns. Despite high autocorrelation, factor momentum profits are mainly driven by high and persistently different mean factor returns in the case of longer formation periods. Option factor momentum fully subsumes option momentum, but not vice versa. Our findings are robust over time, across various market states, and for alternative momentum strategy constructions.

After medical marijuana legalization (MML) by U.S. states, firms’ cost of equity (COE) decreases, especially for those with more growth opportunities, higher productivity, or a more skilled workforce. This policy change also reduces firm risk and leads to an increase in labor supply through increased labor force participation, employment, hours worked, and net migration. Further, home prices rise after MML, reflecting increased local housing demand due to a growing supply of workers. These findings align with theoretical models that link asset prices to labor markets and suggest that MML can lower firms’ COE by mitigating labor search frictions.

We examine hidden orders usage by algorithmic traders (ATs) and nonATs. ATs extensively use hidden orders but of smaller size than nonATs, who are the primary contributors to hidden volume. ATs’ relative share of hidden volume decreases with volatility, adverse selection costs, and the relative tick-size. Proprietary ATs (HFTs), who differ from agency ATs (AATs) in their information sets and potential gains from trade, hide orders to reduce competition for liquidity provision, whereas AATs use hidden orders to conceal information in their more informed orders and manage picking-off risk. Finally, superior technology provides limited benefit for hidden order execution.

Using high-frequency disagreement data from the investor social network StockTwits, we find that greater unsophisticated disagreement facilitates informed buying and selling. During periods of overvaluation, the facilitating effect of disagreement on trading is dampened for informed buyers but is amplified for informed sellers. These findings are unexplained by sentiment, news, and retail order flow, and they remain when we measure disagreement overnight and disagreement of technical investors, which alleviates the concern that disagreement and informed trading respond to a common shock. These findings suggest that informed traders respond meaningfully but differently to valuation changes induced by unsophisticated disagreement.

Predictive regressions of market returns on option-implied moments measured before pre-scheduled FOMC meetings show that tail risks play an important role in understanding the market risk premium around FOMC announcement days. Skewness and kurtosis, which capture investors’ expectations of the tails of the return distribution, robustly predict post-FOMC returns both in-sample and out-of-sample. The predictability lasts up to 1 week and is stronger for expansionary monetary policy shocks. The signs of the corresponding risk premiums are consistent with economic intuition, illustrating the role of periods with high risk premiums to confirm theoretical predictions.

Stablecoins are a new form of private money. They are fragile but largely trade at par. How? We present a model and empirical work to examine a novel source of demand for stablecoins. Stablecoin owners are indirectly compensated for run risk by lending their coins to crypto speculators. The stablecoin can then support its $1 peg, but this arrangement links crypto speculation to traditional financial markets where stablecoins invest their reserves.

This article documents adverse selection in Ginnie Mae issuers’ early buyout decisions. Conditional on default, we find a 1 percentage point increase in interest rate spread increases the probability of an early buyout by 7–9 percentage points. Issuers buy out higher interest rate spread loans because they generate greater economic gains when they reperform. We illustrate how issuers acquire private soft information that provides direct insight into the likelihood of reperformance. Although the soft information is ostensibly collected on behalf of investors during the delinquent loan servicing process, issuers can exploit the information in their early buyout decisions.

We investigate how the government, as a customer, affects a supplier’s environmental policies. We find that government contractors have significantly lower levels of toxic pollution. Exploring the mechanisms, we show that government contractors reduce pollution by strengthening internal environmental governance and increasing investments in pollution abatement. Further analysis rules out alternative explanations related to reduced economic activities and financial constraints. Overall, our results highlight the government’s important role in disciplining corporate environmental misbehavior.

We study trading among strategic traders who may incorrectly assess the degree of market crowdedness. These mistakes distort equilibrium strategies and prices. When traders underestimate market crowdedness, they target larger inventories and trade more aggressively, but their actual profits are lower than expected because they underestimate the amount of information already impounded in prices. Crowded markets are prone to abrupt crashes. The magnitude of price dislocations and the speed of recovery during fire-sale events can help infer traders’ beliefs about market crowdedness.

Using the near universe of online job postings from 2007 to 2021, we construct a firm-level metric of labor market power. We find that firms with higher labor market power tend to have higher financial leverage. Our findings are not driven by product market competition or correlated labor market characteristics. The evidence is less pronounced among firms hiring in occupations with high labor mobility and skill transferability. To establish causality, we exploit the establishment of Amazon HQ2 in Crystal City as a shock to the labor market power of local firms and show consistent findings with our baseline results.

Equity returns follow a pronounced V-shape pattern around the onset of recessions. They sharply drop into negative territory just before business cycle peaks and then strongly recover as the recession unfolds. Recessions are typically preceded by a flat yield curve. Probit models relying on the term spread as a predictor therefore time the beginning of recessions well. We show that model-implied recession probabilities based on the term spread strongly improve equity premium prediction in- and out-of-sample and outperform several benchmark predictors. Correcting for a structural break in the mean of the term spread in 1982 further strengthens the forecast performance.

We argue that cross-ownership increases the amount of private information in stock prices, enhancing the ability of stock prices to provide feedback to managers. Consistent with this argument, we find greater cross-ownership heightens a firm’s investment-q sensitivity. This effect is stronger for firms with a lower propensity for voluntary disclosure and for firms whose managers hold less private information. Furthermore, we find that cross-ownership is negatively associated with the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its peers’ stock prices. Additionally, cross-ownership has a stronger impact on the investment-q sensitivity when measured among investors who trade more actively in the firm’s shares. By using financial institution mergers as an identification strategy, we strengthen the causal inference. Overall, our results suggest that cross-ownership helps increase revelatory price efficiency (RPE), potentially leading to more efficient corporate decisions.

This article documents a trend of declining flexibility in share repurchase policies over the last 4 decades. We show that repurchases have become particularly sticky for firms with repurchase programs in place. We also exploit the additional inflexibility within existing repurchase programs to show that repurchase stickiness can have real effects for firms. Using the 2008 financial crisis as a shock to firms’ ability to raise capital, we find that firms with ongoing share repurchase programs ending after Dec. 2007 reduced investment, employment, and R&D spending by more than similar firms with programs ending before the onset of the crisis.

We show that banks use industry knowledge acquired through corporate lending in mortgage lending, a phenomenon we refer to as the “industry expertise channel.” Specifically, banks that specialize in particular industries expand their mortgage lending activity in regions where those industries are concentrated. The impact of industry expertise increases with information asymmetry and borrower risk. In addition, mortgages originated from this channel contain more soft information and perform better. The effect of the channel increases after unexpected industry distress and the 2008 financial crisis, suggesting that the effect is likely causal.

We administer a theory-driven, lab-in-the-field experiment to study the disposition effect among financial professionals. Our novel design identifies, at the individual participant level, key behavioral drivers of the disposition effect: reference-dependent risk attitudes (“tastes”), second-order uncertainty attitudes (including “ambiguity”), and subjective likelihood assessments (“beliefs”). Among the 237 professionals in our sample, 34% exhibited the disposition effect, which seems to be primarily driven by non-Bayesian beliefs. Our experimental results suggest that, when faced with new information about their asset’s performance, financial professionals failed to update their beliefs sufficiently leading them to sell the asset that gained (lost) value more (less) readily.