Using evidence from Great Britain, the United States, Belgium and Spain, it is demonstrated in this article that in integrated and divided nations alike, citizens are more strongly attached to political parties than to the social groups that the parties represent. In all four nations, partisans discriminate against their opponents to a degree that exceeds discrimination against members of religious, linguistic, ethnic or regional out‐groups. This pattern holds even when social cleavages are intense and the basis for prolonged political conflict. Partisan animus is conditioned by ideological proximity; partisans are more distrusting of parties furthest from them in the ideological space. The effects of partisanship on trust are eroded when partisan and social ties collide. In closing, the article considers the reasons that give rise to the strength of ‘partyism’ in modern democracies.

Most studies on European solidarity (‘bonding’) during COVID‐19 lack a baseline comparison with outside states. We, therefore, cannot say whether European solidarity is universal or geared towards European Union (EU) insiders (‘bounding’). We thus ask whether European solidarity is ‘bounded’, that is, whether it relies on differentiation between European insiders and outsiders. We argue that if existent, bounded solidarity constitutes a long‐term and thick basis for institutional building. To explore this ‘bonding–bounding’ dynamic, we use a vignette experiment embedded into an original survey collected in eight European countries (n ∼ 8900), covering all European regions. Our design varies the countries receiving solidarity, and the channels (EU level vs. member state level), policy domains (health vs. economy) and instruments (loans, grants, medical equipment, vaccines) through which solidarity is provided. Regarding bounding, we find that most countries are more solidaristic with EU countries than an outsider, baseline state (Peru), Italy excepted. There is, nonetheless, a strong heterogeneity between countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden mostly want to help themselves and Southern member states, but not Central Eastern European member states, which we show is due to their perceived obstructionism related to the Rule of Law debate. Concerning the nature of solidarity, we find that most respondents prefer solidarity to be channelled through the EU and loans, with evidence suggesting a freeriding mechanism behind this preference. All in all, our results indicate that EU citizens form a distinct community of solidarity which, in line with a Rokkanian understanding of polity formation, plays a key role in political development and consolidation.

The accent on status-anxiety factors which shape ideologies and political directions has emerged as a popular, but relatively speculative and untested, theme in contemporary political analysis. This article traces the evolution of the “status politics” theme, from its essayist interpretations of American right-wing radicalism to comparative applications in other Western industrialized societies. The task is to make more organized sense of this theme and to submit several derivative statements to a systematic empirical test. The results are based on a secondary analysis of Lausanne survey data and the preliminary findings of a recent nation-wide survey of the Swiss general electorate. The Lausanne results indicate that emotive dissatisfaction with personal status failures and felt aspiration—achievement discrepancies, especially among occupational skidders and immobile respondents, are among the more influential status-anxiety factors associated with classical conservative ideology. The national survey results point to other related status insecurities and dissatisfactions which distinguish ultraconservative National Action and Republican party supporters from other party supporters in the Swiss general electorate. These results lend some comparative weight to the status politics explanation.

Against premature claims about the declining political relevance of social class in post‐industrial democracies, recent research indicates that class continues to be a relevant determinant of political preferences. In post‐industrial societies ‘old’ class divides on economic issues coexist with ‘new’ class alignments on cultural topics. While there is cumulated evidence of social classes’ distinct placement on these issues, this paper argues that the strength of class divides depends on the extent to which these issues are politicized by political parties. Studying preferences on economic and cultural issues (attitudes towards redistribution, immigration, gay rights and European integration), this study shows that class divides in preferences are context dependent. The multilevel analyses drawing on data from the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey for 27 European democracies demonstrate that classes’ differences in preferences are accentuated on issues strongly contested and emphasized by parties, and mitigated on issues where party conflict is weaker. Adding to recent literature on parties and class conflict, this study identifies another stage at which parties can affect the strength of class voting. The varying strength of class divides across contexts also has implications for parties’ ability to garner support beyond a single class. This becomes increasingly unlikely in contexts of high issue politicization.

After a discussion of possible components in a definition of ‘cumulation’ and the relative lack of cumulation in political science, a scheme for research strategies is outlined with the aim of facilitating cumulation, or at least facilitating a diagnosis of the state of political science in this respect. The scheme includes three types of studies: (1) analysis of the formal properties of theoretical approaches in political science, (2) content analyses in the form of inventories of problems, propositions and concepts in the discipline, (3) evaluational analysis, i.e. an assessment of what ‘theory criteria’ to use for evaluating the approaches and of the probable relations between these criteria.

This article explores the contribution that cultural memory studies can make to the debate about the role of ideas and the dynamics of ideational change in policy making. Cultural memory studies engage with the cultural dimensions of remembering, and analyse how shared images of the past are mediated and transferred across distance and time. Such research shows how the past may continue to influence the present by informing the frameworks through which groups and individuals interpret and give meaning to events and phenomena. Since policy makers operate within a cultural context, shared memories are likely also to affect the way they think about the nature and roots of policy issues and the appropriateness and feasibility of policy options. In this article, policy memory (the memory shared by policy makers about earlier policies) is identified as a subcategory of cultural memory. The role of cultural memory among policy makers is studied with reference to Dutch integration policies in two periods: the mid‐1990s and the early 2000s. On the basis of an in‐depth analysis of policy reports and parliamentary debates, references to the past and the role they play in the policy debate are identified. Different modes of dealing with the past are found in the two periods studied, reflecting the different political contexts in which the debates took place. In the 1990s, the memory of earlier policy was invoked in the mode of continuity – that is, policy change was legitimised (conceived) as part of a positive tradition. In the 2000s, memory was invoked in the mode of discontinuity. The same policies were reinterpreted in more negative terms and policy change legitimised by the perceived need to break with the past. Arguably, this reinterpretation of the past was a precondition for the shift in policy beliefs that took place around that time.

Public evaluations of EU performance are not only critical indicators of the EU's output legitimacy, but also shape future support for European integration. For citizens to monitor the political performance of the EU they need relevant facts, yet it is anything but clear that gains in information about EU performance cause change in judgements about such performance. Drawing on two‐wave panel data, this article examines whether acquiring information following a real‐world EU decision‐making event alters citizens' judgements about the utilitarian and democratic performance of the EU. It also examines how this effect differs for people with different levels of general political information. It is found that citizens who acquired performance‐relevant information became more approving of the EU's utilitarian performance but did not change their judgements about its democratic performance. Also, individuals with moderate levels of general political information were affected most strongly by new facts about performance. The implications of these findings for EU‐level representative democracy are considered.

Do representatives provide fair and proportional representation to each place in their district or, rather, do they favour some places, creating winners and losers of representation? While the impact of geography on representation has been extensively examined in majoritarian systems, we know little about the geographical losers of representation in proportional representation systems. We investigate the extent to which different places receive unequal levels of attention in parliament, relative to what we would expect based on their population size as a normative proportional ideal. Crucially, we conceptualize place‐based representation at the micro‐level by looking inside electoral districts, using Google Places and Named Entity Recognition. Findings indicate that there are significant deviations from the proportional ideal. We find that small localities and large cities are overrepresented in parliament, while the medium‐sized cities and suburban peripheries of major metropolises are underrepresented. Places with a higher percentage of the population with university degrees are also overrepresented in parliament. These results carry important normative implications for forms of territorial‐based representation.

Whether countries and their publics are responsive to the international legal commitments they make is the source of long‐standing academic debate. Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine brought real‐world significance to these debates. While Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the invasion raised the prospect that other NATO members could be targeted and that Article 5 collective security commitments would be invoked. While recent research suggests that emphasizing mutual defence treaties can increase public support for defending an ally, prior work focuses on US opinion in a less fraught political environment. We constructed and fielded a survey experiment in Italy in the initial weeks of the Ukraine invasion to probe support for defending a NATO ally, the relevance of the Article 5 legal commitment on support for defending an ally, and the potential moderating influence of gender and political party. Our findings show that the Article 5 commitment significantly increased support for defending an ally. Consistent with past research, we find a significant gender gap, with men being more supportive of defending an ally than women; however, both men and women responded to the Article 5 commitment to virtually the same degree. The estimated treatment effect was larger for supporters of right‐wing parties than for the left; however, the difference was not statistically significant.

The main event in the cabinet during 2000 was the dismissal of Dover Samuels. Allegations were made that some years before entering Parliament he had a sexual relationship with an under-age teenager. On June 17 the allegations were in the hands of an opposition party, Act, and leader Richard Prebble sent a letter containing the claims to the Prime Minister on June 20. Samuels stood down from cabinet, and referred the matter to the police for investigation. Before any findings from the investigation were available, on June 28 the Prime Minister dismissed Samuels on the grounds that he could not be effective as a minister while ’allegations, controversy, and public debate swirl around him’. Various other allegations had surfaced behind the scenes, including drug running and incest. In September all allegations against Samuels were found to be without foundation, but Samuels was not restored to cabinet. On July 6 Parekura Horomia had taken his place. Samuels had been Minister of Maori Affairs, and his performance in that role was already under question before the events that led to his dismissal. Prime Minister Helen Clark had described herself in May as the de facto Minister of Maori Affairs. Samuels had owed his cabinet position to support from his colleagues on the right of Labour’s parliamentary party and his status as senior Labour Maori MP. The allegations against Samuels made it possible for the Prime Minister to appoint a minister in whom she had more confidence.

Party leaders are often regarded as crucial to a party's success. Successful leaders tend to be big personalities who dominate their party's organisation, policy development and electoral campaigns. But does that control come with a price? We test to see if such leaders damage their parties in the medium term. This happens because strong leaders might be ceded too much control of the party organisation, policy and electoral strategy. We specifically hypothesise that political parties will go through a period of leadership instability and electoral decline after strong leaders step down. Using a dataset with elections under party leaders in nine countries over a 25‐year period, and a qualitative case study, we find some evidence for the theory, which should prompt further research of the question.

Can communicative interventions by the government influence political trust and increase public compliance during crises? This study examines the impact of a televised speech by German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the onset of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Using an unexpected‐events‐during‐survey‐design, we find that the speech led to a 7‐percentage point increase in trust in the federal government and up to a 25‐percentage point decrease in citizens' mobility. We also observe demographic variation in susceptibility to speech. We explore the underlying mechanisms by comparing Merkel's speech with similar televised addresses by Mark Rutte and Boris Johnson, where we observe no comparable effects on attitudes. We suggest that specific content, such as an emphasis on solidarity and positive sentiment, may have played a role in mobilizing public support. Our findings indicate that effective leader communication can be a powerful tool for sustaining public support and ensuring compliance with crisis measures.

There were no elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2000. Elections to the upper house of Parliament, the Senate, were held on 12 and 19 November 2000 in 27 districts of the 81 senatorial election districts. With the November 2000 elections, all of the transitional two- and four-year terms of the Senators elected in the first Senate elections in 1996 have expired. At present, there are only Senators elected for six-year terms.

In answer set programming, two groups of rules are considered strongly equivalent if they have the same meaning in any context. Strong equivalence of two programs can be sometimes established by deriving rules of each program from rules of the other in an appropriate deductive system. This paper shows how to extend this method of proving strong equivalence to programs containing the counting aggregate.