Shmuel Nili’s Beyond the Law’s Reach? is an inquiry into the moral duties of the world’s established democracies in a world rife with violent and undemocratic states. Nili argues that these “consolidated” democratic states are “entangled” with the leaders of such violent polities—and uses this entanglement to derive an elegant and plausible series of political duties. In response, this essay seeks to undermine the distinction between the established democracies and the violent states, by showing that some democratic states—including, most centrally, the United States—are as violent as those societies considered by Nili as the focus of international moral obligation. This fact, however, does not impugn the moral obligations identified by Nili; instead, it demonstrates that Nili’s duties might demand something like a necessary form of moral hypocrisy—in which a democratic state might be effectively able to undermine violence abroad, even while incapable of effectively eliminating that violence on its own territory.

In Beyond the Law’s Reach? Shmuel Nili examines the moral responsibilities of affluent democracies toward poorer countries to whose misfortunes they contributed. Because of their entanglement, Nili argues, affluent democracies are (often, but not always) morally barred from pursuing policies more obviously aligned with their moral preferences when another policy would benefit the weakened state more. In this essay, I discuss some of the challenges of trying to repay a moral debt between states. The affluent democracy has incentives to underestimate the extent of its moral debt, while the weakened state benefits from overestimating the harm it suffered. Moreover, since the state is not a unitary actor, different members of a state might disagree on which actions should count as proper forms of atonement. I argue that moral debts cannot ever be fully repaid, but that such impossibility does not undermine the moral requirement to try to pay them; and, further, that the inability to fully settle a moral debt is not a shortcoming to lament, but closer to a blessing in disguise, because acknowledging past misdeeds and embracing the moral implications of deep entanglement may foster greater reciprocity and solidarity in the international realm.

Michael Blake, Yuna Blajer de la Garza, and Alex Zakaras offer insightful critiques of several arguments central to my book Beyond the Law’s Reach? In the process, they raise large questions in political philosophy more generally, especially as it pertains to global affairs. Blake is skeptical about the distinction, driving much of the book, between consolidated liberal democracies and jurisdictions where the “shadow of violence” prevails. Blajer de la Garza worries that the international reparative duties that the book highlights may linger indefinitely, and, consequently, be exploited by cynical political actors. Finally, whereas Beyond the Law’s Reach? argues that liberal democracies’ collective integrity is affected by their entanglement in violence and corruption abroad, Zakaras doubts whether this collective moral problem carries over into the individual level, given individual citizens’ reasonable ignorance of policy details. I offer responses to each of these critiques in turn. I conclude by highlighting the picture of democratic civic responsibility that emerges from these responses.

In his new book Beyond the Law’s Reach? Shmuel Nili shows how affluent democracies have become entangled with violent autocratic regimes and brutal international cartels, and have thereby become complicit in serious global injustices. This essay asks who bears responsibility for this complicity. It argues that citizens of affluent democratic societies often share responsibility for their own government’s unjust entanglements and explores the conditions under which this holds true. It focuses in particular on the challenge posed by relatively “obscure” injustices, which even well-informed citizens cannot be expected to know about. In addressing these cases, this essay outlines a theory of civic obligation that can help explain when citizens have a duty to take action against government injustice and clarify how much they can be expected to know about their representatives’ wrongdoing.

In this research agenda, we first review the thematic landscape of task engagement research, providing definitions and elaborating on the core theoretical infrastructure for task engagement. We then summarize consensus perspectives from this body of work and identify important contributions that task engagement research stands to make to second language (L2) learning and teaching research. Following this, we outline five key research tasks that we believe will broaden the field’s understanding of task engagement, sharpen insights from empirical work, and accelerate the contribution of this research. Our goals are, first, to highlight for readers the shared understandings that exist in this important area of language learning research and, second, to draw attention to specific areas where additional L2 task engagement research is needed to push the field forward productively.

This paper draws on two seemingly disparate moments – standing witness to protest in Guatemala and unpacking programme design in New York City – to explore the connections, linkages and methodological insights brought forward by front-line organisers. These individuals, though not typically recognised as policy experts, offer crucial knowledge that challenges dominant approaches to law and policy. Turning to their actions and framing, this paper argues that these organisers share a deep and urgent analysis of institutional and state violence. Their perspectives highlight the inadequacies of conventional institutional lenses, which often exclude or dismiss such grassroots expertise. The paper emphasises the importance of how these voices are heard and responded to, particularly given the historical and ongoing marginalisation of such knowledge holders. Drawing on multiple examples, it critiques institutional investments in spatial and bureaucratic schemes that deflect responsibility for violence, and that distance possibilities for accountability. This raises the question of what orientation or sensibility is necessary to engage with and to listen to these collective voices differently, especially from within administrative and bureaucratic systems. Grappling with the possibilities and limitations of what a category of ‘activist-scholar administrator’ could mean, this paper identifies three key lessons: the need for bureaucratic imagination, an iterative approach and expanded analytical frameworks. I argue that much more thinking and action are needed to navigate bureaucratic systems – whether in universities or state institutions – in ways that centre community knowledge and respond meaningfully to calls for broader accountability.

As cities in the Global South gain visibility in global forums – engaging in climate negotiations, forming alliances and aligning with development goals – their legal and economic status remains structurally ambivalent. This article challenges the idea that these cities are becoming full international legal actors. Instead, we argue that they possess a ‘borderline international legal personality’: conditionally included in global regimes through mechanisms that reinforce long-standing asymmetries. Central to this dynamic is the notion of ‘creditworthiness’, now a key metric of development. Tools like sub-sovereign credit ratings pressure cities to prioritise investor confidence over local needs. These interventions promise international agency but often deepen financial dependency. We call for a re-reading of urban internationalism, attentive to the in-between status of Global South cities – caught between aspiration and discipline. Any emancipatory urban agenda must confront the financialisation of local governance and centre debt justice, autonomy and institutional reform.

This article furthers our understanding of commercial fishing on the lower Tiber during the Republic and Principate, arguing for a robust industry in the center of Rome. Literary references to the lupus fish and a fishing site “between the bridges” direct attention to the area of the river around the Cloaca Maxima and Tiber Island. Situating intensive fishing there requires reconciliation with other commercial uses of the river, a common-pool resource shared by users with divergent and competing needs. Epigraphic evidence offers insight into professional associations and attendant relationships that were leveraged in favor of the interests of both fishermen and barge operators. I contend that two separate navigation zones existed, to the north and to the south of Tiber Island, and that transport barges venturing inland from Ostia did not navigate beyond Rome’s southern wharves. This system enabled fishing and barge traffic to coexist, protecting numerous interests and allowing for the unimpeded transportation of goods.

Macella, specialized market structures built in various urban centers in Roman Italy and the provinces between the Middle Republic and the Late Antique period, have been interpreted widely as urban symbols of elite prestige and conspicuous consumption. While it is true that elites often acted as benefactors of these buildings and written sources emphasize the sale of luxury foods, documentary and archaeological evidence suggest that bureaucratic incentives played a crucial role in their initial establishment. This article presents a new interpretation of the development of macella and argues, in contrast to traditional views, that these markets were not primarily designed as spaces of luxury consumption catering exclusively to elite customers. Rather, they were conceived as physical and permanent institutional control mechanisms over urban food trade in an increasingly complex and integrated Roman economy.