In the British colony of Natal, laws governing sex for settlers were concerned with reproduction and sexual respectability, which were the grounds for imagining difference amongst imperial populations only recently assembled under colonial jurisdiction. Age of consent laws arose out of these contingencies rather than out of any concern with a liberal politics of social reform. Consequently, colonial age of consent laws governing white settlers bore only superficial resemblance to metropolitan legislative reforms such as age of consent laws. Instead, the Natal state's practices of law-making recognized three discrete and divergent moral economies of sex in the colonial laws governing white settler citizens, Native law which governed the lives of Africans and the consolidated body of laws governing Indian immigrants. In this young colony, not only did ‘age of consent’ laws have to be newly made, but they were conceived separately and contained by ‘colonial law’, ‘Native custom’ and ‘Indian custom’. The sexuality of young white woman was coded in colonial rape laws and used to draw lines of civilizational difference between settler citizens and their Others. For these others, relating sex to exceptional marriage customs excluded from legal codes of civilized common practice was how the state worked to assert difference.

Married at the age of eleven, Rukhmabai refused to go and live with her husband who had filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights against her in 1884. This paper analyses the transplantation of the notion of restitution of conjugal rights into Hindu personal law in India at a time when child marriage was rife and there was no minimum age of marriage. Within this context Rukhmabai's case symbolises an important interjection in its attempt to posit lack of consent to an infant marriage as a defence against suits for restitution of conjugal rights. This marked a shift from female consent being understood as a question of physical maturity alone, to a claim of intelligent consent and the capacity to withhold such consent within an unconsummated marriage arranged in the girl's infancy. While analysing these notions of consent within colonial law the paper also closely scrutinises Rukhmabai's public writings to recover one of the earliest published Indian female views on the need for marital consent.

This article argues that Bernard Mandeville's ideas were more likely to have influenced Jeremy Bentham's writings than previously believed. The conventional interpretation of Mandeville as a forerunner of the Hayekian “theory of spontaneous order” has obscured Mandeville and Bentham's shared emphasis on legal and interventionist solutions for the issues of prostitution and prisoners. This influence is evinced by focusing on some of Mandeville's minor works, which anticipated some of Bentham's arguments. It is unlikely that Bentham directly knew of Mandeville's minor works, but his reformist and interventionist bent was consistent and discernible in the Fable, which Jeremy Bentham read in his youth.

Many endorse the Bad-Difference View (BDV) of disability which says that disability makes one likely to be worse off even in the absence of discrimination against the disabled. Others defend the Mere-Difference View (MDV) of disability which says that, discounting discrimination, disability does not make one likely to be worse (or better) off. A common motivation for the BDV is the Options Argument which identifies reduction in valuable options as a harm of disability. Some reject this argument, arguing that disabled people's prospects aren't hindered by having fewer options. In this article, I defend the Options Argument by arguing that, in disability cases, possessing a greater number of valuable options seems to overall improve well-being prospects. As such, the Options Argument appears to be sound and – although it doesn't establish the BDV – it lends plausibility to the BDV by identifying a potentially significant cost of disability.

Domestic climate change litigation is prospering across the globe to the extent of becoming a transnational phenomenon of growing importance. At the international level the Paris Agreement, although still in its infancy, has been established as the core element of the climate change governance framework. This article explores the still opaque relationship between domestic climate change litigation and the Paris Agreement. It is argued that dynamic interaction between domestic litigation and the Paris Agreement may improve the overall efficacy of both regimes. On the one hand, an examination of the Paris Agreement's architecture and provisions reveals pathways that are already being used or can be explored further in litigation. On the other hand, litigation can assist and complement the Paris Agreement with regard to its implementation and progress towards its overall goals. The result may deliver more than a multi-level perspective on climate change law. As it captures the law in action on different levels, the proposed ‘cross-level’ approach has due regard to the implications of the mutual supportiveness or complementarity of legal tools. It also thereby responds to the concern of whether the law can be of significant benefit in addressing complex global issues like climate change.