David Little has pioneered the study of religion, human rights, and religious freedom during fifty-five years of distinguished scholarly work at Yale, Harvard, Virginia, Georgetown, and the United States Institute of Peace. Starting with his first major book, Religion, Order, and Law: A Study in Pre-Revolutionary England, he has traced cardinal principles like freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion from their earliest formulations in Stoic philosophy and Roman law, through the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, the medieval canonists and scholastics, and their many early modern heirs. Among the latter, he has explored most deeply the contributions of Protestants to the Western understanding of human rights and religious freedom, with special focus on John Calvin, John Locke, Roger Williams, and Reinhold Niebuhr, all of whose ideas he connects to each other and to the broader Western tradition in fresh and inventive ways. He has written astutely on the vexed questions arising under the First Amendment's guarantees of no government establishments of religion and no prohibitions on its free exercise. And he has charted many of the religious sources and dimensions of modern human rights, particularly the fundamental international protections of freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, freedom from religious hatred, incitement, and discrimination, and freedom for religious and cultural self-determination.

“CLS” was an acronym with two very different meanings when I was a fledgling law student some thirty-five years ago. For most, it meant “critical legal studies,” a burgeoning new movement of sundry neo-Marxist jurists and philosophers collectively bent on exposing the fallacies and false equalities of modern law. Many of my first-year law professors were the high priests of this CLS movement. They were making serious waves at the time with their denunciation of much that was considered sound and settled in the law. The best CLS professors taught black letter doctrine—and then shredded it with rhetorical and analytical power. That instruction appealed to my native ethic of semper reformanda—always reforming and working to improve our traditions. Other professors simply taught their pet critical topics, sending us students scrambling to the bookstore in search of study guides that would acquaint us with the legal basics. After a year of such CLS instruction, I could not wait to take the upper-level electives that would no doubt unveil the new and better legal system CLS had in mind. Little was on offer. The “crits,” I soon learned, were better at deconstruction than reconstruction of the law. Not surprisingly, this movement has now faded and fractured into sundry special interest groups.

Economic arguments in support of linking emissions trading schemes suggest that such linking could provide access to lower cost abatement options and increase market stability. The decisions of whether and how to link emissions trading schemes often focus on the design features of the relevant schemes, but an additional factor which has the potential to undermine the efficiency of linked schemes is taxation. This article systematically tests two alternative approaches to the direct (income) taxation of cross-border transfers of emission allowances for differential tax outcomes. Four hypothetical transactions are considered under three different linking mechanisms and on the assumption that a tax treaty based on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital is in force. This analysis evidences that, in some cases – and especially if the relevant jurisdictions adopt different approaches to the taxation of allowance transactions under domestic law – there is the potential for timing differences or double taxation that could impact on the efficiency of the linked trading schemes. It is therefore important for tax implications to be considered as part of any linking proposal.

Over the past 30 years, a growing amount of scholarly attention has been paid to forms of constitutional interpretation other than judicial review, ranging from departmentalism to explicitly removing judicial review from the court's purview. As many of these works have recognized, such skepticism is not new, but has a strong historical tradition. What has not often been noted, however, is that differing conceptions of judicial review—even opposition to judicial oversight of legislative actions—existed nearly from the moment that Marbury v. Madison was decided. This article examines some of these divergent opinions on judicial review in the Early Republic by studying how it was perceived by the Old Republicans, the conservative faction of the Virginia Jeffersonians.

In modern populations, inequalities in oral health have been observed between urban and rural communities, but to date the impact of the place of residence on oral health in archaeological populations has received only limited attention. This meta-study analyses dental palaeopathological data to examine the relationship between place of residence and oral health in Roman, early medieval, and late medieval Britain. Published data on ante-mortem tooth loss, calculus, caries, dental abscesses, and periodontal disease were analysed from cemeteries in urban and rural locations from each period. The results indicate that the place of residence influenced oral health in Roman and late medieval times, with urban populations enjoying better oral health than rural populations in Roman Britain, but poorer oral health in the late Middle Ages. These findings may reflect changes in the nature of urban settlements and in their relationship with their rural hinterlands over time.

According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's (2008) fitting-attitude analysis of value relations, two items are on a par if and only if it is both permissible to strictly prefer one to the other and permissible to have the opposite strict preference. Rabinowicz's account is subject, however, to one important objection: if strict preferences involve betterness judgements, then his analysis contrasts with the intuitive understanding of parity. In this paper, I examine Rabinowicz's three responses to this objection and argue that they do not succeed. I then propose an alternative solution. I argue that the objection can be avoided if we ‘relativize’ Rabinowicz's account and define parity in terms of opposite strict preferences between two items that are only relatively permissible, rather than permissible simpliciter. I argue that this account of parity can be defended if we take seriously the distinction between sufficient and decisive reason for a preference relation. I also show that, on the basis of this distinction, we can arrive at a more extensive taxonomy of value relations than the one proposed by Rabinowicz.

Feature Inheritance (Richards 2007) entails that uninterpretable features originate on the phase head C or v* and are then transferred to the associated Agree head, T or V. In the present article, it is argued that the French que–qui alternation is the locus of a Case contrast, implying that nominative Case originates on the complementiser and only becomes associated with T as a consequence of feature transfer. Que–qui thus provides new, Case-based empirical support for the theory of Feature Inheritance. The article also suggests that the que–qui alternation has an important implication for Chomsky's recent application of dynamic antisymmetry, reinterpreted in terms of labelling, to the issue of subject extraction failure. Specifically, the alternation appears to indicate that Case-matching is required, in addition to phi-feature agreement, in order for extraction to be blocked by labelling.

Near the end of the nineteenth century, English scholar James Bryce criticized Western railroad land grants as “often improvident” and as giving “rise to endless lobbying and intrigue, first to secure them, then to keep them from being declared forfeited in respect of some breach of the conditions imposed by Congress on the company.” Bryce also observed the extent to which grants of land to railroads allowed the beneficiary companies to exercise great power not only through their role as carriers of people and commerce, but also through their role as large landowners. This, he noted, brought them “yet another source of wealth and power” and “brought them into intimate and often perilously delicate relations with leading politicians.” From the perspective of the so-called “railroad tycoons” and their financial backers, the land grants became sources of wealth and power independent of and sometimes contrary to the interests of the railroad corporations themselves as carriers. Whereas Congress intended the railroad land grants to serve as a means to the end of railroad construction and the settlement of the federal government's expansive public domain, the railroads came to see them as an end in themselves: as independent sources of wealth and power.

How much personal partiality do agent-centred prerogatives allow? If there are limits on what morality may demand of us, then how much does it permit? For a view Henry Shue has termed ‘yuppie ethics’, the answer to both questions is a great deal. It holds that rich people are morally permitted to spend large amounts of money on themselves, even when this means leaving those living in extreme poverty unaided. Against this view, I demonstrate that personal permissions are limited in certain ways: their strength must be continuous with the reasons put forward to explain their presence inside morality to begin with. Typically, these reasons include non-alienation and the preservation of personal integrity. However, when personal costs do not result in alienation or violate integrity, they are things that morality can routinely demand of us. Yuppie ethics therefore runs afoul of what I call the ‘continuity constraint’.

Crucial to the implementation of the War Relocation Authority's (WRA) regulations of its detention camps for the uprooted Japanese American community of the West Coast were the WRA “project attorneys,” white lawyers stationed in the camps who gave legal advice to administrators and internees alike. These lawyers left behind a voluminous correspondence that opens a new window on the WRA's relationship with its prisoners, a relationship heretofore understood as encompassing coercion on one side and either compliance or resistance on the other. This article uses the voluminous correspondence of the project attorney at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center in Wyoming as a new lens for viewing the regulatory relationship between the WRA and the imprisoned community. It focuses on three of the many matters about which the project attorney gave advice: the design of the camp's community government, its criminal justice system, and its business enterprises. Evidence from this one law office suggests that on many key issues, the relationship between the WRA and the internees was marked not so much by coercion as by reciprocal accommodation, with each taking account of some of the preferences of the other. While the data are from just one of the ten WRA camps, they suggest a need to reconsider our understanding of how this American system of racial imprisonment operated.

What is divinity if it can come
Only in silent shadows and in dreams?
—Wallace Stevens

The score of Steve Reich's Violin Phase specifies that the performer is to recapitulate aspects of the composer's creative process in the studio. Working with a four-channel tape recorder, the violinist and a sound engineer are given detailed directions for creating the basic tape loop that generates the performance tape used in live performance. And yet – no doubt due to the scarcity of appropriate tape recorders – most present-day performers of Violin Phase use looping hardware or software that make it possible to dispense with many of the instructions in the score, including the necessity of having the engineer on stage. That this significant change in performance practice seemingly passes for the most part without notice demonstrates how the decades-long ubiquity of tape has been replaced by a kind of invisibility, through which the particularities of the medium have been subsumed into more generalized notions of fixed media. I argue that the specific materialities of tape and tape machines are not incidental to Violin Phase, but are central to its composition, performance, and reception. A focus on the role of tape, and indeed on the roll of tape itself, can illuminate this and other pieces as well as Reich's deep involvement with music technologies throughout his career.