At least some people want to be loved simply for being the particular individuals they are, as distinct from any properties they might possess. However, the most prominent theories in contemporary philosophical work on love are framed so as to exclude that possibility. In this article, I argue that Christians have the resources to say that one can be loved for oneself if they appeal to the love God has for his creatures in making them from nothing. This article comprises four sections. In the first two sections, I introduce and characterize the desire to be loved for oneself, distinguishing the relevant desideratum from other, similar phenomena. In the third section, I note that the appraisal and bestowal views exclude the possibility that one could be loved for oneself in the relevant sense and note some other possible, initial objections. Finally, in the fourth section, I attempt to show one way in which God can be said to love his creatures in creating them – despite the fact that they do not exist before their own creation. I do so by attempting to show that, plausibly, there is a sense in which, if God engages in the creative act for its own sake and the creature itself is that act seen under a certain aspect, God can plausibly be said to create the creature for its own sake – and so, plausibly, to create it in love.

This paper argues that the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA), originally formulated as a much-noted intervention in the realist/antirealist debate about scientific theories, has notable implications for discussions of hypotheses concerning ultimate reality – particularly for the debate about so-called (alternative) concepts of God in both philosophy of religion and theology. Despite the substantial differences between scientific theories and concepts of God, or other hypotheses concerning ultimate reality, certain common strategies for establishing their central claims as true show surprising similarities in their vulnerability to the PUA. The main thesis advanced is that inferences that the central claims of a given concept of God are (probably or approximately) true are unreliable if, and to the extent to which, that concept of God is accepted on the basis of, and its central claims are arrived at and justified through, inferences to the best explanation or eliminative inferences. If the argument is successful, then if theological realism in the form of realist theism is to be maintained, the central claims of concepts of God must be based also on other epistemic grounds.

This article is part of Religious Studies’ initiative to publish a series of interviews with distinguished philosophers of religion. Each interview explores the personal and academic background of the interviewee and discusses their core philosophical views. The aim is to inspire students and scholars and to provide an overview of some of the most important works developed by contemporary philosophers of religion. In this interview, Chris Tweedt interviews Jonathan Kvanvig, covering such topics as his upbringing, his educational and career trajectory, and his views on philosophical methodology, epistemic humility, divine providence, faith, and hell.

This article examines the role of religious law in the context of modern state formation in the Arabian Gulf sheikhdoms. It focuses on Qatar, where a dual legal system emerged out of contestations over political community in the aftermath of imperialism and oil. From the mid-twentieth century onward, the ruling family empowered both a sharia and a civil judiciary without fully clarifying the jurisdictional boundaries between the two judiciaries. Until the 2003 unification of the judiciary, litigants were seemingly free to take civil and criminal cases to a court of their choice. I suggest that the appeal of Qatar’s Sharia Courts lay primarily in the socially embedded nature of Islamic legal practice, the extra-legal functions fulfilled by sharia judges, and the transnational networks of Islamic institutions. While the appeal of the sharia was partly produced by the state, Islamic legal institutions also drew force from their oppositional stance toward modern state power. The Qatari case shows how legal actors can secure state recognition by positioning themselves as authentic cultural mediators against the alienating structures of modern bureaucracy when they offer an alternative model of justice grounded in a dense network of social relations and the provision of a wide range of services.

This article argues that the image of the ‘bad German’ and the animus that accompanied it was tempered by that of the defeated German and the pity Italians in liberal and Catholic circles expressed for German misery. Such sympathetic expressions were not confined to the ruling elite but circulated broadly in media representations and in accounts given by Italians who travelled north in the early postwar years. To view Germans as objects of pity was an empowering act and a humanising one. As an emotion and a practice, pity provided a blueprint for how to think and feel about the former enemy – and oneself – that, in Italy, reinforced Catholic and liberal frameworks for political and social reconstruction. Important to constructions of East–West difference and to the Christian democratic groundings of Western Europe, pity continues to shape debates on European identity, immigration and humanitarian aid.