The outbreak of the American Revolution thrust would-be revolutionaries into a paradoxical relationship with the law. As they overthrew colonial governments from New Hampshire to Georgia during the summer and fall of 1775, leaders of the resistance to Great Britain found themselves in the awkward position of having to justify rebellion against British authority while still professing to be law-abiding Britons. The revolutionaries’ mandate to govern rested on protecting rights to property and representation that many colonists believed had been violated by agents of the Empire, but the practicalities of war demanded extra-legal measures. The popular governments that replaced colonial administrations had to find a way to balance upholding many of the laws of the old regime while simultaneously organizing an armed insurrection against it. Much of this burden fell on revolutionary committees at the town and local level. As the Continental Congress and provincial elites vacillated between rebellion and reconciliation and struggled to assert control over the fast-growing revolutionary coalition, ad hoc governments comprised of ordinary citizens took on the tasks of governing their regions and organizing for armed struggle. For much of 1775 and early 1776, these popular regimes precariously balanced the need for extra-legal expediencies with the need to maintain at least a semblance of law to maintain their legitimacy.

This article develops two logical arguments from evil that bypass Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence through a critical examination of the relationship between freedom and value. The first argument assumes that morally innocent freedom is valuable, challenging the traditional emphasis on significant freedom. The second argument draws on an interpretation of J.L. Mackie’s underexplored ethical perspective, which highlights a form of evil that contrasts with the positive value of free will.

In numerous climate litigation cases before national courts, plaintiffs have referred to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and/or the Paris Agreement to support their claims. So far, no systematic appraisal has been conducted on how national courts have responded to such references to international climate law and the extent to which they have engaged with it. This article examines 148 cases in which plaintiffs refer to international climate law, mapping and analyzing judgments of national courts that either avoid, align with, or contest this legal framework. The findings indicate that invoking international climate law is not an easy path to success, as courts often have opted to avoid engagement with claims based on international climate law. Yet, in several landmark cases, courts have aligned with international climate law, contributing to the advancement of the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), founded in Paris in 1946 by a group of antifascist lawyers, has long been dismissed as a Soviet front organization. Yet, this characterization overlooks its complex and multifaceted history. This paper reassesses IADL’s first thirty years, exploring its origins, internal debates, and cross-border engagement. Drawing on archival records, this article argues that—despite a period of Communist influence—the IADL contributed to international legal and political discourse by advancing an original approach defined here as radical legal internationalism. Through this framework, IADL lawyers questioned Cold War ideological boundaries and brought into dialogue Communist, progressive, New Left, decolonial, and liberal rights traditions. The article also uncovers the IADL’s significant role in promoting international law and human rights through trial observation, UN advocacy, and missions of inquiry. In challenging the dominant account of the Left’s delayed and uneasy embrace of human rights, this article calls for a broader understanding of Cold War-era legal internationalism and highlights an alternative tradition of legal activism.