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Variation between general practices in the rate of consultations for musculoskeletal pain conditions may signal important differences in access to primary care, perceived usefulness, or available alternative sources of care; however, it might also just reflect differences in underlying ‘need’ between practices’ registered populations. In a study of 30 general practices in Staffordshire, we calculated the proportion of adults consulting for a musculoskeletal pain condition, then examined this in relation to selected practice and population characteristics, including the estimated prevalence of self-reported musculoskeletal problems and chronic pain in each practices’ registered population. Between September 2021 and July 2022, 18,388 adults were consulted for a musculoskeletal pain condition. After controlling for length of recruitment, time of year, and age-sex structure, the proportion consulting varied up to two-fold between practices but was not strongly associated with the prevalence of self-reported long-term musculoskeletal problems, chronic pain, and high-impact chronic pain.
This article suggests that Henry, third Earl Grey, had a vision of a liberal British world, which he hoped to implement through a political career. It was based on strong executive governance, representative politics, and the abolition of protection and slavery. It relied on the free market and good race relations to bring progress. He rejected the idea that legislation could impose improvement on colonial peoples. His program was quickly derailed, because of turbulent representative politics in Britain and the colonies after 1848. Later political developments made any integrated liberal vision of empire even more impractical. Studying Grey's arguments, and their fate, can help the task of defining British imperial liberalism. It is best understood as an attempt to check (Tory) vested interests, rather than as an ideology of interventionist improvement. Its priorities and tensions make most sense in relation to the concepts, assumptions, and turning points that dominated British politics.
If states are permitted to create and maintain a military force, by what means are they permitted to do so? This article argues that a theory of just recruitment should incorporate a concern for moral risk. Since the military is a morally risky profession for its members, recruitment policies should be evaluated in terms of how they distribute moral risk within a community. We show how common military recruitment practices exacerbate and concentrate moral risk exposure, using the UK as a case study. We argue that the British state wrongs its citizens by subjecting them to excessively morally risky recruitment practices. Since, we argue, this risk exposure cannot be justified by appealing to the benefits of a military career for recruits, our argument calls for reform of existing practices. Our method of evaluation is generalizable and therefore can be used to assess other states’ practices.
Chater & Loewenstein argue that i-frame research has been coopted by private interests opposed to system-level reform, leading to ineffective interventions. They recommend that behavioural scientists refocus on system-level interventions. We suggest that the influence of private interests on research is problematic for wider normative and epistemic reasons. A system-level intervention to shield research from private influence is needed.
Despite a recent explosion of interest in the ethics of armed conflict, the traditional just war criterion that war be waged by a “legitimate authority” has received relatively little attention. Moreover, of those theorists who have addressed the criterion, many are deeply skeptical about its moral significance. This article aims to add some clarity and precision to the authority criterion and the debates surrounding it, and to suggest that this skepticism may be too quick. The first section analyzes the authority criterion and reveals that there are at least two distinct moral claims associated with it, each requiring separate evaluation. The second section outlines an increasingly influential “reductivist” approach to just war theory, explaining how this approach grounds powerful objections to the authority criterion. The third section sketches the most promising strategies for providing a qualified defense of authority, while acknowledging the further questions and complications these strategies raise. Importantly, the article aims to rehabilitate the authority criterion from within a broadly reductivist view.
Based on a case study of informal sector construction labour in the central Indian steel town of Bhilai, this paper explores the intersection and the mutually constitutive relationship between social class on the one hand, and gender (and more specifically sexual) relations on the other. It is part of an attempt to document and analyse a process of class differentiation within the manual labour force between aspirant middle class organized sector workers and the unorganized sector ‘labour class’. With some help from the (pre-capitalist) ‘culture’ of their commonly work-shy men-folk, their class situation forces ‘labour class’ women onto construction sites where they are vulnerable to the sexual predation of supervisors, contractors and owners. That some acquiesce reinforces the widespread belief that ‘labour class’ women are sexually available, which in turn provides ‘proof’ to the labour aristocracy that they themselves are a different and better breed, superior in culture and morals. Class inequalities produce a particular configuration of gender relations; gender relations (and in particular sexual relations) produce a powerful ideological justification for class differentiation. This proposition has strong resonances with processes reported from other parts of the world; but in the Indian context and in its specific focus on sex it has not been clearly articulated and its significance for class formation has not been adequately appreciated.
The scientific literature contains evidence suggesting that women who have been treated for breast cancer may, as a result of their diagnosis, increase their phyto-oestrogen (PE) intake. In the present paper, we describe the creation of a dietary analysis database (based on Dietplan6) for the determination of dietary intakes of specific PE (daidzein, genistein, glycitein, formononetin, biochanin A, coumestrol, matairesinol and secoisolariciresinol), in a group of women previously diagnosed and treated for postmenopausal breast cancer. The design of the database, data evaluation criteria, literature data entry for 551 foods and primary analysis by LC–MS/MS of an additional thirty-four foods for which there were no published data are described. The dietary intake of 316 women previously treated for postmenopausal breast cancer informed the identification of potential food and beverage sources of PE and the bespoke dietary analysis database was created to, ultimately, quantify their PE intake. In order that PE exposure could be comprehensively described, fifty-four of the 316 subjects completed a 24 h urine collection, and their urinary excretion results allowed for the description of exposure to include those identified as ‘equol producers’.
It is a classical anthropological paradox that symbols of rebirth and fertility are frequently found in funerary rituals throughout the world. The original essays collected here re-examine this phenomenon through insights from China, India, New Guinea, Latin America, and Africa. The contributors, each a specialist in one of these areas, have worked in close collaboration to produce a genuinely innovative theoretical approach to the study of the symbolism surrounding death, an outline of which is provided in an important introduction by the editors. The major concern of the volume is the way in which funerary rituals dramatically transform the image of life as a dialectic flux involving exchange and transaction, marriage and procreation, into an image of a still, transcendental order in which oppositions such as those between self and other, wife-giver and wife-taker, Brahmin and untouchable, birth and therefore death have been abolished. This transformation often involves a general devaluation of biology, and, particularly, of sexuality, which is contrasted with a more spiritual and controlled source of life. The role of women, who are frequently associated with biological processes, mourning and death pollution, is often predominant in funerary rituals, and in examining this book makes a further contribution to the understanding of the symbolism of gender. The death rituals and the symbolism of rebirth are also analysed in the context of the political processes of the different societies considered, and it is argued that social order and political organisation may be legitimated through an exploitation of the emotions and biology.
In the long-drawn-out Reform crisis of 1830-1832, there had been much radical criticism of the Tory leanings of the Church, manifest in the bishops' overwhelming opposition to the Reform Bill in the Lords, and evangelical attacks on its bloated and complacent internal state. The 1848-1851 period was a major watershed in British history, in which the 'Old Corruption' argument finally lost its potency. The changed political atmosphere not only bolstered the institutions of state; it also altered attitudes to the role of interests in politics. The main reason for the waning of interest in institutional reform was, rather, the growing acceptance of the notion that politics itself was no longer controlled by an unrepresentative elite, but was open to popular influence. The Whig-Liberal tradition of measured constitutional reform did a good deal to improve the representativeness, reputation and remit of Parliament and strengthen popular confidence in the state.
The most important variable in the relationship between religion and politics in modern British history has not been the strength of religion but the strength of politics. The key question is not the extent of ‘secularisation’ at any one time – which is fortunate, given how tricky and unstable a concept it is. Religion has not played as destabilising a role in British mainland politics over the last two centuries as it has in some other countries. But it does not follow that religion has been a marginal influence in a ‘secular’ political culture. This chapter argues that, on the contrary, religion has often been a major theme in politics, certainly in the nineteenth century. However, religious disagreements were confined and muted by political processes. In Britain, the religious conscience was disciplined to accept the legitimacy and primacy of political institutions, even while it remained vibrant within the broader public culture.
Most prominent in asserting a religious conscience were evangelical Protestant Dissenters, for whom opposition to state support for religion was a basic principle. As soon as the political reforms of 1828–32 gave them a national political presence, they started agitating against the requirement to pay rates for the upkeep of the local Anglican Church, their exclusion from Oxford and Cambridge universities, and the existence of the Anglican Church establishment itself in England, Wales and Ireland.
This volume deals with the way in which money is symbolically represented in a range of different cultures, from South and South-east Asia, Africa and South America. It is also concerned with the moral evaluation of monetary and commercial exchanges as against exchanges of other kinds. The essays cast radical doubt on many Western assumptions about money: that it is the acid which corrodes community, depersonalises human relationships, and reduces differences of quality to those of mere quantity; that it is the instrument of man's freedom, and so on. Rather than supporting the proposition that money produces easily specifiable changes in world view, the emphasis here is on the way in which existing world views and economic systems give rise to particular ways of representing money. But this highly relativistic conclusion is qualified once we shift the focus from money to the system of exchange as a whole. One rather general pattern that then begins to emerge is of two separate but related transactional orders, the majority of systems making some ideological space for relatively impersonal, competitive and individual acquisitive activity. This implies that even in a non-monetary economy these features are likely to exist within a certain sphere of activity, and that it is therefore misleading to attribute them to money. By so doing, a contrast within cultures is turned into a contrast between cultures, thereby reinforcing the notion that money itself has the power to transform the nature of social relationships.
Between the 1830s and 1880s European problems had a profound impact on British politics. Jonathan Parry examines the effect on the British Liberal movement of the most significant of these, such as the 1848 Revolutions, the unification of Italy, the Franco-Prussian War and the Eastern Question, arguing that these European problems made patriotism a major political question: governments were judged by their success in promoting British interests abroad, but also by the purity, potency and 'Englishness' of the political values they represented. This volume makes a major contribution towards understanding three important aspects of nineteenth-century British history: British attitudes to Europe, contemporary notions of national identity, and the nature and dynamic of British Liberalism. Setting foreign and domestic policy discussions in a patriotic framework, Parry offers an analysis of the ideas that influenced the Liberal political coalition and the turning-points affecting its vigour and unity as a political movement.
In a suggestive recent article, Michael Burawoy (2003) discovers a complementarity and an at first sight unlikely convergence between Karl Polanyi and Antonio Gramsci. Though they came from different backgrounds, and had roots in the different Marxian traditions of Lukacs and Lenin, both broke with, and in comparable ways superseded, “Classical” Marxism. Taken together they lay the ground for the development of a rejuvenated and more “sociological” recension of the tradition. While most variants occlude society in their preoccupation with the state, the market, and their interrelations, they make it central to the analysis. Polanyi's focus is on the relationship between (“active”) society and the market; Gramsci's focus is on that between (“civil”) society and the state. But, crucially, they converge “on a similar conception of society as both the container of capitalism's contradictions and the terrain of its transcendence” (Burawoy 2003: 21–2). On Burawoy's reading, however, Gramsci has a more compelling analysis of “containment” than of “transcendence.” Polanyi provides genuine scope for a theory of counter-hegemony but is Pollyanna-ish about the obstacles to it.
Both reject the linear teleology of Classical Marxism and the mechanical determinism of the German Marxism of their day. History is not pre-ordained. “We can only know what is or has been, not what will be – for this does not exist, and is therefore by definition unknowable,” says Gramsci (quoted in Kolakowski 1981 3: 234).
Nineteenth-century political history is often written without any reference to the fact that most propertied Britons considered their country to be the greatest power that the world had ever seen and expected that status to be maintained. It is almost always written without reference to the widespread belief that Providence had given Britain its great position and required duties in return. And it is invariably written without enough reflection on the connection between Britain's global policy and the domestic dominance of the Liberal party between 1830 and 1886. This book has argued that for most of that period the Liberal party was successful at identifying with the values that seemed to have made Britain a uniquely successful polity and a major force in the progress of the world. Liberal leaders constructed a series of patriotic discourses around the themes of constitutionalism, tolerance, fiscal accountability, free trade and Christian humanitarianism. By studying the period 1830–86 as a whole, and by concentrating on how those discourses connected domestic, Irish and foreign themes, it is possible, on the one hand, to get a clearer sense of the nature and timing of British political shifts, and, on the other, to see that the most effective political language was one that was both liberal and nationalistic. By emphasising the pre-Gladstonian history of British Liberalism, a better picture emerges both of the character and success of the Liberal party, and of the prevailing political values of the nineteenth century, before the brief swing to imperialism of the 1880s and 1890s.