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We describe the electoral history of one of Europe’s most successful party families over the past 100 years in 31 countries. With a unique and newly collected dataset of national election results and a large number of economic and social variables measured for each country-election observation, we find that two main factors drive the electoral performance of social democratic parties: public-sector spending and the size of the manufacturing sector. Our findings suggest that most of the fall in support for social democratic parties in recent years is correlated with a decline in the number of industrial workers as well as a reduction in the propensity of social democratic parties’ core supporters (industrial workers and public-sector employees) to vote for them.
Immigration is highly salient for voters in Europe and the USA and has generated considerable academic debate about the causes of preferences over immigration. This debate centers around the relative influences of sociotropic or personal economic considerations, as well as noneconomic threats. We provide a test of the competing egocentric, sociotropic, and noneconomic paradigms using a novel constrained preference experiment in which respondents are asked to trade off preferred reductions in immigration levels with realistic estimates of the personal or societal costs associated with those reductions. This survey experiment, performed on a national sample of British YouGov panelists, allows us to measure the price-elasticity of the publicʼs preferences with regard to levels of European and non-European immigration. Respondents were willing to admit more immigrants when restriction carries economic costs, with egocentric considerations as important as sociotropic ones. People who voted for the UK to Leave the European Union in the 2016 referendum are less price-elastic than those voting Remain, indicating that noneconomic concerns are also important.1
Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites, but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. This article addresses this issue by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in Norway in 1919, which permits the measurement of parties’ vote shares in pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect on the fragmentation of the party system, due in part to strategic party entry. The authors find, though, that another main effect of the reform was that many voters switched between existing parties, particularly between the Liberals and Conservatives, as the incentives for these voters to coordinate against Labor were removed by the introduction of PR.
What are the lessons of the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the European Union (EU) regarding the effects of message framing? This article reports findings from an innovative online survey experiment based on a two-wave panel design. The findings show that, despite the expectation that campaign effects are generally small for high-salience issues – such as Brexit – the potential for campaign effects was high for the pro-EU frames. This suggests that within an asymmetrical information environment – in which the arguments for one side of an issue (anti-EU) are ‘priced in’, while arguments for the other side (pro-EU) have been understated – the potential for campaign effects in a single direction are substantial. To the extent that this environment is reflected in other referendum campaigns, the potential effect of pro-EU frames may be substantial.
What motivates politicians to engage in legislative activities? In multilevel systems politicians may be incentivized by ambitions to advance their careers either at the state or federal level. This article argues that the design of the electoral institutions influences how politicians respond to these incentives. Analyzing a unique dataset of both ‘stated’ and ‘realized’ career ambitions of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), it finds that those who seek to move from the European to the national (state) level participate less in legislative activities than those who plan to stay at the European (federal) level. For MEPs who aim to move to the state level, attendance and participation in legislative activities is substantively lower among legislators from candidate-centered systems. Importantly, the effect of career ambitions on legislative participation is stronger in candidate-centered systems than in party-centered systems. These findings suggest that the responsiveness associated with candidate-centered systems comes at the expense of legislative activity.
Which parties benefit from open-list (as opposed to closed-list) proportional representation elections? This article shows that a move from closed-list to open-list competition is likely to be more favorable to parties with more internal disagreement on salient issues; this is because voters who might have voted for a unified party under closed lists may be drawn to specific candidates within internally divided parties under open lists. The study provides experimental evidence of this phenomenon in a hypothetical European Parliament election in the UK, in which using an open-list ballot would shift support from UKIP (the Eurosceptic party) to Eurosceptic candidates of the Conservative Party. The findings suggest that open-list ballots could restrict support for parties that primarily mobilize on a single issue.
This study uses roll-call voting data from 16 legislatures to investigate how the institutional context of politics—such as whether a country is a parliamentary or presidential regime, or has a single-party, coalition or minority government—shapes coalition formation and voting behavior in parliaments. It uses a geometric scaling metric to estimate the “revealed space” in each of these legislatures and a vote-by-vote statistical analysis to identify how much of this space can be explained by government-opposition dynamics as opposed to parties’ (left-right) policy positions. Government-opposition interests, rather than parties’ policy positions, are found to be the main drivers of voting behavior in most institutional contexts. In contrast, issue-by-issue coalition building along a single policy dimension is only found under certain restrictive institutional constraints: presidential regimes with coalition governments or parliamentary systems with minority governments. Put another way, voting in most legislatures is more like Westminster than Washington.
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY attempted to balance two principles of representation in their redesign of the institutional structures of the European Union: the one, based on the indirect representation of publics through nationally elected governments in the European Council and Council of Ministers; the other, based on the direct representation of publics through a more powerful European Parliament. There is much to be said for this balance, for neither of the two principles can, on its own, be an adequate solution at this stage in the development of the EU. The Council suffers from a non-transparent style of decision-making and is, in the view of many, closer to oligarchic than to democratic politics. On the other hand, the claims of the European Parliament to represent public sentiments on European integration are limited by low voter participation, the second-order nature of European elections and the still Protean nature of what we might call a transnational European demos. The EU lacks a single public arena of political debate, communications and shared meanings; of partisan aggregation and political entrepreneurship; and of high and even acceptance, across issues and member states, that it is European and not national majority views which should count in collective rule-making.
This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval. The study predicts smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, under the co-decision (consultation) procedure when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament (Commission) are closer to each other. More activity is expected under qualified majority voting in the Council than under unanimity. The results find support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009.
Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.
Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.
A growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.
With the European Parliament comprising politicians from many different countries, cultures, languages, national parties and institutional backgrounds, one might expect politics in the Parliament to be highly-fragmented and unpredictable. By studying more than 12,000 recorded votes between 1979 and 2004 this 2007 book establishes that the opposite is in fact true: transnational parties in the European Parliament are highly cohesive and the classic 'left-right' dimension dominates voting behaviour. Furthermore, the cohesion of parties in the European Parliament has increased as the powers of the Parliament have increased. The authors suggest that the main reason for these developments is that like-minded MEPs have incentives to form stable transnational party organizations and to use these organizations to compete over European Union policies. They suggest that this is a positive development for the future of democratic accountability in the European Union.
Party ‘federations’ have begun to exist in the European Union, but these are not ‘parties’ in the true sense of the word. They are beginning to exercise some influence, not just in the European Parliament but, to an extent at least, on the European Commission and on the European Council as well. However, it does remain the case that the structure of the European Union is not conducive to the setting up of real parties: elections to the European Parliament have been regarded as being, to an extent, ‘second-order’ compared with national elections, and the system as a whole is also typically regarded as suffering from a ‘democratic deficit’. What is needed is to design an institutional mechanism to facilitate competitive party government in the European Union.
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science,Abdul G. Noury, Université Libre de Bruxelles,Gérard Roland, University of California, Berkeley
In this chapter, our aim is to provide some essential background material for understanding the argument and evidence we present in the rest of the book. We focus on three aspects of the story of the European Parliament: (1) the main powers of the institution and how these have changed; (2) how the political parties and the party system in the European Parliament have evolved; and (3) why the ‘electoral connection’ from citizens to MEPs remains rather weak despite six rounds of European Parliament elections. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ‘roll-call votes’ in the European Parliament, which is the data we use in the rest of the book to understand how politics inside the European Parliament has changed. Roll-call votes are votes where the voting decision of each MEP is recorded. The roll-call voting records are published in the annexes to the minutes of the plenary sessions of the European Parliament. Nowadays, they can also be found on the website of the European Parliament.
1.1 Powers of the European Parliament
The precursor to the modern European Parliament was the ‘Assembly’ of the European Coal and Steel Community, which held its first meeting on 10 September 1952.
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science,Abdul G. Noury, Université Libre de Bruxelles,Gérard Roland, University of California, Berkeley
Following the reform of the Commission investiture procedure by the Maastricht Treaty, as described in Chapter 1, on 21 July 1994 the European Parliament voted for the first time on the choice of a Commission President, and backed Jacques Santer by a narrow margin. Many MEPs, mostly on the left, were reluctant to support Santer. This was partly because they disagreed with his policy agenda (as a Christian democrat politician) and partly because they were unhappy with the way the nomination process had been conducted by the European Council. So, when the Commission was later accused of gross mismanagement, many MEPs who had originally opposed Santer now found the ideal opportunity to challenge his legitimacy. The Commission survived two censure votes before resigning en masse in March 1999, just before a likely loss in the third censure vote.
The story of the Santer Commission is a revealing case of how the European Parliament exercises its executive-control powers. This case also enables us to test whether our argument, which holds for a large number of votes across a long time period, also explains MEP behaviour when there are high political stakes. If democratic politics exists in the European Parliament, then the positions of the European parties should make a difference, and the left–right dimension should structure MEP behaviour, regardless of whether the parliament is voting on a minor non-legislative resolution or on a Commission censure motion.
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science,Abdul G. Noury, Université Libre de Bruxelles,Gérard Roland, University of California, Berkeley
If we follow the reasoning from Chapter 2, a strong party system requires that parties are cohesive, in other words that the elected members of the same party vote in a disciplined way, following the position reached by their party leaders in the parliament. A political party will attract support by making commitments to particular policies or goals that are distinct from the commitments of other parties. If a party is able to work as a highly organised team, it will be able to turn these promises into policy outcomes. If a party is not able to ‘rally its troops’, it will have little chance of shaping policy outcomes, and so will leave its supporters disappointed. Scholars of the EU have hence argued that for transnational parties to increase the democratic accountability of the EU they must be able to act cohesively to implement the policy platforms they announce (e.g. Attinà, 1992; Andeweg, 1995; Hix and Lord, 1997). If voting in the European Parliament breaks down along national lines rather than party lines, the transnational political groups cannot claim to be able to articulate the classic ideological viewpoints in the EU policy-making process with any real degree of effectiveness. Testing for the cohesiveness of parties is the first natural step towards understanding the effectiveness of parties. As in the previous chapter, where we looked at the long-run and short-run determinants of participation, we analyse in this chapter the long-run determinants of cohesion.
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science,Abdul G. Noury, Université Libre de Bruxelles,Gérard Roland, University of California, Berkeley
One of the main ways of understanding politics inside legislative institutions is to investigate the shape of the policy space. The number of policy dimensions and the location of actors on these dimensions determine, among other things, which actors are pivotal and the possibility and direction of policy change (e.g. Tsebelis, 2002). Not surprisingly, a fast growing area of political science research in recent years has been the estimation of actors' ideal points. This has taken a variety of forms and methods, such as scaling of roll-call voting data (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), hand coding of party manifestos (Budge et al., 2001), surveys of experts' opinions of parties' positions (e.g. Laver and Hunt, 1992), or computer coding of political statements (e.g. Laver et al., 2003).
The European Parliament is an especially interesting object for spatial analysis of the dimensionality of politics because of its unique features. There is considerable heterogeneity between the cultures, histories, economic conditions and national institutions of the EU member states. Therefore, politics in the European Parliament is likely to be more complex than politics in many national parliaments. MEPs are also members of national parties as well as European political groups. A legislature with such characteristics is potentially one with high dimensionality.
In this chapter we describe the policy space inside the European Parliament by applying an established scaling method to the roll-call votes between 1979 and 2004.
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science,Abdul G. Noury, Université Libre de Bruxelles,Gérard Roland, University of California, Berkeley
Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science,Abdul G. Noury, Université Libre de Bruxelles,Gérard Roland, University of California, Berkeley