In the era of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 (IR 4.0), the adequacy of training models for industrial needs is being challenged. Africa is a skills hub, threatened by unemployment among young people, especially graduates, competition, and the sustainability of industrial fabrics. By carrying out a systematic literature review, this article aims to highlight the aspects and outcomes of the educational revolution that must accompany IR 4.0. The results show that IR 4.0 offers new careers, and that training is a key barrier to the successful digital transformation of the industry. University 4.0 is the conversion needed to overcome this barrier. This article explains this new academic model generating skills, which refers to the ability to perform activities effectively with high technical, digital, and flexible management capacities. Faced with the low adoption of IR 4.0, and the lack of a systematic literature review, this article offers a significant platform for the research community, both academic and industrial.

This article proposes five ideas that the design of data governance policies for the trustworthy use of artificial intelligence (AI) in Africa should consider. The first is for African states to assess their domestic strategic priorities, strengths, and weaknesses. The second is a human-centric approach to data governance, which involves data processing practices that protect the security of personal data and the privacy of data subjects; ensure that personal data are processed in a fair, lawful, and accountable manner; minimize the harmful effect of personal data misuse or abuse on data subjects and other victims; and promote a beneficial, trusted use of personal data. The third is for the data policy to be in alignment with supranational rights-respecting AI standards like the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the AU Convention on Cybersecurity, and Personal Data Protection. The fourth is for states to be critical about the extent to which AI systems can be relied on in certain public sectors or departments. The fifth and final proposition is for the need to prioritize the use of representative and interoperable data and ensure a transparent procurement process for AI systems from abroad where no local options exist.

Two fruit fly (Diptera: Tephritidae) species of economic importance: Ceratitis rosa Karsch and Ceratitis quilicii De Meyer, Mwatawala & Virgilio are present in South Africa. The two species were considered as one species prior to 2016, but were subsequently separated. In this study, the distribution and abundance of the two species were quantified in seven provinces in South Africa through trapping with Enriched Ginger Oil as an attractant. Trapping was conducted over three seasons across two years (2020 and 2021): late summer, autumn-winter, and spring-early summer. Host ranges of the two species were investigated by fruit sampling in and outside of trapping sites. Ceratitis quilicii was more widely distributed than C. rosa with the latter being recorded in only three north-eastern provinces. There were geographical limits for both species with no records of them in Northern Cape Province. Catches of C. quilicii were higher in summer with average temperatures varying from 15 to 27°C while for C. rosa, catches remained low and consistent between seasons. Ceratitis quilicii catches decreased at lower rates than those of C. rosa at temperatures below 15°C. The two species were reared from 13 plant species from nine families. Four of these hosts were infested by both C. quilicii and C. rosa in the same province where they occurred. Preferred hosts of the two species belonged to the Myrtaceae family. The characterisation of the distribution, abundance and host ranges of these pests will provide a baseline for pest status determination and implementation of management actions.

Drawing on their own field studies, the authors examine how state and local actors involved in resource management and peacebuilding activities are implicated in the conflict between farmers and herders in Plateau State, Nigeria, and Central Darfur State, Sudan. The authors show that state officials, traditional chiefs, and security agents intensified the conflict by perpetuating the inequitable distribution of resources needed for the survival of farmers and herders, while promoting a peacebuilding process that empowered some groups and disempowered others. The divisive role state and local actors played accentuated the socio-political grievances underlying the conflict and enervated the peacebuilding process.

The concept of degrowth aligns with the principles of Climate and Environmental Justice (CEJ) in significant aspects. Both frameworks underline the need for new global structures and social movements that promote ecological conservation, local economic regeneration, and social well-being that goes beyond material accumulation. Therefore, degrowth can reinforce the pursuit of transformative global climate justice. However, I contend that significant contradictions remain between degrowth and North–South climate justice. I argue that on both conceptual and policy grounds, a ‘strong version’ of the green economy provides a better foundation for seeking international climate justice for Africa than degrowth. I also contend that green growth is a more pragmatic and realistic approach to global climate justice because it is more sensitive to the norms, structures, and dynamics of global politics.

Does Chinese aid to African countries trigger Chinese foreign direct investment? Bridging the literature on the impact of foreign aid on foreign direct investment (FDI) and that on state ownership, we consider FDI by China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compared with that of its privately owned enterprises (POEs) and find FDI by the former is more likely to follow Chinese governmental aid to Africa. Borrowing from institutional theory, we posit that FDI by SOEs follows political imperatives while FDI by POEs pursues market motives. Using data from multiple sources on 3,760 Chinese FDI projects in Africa between 2001 and 2015, we find a correlation between SOE FDI and government aid than that of POEs; that aid has a greater impact on the probability of FDI when the policies of the host country and those of China are in sync, especially in the case of SOEs; and that in low-investment-risk countries the link between aid and investment is weakened, especially in the case of POEs. The results are robust and consistent across different measures and analyses. We contribute to the literature on the relationship between aid and FDI, as well as to that on varieties of capitalism.

Sabina Yuhas (@Overszabi) and Juliana Belova (@juliewanderz or Oyibo Marlian) are Hungarian and Russian women, respectively, who are fascinated by Nigerian popular culture. Despite their successes in exploiting Black culture to attain wealth and fame in the Nigerian mediasphere, their works have hardly been studied. Close readings and nuanced analyses of their selected TikTok skits show a multiplicity of images that are neither fully European nor Nigerian—equivocal identities—mediating Otherness. However, the longstanding power asymmetries between Africa and Europe characterize their enactments as commodification of Blackness, accounting for why Nigerians who perform “Europeanness” do not attain corresponding success.

Zambia experienced its third electoral turnover in the 2021 election. While the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) lost votes across the territory, the electoral collapse in urban Zambia was particularly remarkable. This paper argues that economic performance voting can explain urban party switching in Zambia. The argument is supported by a unique panel survey of Zambian voters in the period 2019–2022. We show that urban voters were more likely to desert the PF, even when we control for ethnicity. We also show that they were more likely to evaluate the economy poorly and more likely to change their electoral preferences in view of such poor economic evaluation. Our results stress that African elections should not be understood as static expressions of stable political cleavages but may function as real opportunities for political accountability. However, the extent to which voters are willing to re-evaluate their vote choice varies across space.