The COVID-19 pandemic presents Northern-based development organisations with unprecedented difficulties. They are challenged in fundraising opportunities in their home countries and in finding ways to continue their work in the Global South. As the first study to present a systematic mixed method, cross-country study of small-scale, voluntary development organisations in four different European countries, this study provides insight into the role of these private development initiatives (PDIs) in the COVID-19 crisis and sheds light on the differential impact of the crisis on these organisations. Whereas most PDIs are involved in long(er)-term development interventions, the COVID-19 crisis was for most organisations their first experience of emergency aid. Overall, we see strong resilience among PDIs and also find that the organisations which relied more exclusively on traditional methods of fundraising (offline) received a greater funding hit than organisations—often with more younger members—that had already moved to online fundraising.

Following the June 2010 elections, Belgium was left for more than a year without a full government, as negotiations about constitutional reform dragged on. In this article, I investigate why this interregnum did not have any fatal consequences for Belgian governance and society. On a formal level, the Belgian constitution allows a caretaker government to take all necessary steps to ensure continuity, thus avoiding government deadlock. From a political science perspective it can be noted that in a system of multi-level governance, other levels typically step in if one level fails. This is especially the case in a country like Belgium with a strong pro-European consensus, where European Union (EU)-interference is considered as legitimate. The theoretical relevance is that multi-level governance can be seen as a safeguard against government failure.

In the literature on a possible decline of participation levels, several factors are invoked as alleged causes for this trend. Most prominent among these are generational replacement, the spread of television, rising geographic mobility, increasing time pressure, marital instability, and the decline of religious affiliations. In Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam (Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2000) lends credibility to the claim that these factors are at least related to the decline of participation levels in the United States, and might even be regarded as an underlying cause. In this paper, the author assesses whether these variables also have a bearing on the participation level of the Belgian population. The analysis of a Belgian survey (N = 1341) shows that for most of the invoked causes, the relation is not significant, although the decline in religious affiliation does seem a likely candidate for further research. The paper closes with some suggestions for future research on civic engagement.

In this article an integrated framework of agenda‐setting is proposed that incorporates the two main accounts of agenda‐setting: the information‐processing approach by Comparative Agenda Project scholars and the preference‐centred account advanced by Comparative Manifestoes Project scholars. The study claims that attention allocation is determined at the same time by preferences, information and institutions, and that attention allocation is affected by the interactions between these three factors. An empirical test is conducted that draws upon a dataset of parliamentary questions/interpellations in Belgium in the period 1993–2000. It is found that attention in parliament is indeed driven by preceding party manifestos (preferences), by available information (media coverage) and by institutional position (government or opposition party). The evidence establishes that agenda‐setting is also affected by the interactions between preferences, information and institutions. Actors, given their preferences, treat information in a biased fashion, and institutions moderate information's role.

Democratic theory argues that individuals should have their policy preferences equally represented in politics. Research on opinion congruence has often found, however, that political parties’ views are more likely to align with those of higher-income and higher educated citizens. We argue that this conclusion does not account for heterogeneity among parties. Based on an integrated dataset containing the positions of over 1,700 Belgian citizens and 11 Belgian parties on over 120 policy statements, we examine how opinion congruence inequality between privileged and underprivileged people varies between parties. We find that left-wing parties align more with underprivileged citizens than they do with privileged citizens on economic issues, while the opposite holds for right-wing parties. On cultural issues, however, both left- and right-wing parties better represent the preferences of privileged people. The exception is the radical right party Vlaams Belang, which on the cultural dimensions better represents the views of underprivileged voters.

The fact that Belgian politicians did not succeed in forming a government coalition following the June 2010 elections did not prevent public managers and civil servants to guarantee the continuity of government operations. Leading civil servants, whether as departmental managers or as ministerial advisors simply continued to function. Complying with caretaker government conventions, they followed a line of permanence and caution, while urgent matters occasionally released the break on new policy initiatives. It has to be noted that the absence of a federal government for more than a year did not lead to strong negative effects in the delivery of government programmes. Yet, in absence of a political mandate for change, civil servants and public managers cannot implement policy adaptations or drastic reforms that are considered as necessary for the long-term stability of the Belgian economic and social system.

The absence of a federal government in Belgium following the June 2010 elections can be used to illustrate the robustness of multi-level governance structures. As Belgium is a federal country, regional governments simply continued to function. The European Union (EU) actually forced Belgian political decision makers to continue to cooperate, for example, with regard to the Belgian presidency of the EU in 2010 and with regard to the government budget. There is, however, also an unintended side effect of this form of multi-level governance. The continued presence of European and regional policies, to some extent, reduces the necessity for having a national government. Therefore, during government negotiations, the default option of not reaching a compromise is rendered more attractive, and this could reduce the willingness of political parties to find a compromise.

This research note presents the RepResent Belgian Panel (RBP). The RBP is a voter panel survey consisting of four waves fielded to a sample of voters in Belgium around the May 2019 federal, regional, and European elections in Belgium. It provides unique data on about 250 variables for a quota sample of the same respondents, pre-2019 elections (N = 7351), post-2019 elections (N = 3909), one year after the elections (N = 1996), and 2 years after the elections (N = 1119). The RBP panel dataset was designed to analyse voters’ political attitudes and behaviours, notably on different dimensions of democratic representation, and with a specific focus on democratic resentment (e.g. citizens’ attitudes towards democracy such as distrust and alienation, but also behaviours such as abstention, protest, or voting for anti-establishment parties). Its longitudinal structure allows to explore the political dynamics at play in Belgium throughout the lengthy government formation process. Finally, the last two waves of the RBP were fielded during the Covid-19 pandemic, allowing to explore public opinion before and during this global crisis. The RBP should be of interest to scholars of public opinion and electoral studies.

It is well known that different types of electoral systems create different incentives to cultivate a personal vote and that there may be variation in intra‐party competition within an electoral system. This article demonstrates that flexible list systems – where voters can choose to cast a vote for the list as ordered by the party or express preference votes for candidates – create another type of variation in personal vote‐seeking incentives within the system. This variation arises because the flexibility of party‐in‐a‐district lists results from voters' actual inclination to use preference votes and the formal weight of preference votes in changing the original list order. Hypotheses are tested which are linked to this logic for the case of Belgium, where party‐in‐a‐district constituencies vary in their use of preference votes and the electoral reform of 2001 adds interesting institutional variation in the formal impact of preference votes on intra‐party seat allocation. Since formal rules grant Belgian MPs considerable leeway in terms of bill initiation, personal vote‐seeking strategies are inferred by examining the use of legislative activity as signalling tool in the period between 1999 and 2007. The results establish that personal vote‐seeking incentives vary with the extent to which voters use preference votes and that this variable interacts with the weight of preference votes as defined by institutional rules. In addition, the article confirms the effect of intra‐party competition on personal vote‐seeking incentives and illustrates that such incentives can underlie the initiation of private members bills in a European parliamentary system.

Aid fragmentation is considered a burden for recipient countries. NGOs as important channellers of official development assistance can contribute significantly to this fragmentation. This article is a first attempt to conceptualize and measure NGO aid fragmentation while identifying the complex set of (contradictory) incentive structures. The Belgian case, with its multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic setting, and multi-layered government structures is a crucial case for showing the possible variety of factors which may influence fragmentation. The research finds that fighting aid fragmentation may prove a lot more difficult than suggested because, in the Belgian case, with its multiple incentive structures, fragmentation actually pays off for NGOs.

Since 2001, the political science associations of The Netherlands and Flanders (Belgium) have sought ever closer cooperation, culminating in the organisation of annual Dutch–Belgian political science conferences. One of the goals of this unprecedented cooperation is to strengthen the visibility of Dutch-language political science, and to keep Dutch alive as a credible language for political science research. At first sight, this form of regional cooperation runs counter to processes of internationalisation and Europeanisation. It can be argued, however, that exactly these regional identities and associations (cf. also the Nordic countries) can counterbalance a one-sided orientation to Anglo-Saxon norms within international political science.

Traditionally, it is assumed that the executive strongly controls Parliament within the Belgian political system. The absence of a federal government following the 2010 elections had three consequences on the activity of the Belgian Parliament. Some actions were put on hold, and essential reforms were delayed. On other issues, however, Members of Parliament took the lead, developing ad hoc majorities that cut across earlier cleavages between majority and opposition. Third, however, parties continued to vote along the majority of the caretaker government. While it could be expected that this situation, in the long run, might lead to a stronger position of Parliament vis-à-vis government, it is to be expected that traditional power relations will be restored once a full government has been formed.

In this debate section, four Belgian political scientists reflect on the theoretical relevance of the lengthy political crisis that Belgium has known following the elections of June 2010. It is argued that the absence of a federal government did not lead to a policy vacuum, as regional governments, the European Union, public service managers and Members of Parliament tried to expand the scope of their authority. Given trends towards multi-level governance, it is expected that the Belgian political system will manage to survive, even if one of the levels of government (temporarily) falls out.

European societies are increasingly grappling with the often violent and deceitful circumstances through which now-treasured artefacts made their way from their colonies to museums in the metropole. This article shows this emerging norm of colonial heritage restitution by describing key norm components and assessing the norm’s current strength. Moreover, the article analyses the norm’s implementation in two European states to better understand how and why states implement the colonial heritage restitution norm. The comparison shows that Belgium and the United Kingdom have implemented the norm differently and incompletely: while both states have seen extensive discourse surrounding colonial heritage restitution as a moral duty to right past wrongs among civil society and museums, domestic legal changes and museum policies have varied due to different institutional contexts and government positions on heritage restitution. The paper attests to the critical role of national governments’ norm support for explaining divergent implementation, while other domestic actors such as museums and civil society groups are advocating for heritage restitution. The paper contributes to emerging research on museums as norm entrepreneurs in International Relations and transitional justice in established democracies.

Scholars have long recognized the importance of so-called “Ghent” systems of unemployment insurance for working-class strength and therefore national capitalist development. While only three European countries currently maintain “pure” Ghent systems, nearly a dozen did so during the first half of the last century. This article investigates the discontinuation of these systems in two paradigmatic cases, Belgium and the Netherlands. By focusing on the irreconcilable nature of trade union goals regarding the delivery, range, and funding of unemployment insurance, the analysis explains how the discontinuation of Ghent in these two countries could occur under distinctly union-friendly governments and with the explicit consent of their trade union movements. By showing that both the Belgian and Dutch trade union movements displayed great uncertainty regarding the organizational costs and benefits of assuming responsibility for benefit delivery, the article also explains why Belgium subsequently created a semi-Ghent system that continued to significantly boost union membership, while the Netherlands did not.

Gendered inequalities in campaign finance are generally considered an important impediment to the equal representation of women in parliament. A multivariate analysis of 11,897 Flemish candidates in the Belgian elections from 1999 to 2019 provides strong new evidence of the gender gap in campaign spending, showing that women candidates are significantly outspent by men. But this gender gap is only present after the introduction of strict quota and is limited to non-incumbents. It takes 16 years and five elections after the introduction of strict quotas before this gender gap narrows. In terms of the funding of their campaigns, women draw significantly less money from their personal wealth and receive less money from their parties when strict quotas are in place.