Current scholarship increasingly argues that international factors and, more specifically, authoritarian collaboration fundamentally affect the persistence of authoritarian rule. In order to generate a better understanding of the nature and effects of these international dimensions of authoritarianism, this article provides a conceptual framework for various aspects of authoritarian collaboration to prevent democracy, particularly the relationship between authoritarian regime types and their international democracy‐prevention policies. It differentiates between authoritarian diffusion, learning, collaboration and support, as well as between deliberate efforts to avert democracy and efforts not explicitly geared towards strengthening autocracy. The article further distinguishes between crisis events and normal conditions where authoritarian rulers' hold on power is not in danger. It is argued that authoritarian powers' motivations to provide support to fellow autocrats are self‐serving rather than driven by an ideological commitment to creating an ‘authoritarian international’: authoritarian rulers first and foremost strive to maximise their own survival chances by selectively supporting acquiescent authoritarian regimes, maintaining geostrategic control and fostering their developmental goals.

Civil society in Gramscian conception is an arena of hegemonic contestations and therefore essentially political. Development is also a political process inasmuch as it involves power in the allocation of resources and values. Yet, some African states as elsewhere globally, attempt to create and reproduce a legal–policy environment that favours an ‘apolitical’ ‘development’-oriented civil society while disabling those perceived ‘political’. This article argues the state–civil society relationship ambivalence is a product of competing visions of what constitutes ‘politics’ and ‘development’ and their governmentalities. Drawing on existing literature, primary interviews and media articles, the paper attempts to bring into conversation discourses on the political and development roles of civil society and how these have shaped state–civil society relationships from colonial period to the present day Kenya. Reflecting on manifestations of assumed role dichotomy and implications for state–civil society relations, the paper argues that the dual roles are complimentary and mutually reinforcing. The dual roles have also resulted in multiple relationships between state and civil society.

The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has overwhelmed the Lithuanian healthcare system. In an attempt to meet its emergency situation and mitigate the new challenges, the Government reached out to the private sector, aiming to develop a sustainable cooperation approach in healthcare service provision. The article examines the potential implications for the healthcare system in Lithuania and adaptation paths. The preliminary overview refers to the assumption that the efforts to deliver sustainable service in the healthcare sector were uncoordinated and showed institutional vulnerability in both private and public sectors.

Since a few years, humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are faced with increased insecurity in regions where armed conflicts prevail, such as in Afghanistan, Somalia or Sudan. An analysis of the NGOs’ reaction to this development based on 23 semi-structured interviews reveals that identity matters and plays a crucial role. On the one hand, for reasons related to their identity, addressing this insecurity proves challenging for NGOs, which is why they tend to shy away from taking steps in this direction. On the other hand, identity can facilitate organisational learning and help overcome organisational barriers related to it. In this respect identity allows NGOs to join security networks and cooperate across NGO boundaries, while at the same time using it as an indicator to distinguish between who they can trust and who therefore is part of the network and who is not.

We investigate cooperative attitudes among workers of nonprofit organizations by means of a novel empirical method combining experimental and survey data. Specifically, a two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game is attached to a nationwide survey of social cooperatives in Italy. We experimentally manipulate social proximity of those interacting in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the relative returns of mutual cooperation. We find that higher returns foster cooperation when social proximity of participants is low, while cooperation is not affected by a change in social proximity alone. Furthermore, social relations in the workplace and innate dispositional factors correlate with choices in the game. Our findings offer stimulating insights into the interplay between organizational features and workers’ motivations.

Efforts to address human trafficking require a multi-faceted approach. The “3-P” index outlined in the U.N. protocol on human trafficking highlights the importance of prosecuting criminals, protecting survivors, and preventing the crime. In addition to states, civil society organizations (CSOs) play a crucial role in fighting this issue. Cooperation between the state and CSOs is increasingly recognized as a vital strategy for combatting human trafficking. Does the consulting of CSOs by policymakers affect outcomes in prosecution, protection, and prevention? Using data from an original data set of 183 countries, my findings suggest that cooperation significantly influences prosecution and prevention efforts, but not protection efforts. I theorize that this is because there are low technical and political costs to implement prosecution and prevention policies, but high technical and political costs to implement protection policies. Furthermore, I argue that CSO consultation is more likely to be associated with shallow, rather than deep, policy changes.

This article reports on a survey of seventeen national political science associations in Europe, which was undertaken as part of discussions leading up to the first Annual General Meeting of a European Confederation of Political Science Associations (ECPSA) held in Spain in summer 2008. The survey provides a detailed overview of the landscape of associations which are widely divergent in size and resourcing but which generally attempt to fulfil similar roles and functions. The responses indicate the forces driving the movement for a new confederation to encourage and enable closer working relationships between national associations.

In Julia Maskivker’s recent “Justice and Contribution,” she argues that, under normal circumstances, the failure to guarantee that life-sustaining workers are above the non-struggle point is not merely disrespectful and a failure of beneficence, but a violation of the norms of fair play and, as such, a “low blow.” In this article, I offer a critical reply to Maskivker. I begin by explaining her reasoning. Then I turn to critique, focusing on two key weaknesses and, in so doing, drawing out two larger lessons.

Do large language models (LLMs) – such as ChatGPT-3.5 Turbo, ChatGPT-4.0, and Gemini 1.0 Pro, and DeepSeek-R1 – simulate human behavior in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game with varying stake sizes? Through a replication of Yamagishi et al. (2016) ‘Study 2,’ we investigate this question, examining LLM responses to different payoff stakes and the influence of stake order on cooperation rates. We find that LLMs do not mirror the inverse relationship between stake size and cooperation found in the study. Rather, some models (DeepSeek-R1 and ChatGPT-4.0) almost wholly defect, while others (ChatGPT-3.5 Turbo and Gemini 1.0 Pro) mirror human behavior only under very specific circumstances. LLMs demonstrate sensitivity to framing and order effects, implying the need for cautious application of LLMs in behavioral research.

Researchers have long speculated about the evolutionary benefits of religiosity. One explanation for the evolution of religious ritual is that rituals signal commitment to co-religionists. As a major domain of prosocial behaviour, alloparental care – or care directed at children by non-parents – is a plausible benefit of religious signalling. The religious alloparenting hypothesis posits that parents who signal religious commitment receive greater alloparental support. Prior research on religiosity, cooperation, and allocare tends to treat individuals as isolated units, despite the inherent collective nature of religious cooperation. Here, we address this limitation in a survey-based study of 710 parents in rural Bangladesh. Instead of focusing only on mothers, we consider the interplay between both mothers and fathers in eliciting allocare, and leverage variation in the covertness of religious rituals to test a key mechanistic assumption linking religious ritual with cooperation. We find that parents who practice religious rituals more frequently receive greater alloparental support from co-religionists. This effect is moderated by parent gender, as well as variation in the visibility of religious rituals. Women’s private practices positively affect only those alloparents with whom they share a household, whereas men’s public practices positively affect alloparents more broadly.

Current scholarship often views international environmental law (IEL) through a crisis or ambition lens. The “crisis lens” apologizes for the limitations of doctrinal methods in resolving disputes. The “ambition lens” seeks to align IEL with a planetary perspective but is criticized for utopianism. We offer a social-systems-theoretical alternative. IEL’s ability to learn and adapt to social change also depends on sustaining law’s function of stabilizing expectations. This constitutes the core of Luhmann’s theory of operative closure. We devise three hypotheses to reconstruct IEL’s operative closure and apply them to the South China Sea. Hypothesis 1: Environmental impact assessment norms address the problem of contingency management. Hypothesis 2: Due diligence norms address the problem of confidence maintenance. Hypothesis 3: Cooperation norms address the problem of trust retention. Our analysis shows that reconstructing IEL’s operative closure reveals its societal responsiveness. This presents a new critical lens for observing IEL’s social phenomena.

Legitimizing property rights over the resources that participants use in dictator and ultimatum games has been shown to significantly alter behavior. However, a similar impact has not been observed in public good experiments. We employ an interior public good design with thirty periods of peer punishment, which allows groups to choose between plausible contribution norms without conflicting with efficiency. Across our Unearned and Earned treatments, endowments are randomly allocated or earned through a real effort task. In Unearned, both High and Low types adhere to a norm of contributing an equal proportion of one’s endowment. In contrast, in Earned, only Low types adhere to the proportional contribution norm, while High types contribute less than an equal proportion. Notably, deviations from the proportional contribution by High types are punished significantly less in Earned, suggesting a greater tolerance to such deviations when property rights are earned.

Sacrificing own resources to punish norm violators is often regarded an altruistic act, promoting cooperation and fairness within social groups. However, recent studies highlight difficulties in interpreting third-party punishment as a prosocial and cooperative signal. Moving beyond abstract, decontextualized settings typically employed in economic game paradigms, we aimed to better understand the appraisal of observed punishment and punishers in real-world situations. To this end, we created and validated 24 written vignettes of everyday-life scenarios depicting interactions between a perpetrator, a victim, and a punisher. Across two preregistered experiments, we systematically manipulated key aspects of third-party punishment: transgression type and punishment type (property-oriented, corporal, or psychological; Experiment 1; N = 48) and punishment severity (weak or strong; Experiment 2; N = 50). Participants rated punishment adequacy and the punisher’s warmth, competence, and suitability as an interaction partner, whether as a friend or team leader. Results indicated preferences for psychological punishments, punishments that aligned with transgression type, and less severe punishments. Our findings support the notion that punishment is an ambiguous issue and reveal important contextual factors that contribute to its evaluation as a useful social strategy.

Many traditional subsistence groups have been described as ‘egalitarian societies’. Definitions of ‘egalitarianism’, especially beyond anthropology, have often emphasised equality in resource access, prestige or rank, alongside generalised preferences for fairness and equality. However, there are no human societies where equality is genuinely realised in all areas of life. Here we demonstrate, empirically, that nominally egalitarian societies are often unequal across seven important interconnected domains: embodied capital, social capital, leadership, gender, age/knowledge, material capital/land tenure, and reproduction. We also highlight evidence that individuals in nominally egalitarian societies do not unfailingly adhere to strong equality preferences. We propose a new operational framework for understanding egalitarianism in traditional subsistence groups, focussing on individual motivations, rather than equality. We redefine “egalitarianism” societies as those where socio-ecological circumstances enable most individuals to successfully secure their own resource access, status, and autonomy. We show how this emphasis on self-interest — particularly status concerns, resource access and autonomy — dispels naive enlightenment notions of the ‘noble savage’, and clarifies the plural processes (demand-sharing, risk-pooling, status-levelling, prosocial reputation-building, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility) by which relative equality is maintained. We finish with suggestions for better operationalizing egalitarianism in future research.

We design an experiment to study the implications of introducing position uncertainty in a social dilemma where eight players decide to contribute to a public good sequentially. Contributions are significantly higher when players make sequential decisions to contribute or not, are uncertain about their position in the sequence, and observe a sample of their predecessors’ choices compared to the simultaneous-move game. Yet, contribution rates remain invariant to the number of agents sampled. Consequently, contributions don’t unravel even with position certainty, and there is no incremental benefit of introducing position uncertainty, contrary to the theoretical prediction. Furthermore, controlling for the sum of contributions observed, individuals contribute less the later in the sequence they are.

Political work requires alliance building, but antagonism and divisions dominate legislatures and society in many democracies. How do legislators handle being pulled in both directions simultaneously? We use the anthropological method of ethnography and the political science method of network analysis and show how their combination enhances understanding of cross-party cooperation among Representatives even when such work is not depicted in the media and may clash with expectations of constituents. This interdisciplinary project utilizes a case study of the Texas House of Representatives, which provides a tough case for cooperation given the intense polarization of the state’s politics. Through observational and interview research methods of anthropology, we discovered how and why Representatives work across party lines. We then used network analysis to assess what traits of Representatives are associated with bill coauthoring and joint authoring to systematically measure cooperation. More senior Representatives, Hispanic, African American, and Asian Representatives but not women, and Representatives who join a bipartisan caucus most often build networks across party lines.

Culture consists of practices – behaviour patterns – shared by members of a group. Some attempts to demonstrate evolution of cultural practices in the laboratory have shown evolution of material products, such as paper aeroplanes. Some attempts have shown evolution of actual group behaviour. The present experiments demonstrated evolution of group coordination across generations in punishing defection in a public-goods game. Cost of punishing defection varied across replicates that consisted of series of groups (generations) of 10 undergraduates each. Each generation played the game anonymously for 10 rounds and could write messages to the other participants and punish defection every round. The effectiveness of punishment depended on the number of participants choosing to punish. In Experiment 1, cultural transmission from generation to generation consisted of written advice from one generation read aloud to the next generation. In Experiment 2, transmission from generation to generation consisted of having some participants return from the previous group. The cost of punishing varied across replicates: zero, one, two or five cents. In both experiments, the evolution of altruistic punishing was strongly dependent on the cost of punishing. The results add to plausibility of studying evolution of complex behaviour patterns like cooperation in the laboratory.