This chapter explores the delicate balance between the need to combat online disinformation and the safeguarding of fundamental rights, particularly media freedom and pluralism, as essential elements of freedom of expression and democracy. The chapter outlines the evolution of the EU’s policies and regulations related to information integrity and discusses the key elements and challenges of the EU’s approach to addressing disinformation in the context of media pluralism. Focusing on the Code of Practice on Disinformation, the Digital Services Act, and the European Media Freedom Act, the chapter discusses their complex interplay and overarching strategy, which delegates the critical task of assessing systemic risks and fundamental rights – including media freedom and pluralism – to very large online platforms.

This chapter examines the legitimacy and sustainability of sanctions against media outlets as a tool to counter foreign propaganda, focusing on the European Union’s restrictive measures against state-controlled Russian media following the invasion of Ukraine. While acknowledging the pressing need to address harmful disinformation and propaganda, particularly in times of war, we argue that the EU’s current sanctions model raises significant concerns regarding media freedom and freedom of expression. The chapter critically analyses the conceptual ambiguity surrounding ‘propaganda’ and ‘disinformation’ in international law, highlighting the tensions between content-based restrictions and fundamental rights. Drawing on comparative analysis of national approaches, particularly from Eastern European states, the chapter proposes an alternative tripartite framework for assessing media sanctions. This framework focuses on: (1) behaviour and content of media outlets; (2) adherence to principles of independent media and quality journalism; and (3) the relationship with ‘aggressor states’. We contend that this approach provides more objective criteria for identifying bona fide news media and propaganda channels, while better aligning with international human rights standards and the liberal understanding of media freedom.

This chapter explores potential advancements in co-regulatory settings to better cope with basic rights and democratic requirements when tackling disinformation online. While dubious information has become increasingly prevalent on social media platforms and might cause individual and societal harm, regulatory measures have depend on state regulation, self-regulation, and traditional co-regulation. In view of the disadvantages of state regulation and self-regulation, co-regulatory approaches are seen as the way forward in disinformation governance. The chapter argues that current co-regulatory settings have inherited structural deficits from state regulation and self-regulation when dealing with the specific challenges of disinformation, especially in cases of ‘awful but lawful’ speech. The chapter examines the requirements of adequately advanced co-regulatory approaches, the roles of the relevant actors, and the implications for future EU audiovisual policies.

Chapter 5 analyzes contemporary societal transformations through the lens of emerging technologies, political trends, and cultural shifts. It emphasizes how social media and artificial intelligence (AI), especially large language models, are reshaping communication, public perception, and decision-making processes. Social media amplify discontent, promote self-organization, and facilitate both progressive movements and misinformation. A concerning trend is the apparent societal shift from rational, collective discourse toward more intuitive, individualistic, and emotionally driven communication. This is evidenced by linguistic analyses of books, search trends, and journalistic styles. The chapter also explores the effects of neoliberal economic policies, which have fueled inequality and stress, potentially impacting cognitive function and social cohesion. Concurrently, a rise in populism and democratic backsliding is observed, driven by perceived grievances, xenophobia, and manipulation of public opinion. Together, these interconnected developments suggest humanity is at a critical juncture.

Chapter 3 presents the other side of the coin, namely AI risks and harms. Automated decision systems, chatbots, recommender systems, and other AI-powered software and platforms have been found to cause potential risks or actual harms to affected persons and communities. Such risks and harms include bias and discrimination, surveillance, inaccurate, incorrect and unreliable output, disinformation, misinformation or manipulation, harm to life, livelihood and wellbeing, privacy violations, decline in product and service quality, political polarization, online radicalization and algorithmic censorship, and job replacement. Some of these harms, such as bias and discrimination, have already been experienced frequently, while others, like job replacement, point to future risks. It is also worth noting that AI risks and harms often aggravate existing social and political problems. For example, political polarization and radicalization, while exacerbated by algorithmic curation, appear to have origins in societal divisions. Finally, AI is criticized for causing system-level harm in the form of environmental degradation, exploitation of labor, and market concentration.

Chapter 5 focuses on the regulation of social media platforms and platform architecture, with changes in EU perceptions regarding the reliability of these platforms and the values of their owners. It examines the shift from economically motivated self-regulatory regimes in these sectors based in logics of efficiency to a digital sovereignty-motivated move to a logic of security in regulation. It identifies the explicit linkage between economic and security concerns, particularly as it relates to disinformation and political advertising, with the promotion of co-regulatory regimes with significant levels of oversight provided by the Commission. It explores the approach to regulatory export adopted in these initiatives, with an emphasis on control of platforms regardless of where they are based, so long as they offer services in the EU.

Cyber disinformation is a global, very sophisticated phenomenon, capable of producing negative consequences on democratic values and institutions. This chapter argues that individual behavior of users plays a key role in the control of the phenomenon and aims to identify factors that impact on users’ behavioral intentions and cyber hygiene behavior. This chapter integrates the Extended Theory of Planned Behavior and a Structural Equation Model, realized through Partial Least Square – –Structural Equation Modeling, applied to the cyber disinformation phenomenon. The research data were collected using a questionnaire administered in Poland and Romania and analyzed using the Structural Equation Model. The model’s parameters were processed using the SmartPLS software. The reliability of the variables was assessed using Cronbach’s Alpha and Composite Reliability. The research revealed the applicability of the Theory of Planned Behavior model and found that Moral Norms and Perceived Behavioral Control have an impact on Behavioral Intention and Cyber Hygiene Behavior. The findings of this chapter can provide stakeholders with important insights that can lead to improved responses to the phenomenon.

In this chapter, we explore how Israel approaches its protection from cyber threats with a focus on disinformation. The chapter relies on primary source material in English and Hebrew and interviews with Israeli researchers and disinformation experts. This chapter outlines the overview of the disinformation threats Israel has been facing in the recent past and present, diagnoses the presence and absence in legislative policy concerning disinformation, and analyzes Israel’s private industry efforts to bolster cyber security defense. Finally, our conclusion considers a variety of overarching outlooks on the future of countering internal disinformation in Israel.

Rising to speak in the House of Commons in November 1947, Winston Churchill – by then no longer prime minister but still member of parliament, his party having been defeated in the general election of May 1945 – remarked that “No one pretends that democracy is perfect … Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried.” Churchill felt especially convinced that it was superior to those varieties of governance that relied upon “a group of super men and super-planners … ‘playing angel’ … and making the masses of the people do what they think is good for them, without any check or correction.” The following year, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was signed. While the term democracy is not mentioned, its essence is enshrined in the document, signed by democracies and autocracies alike: “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

The existence of democratic systems of government threatens the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. Democracy presents unique opportunities and vulnerabilities, including public debate and free expression, which nefarious actors can exploit by spreading false information. Disinformation can propagate rapidly across social networks and further authoritarian efforts to weaken democracy. This research discusses how Russia and China leverage online disinformation across contexts and exploit democracies’ vulnerabilities to further their goals. We create an analytical framework to map authoritarian influence efforts against democracies: (i) through longer term, ambient disinformation, (ii) during transitions of political power, and (iii) during social and cultural divides. We apply this framework to case studies involving Western democracies and neighboring states of strategic importance. We argue that both China and Russia aim to undermine faith in democratic processes; however, they bring different histories, priorities, and strategies while also learning from each other and leveraging evolving technologies. A primary difference between the countries’ disinformation against democracies is their approach. Russia builds on its longstanding history of propaganda for a more direct, manipulation-driven approach, and China invested heavily in technological innovation more recently for a permeating censorship-driven approach. Acknowledging it is impossible to know disinformation’s full scope and impact given the current information landscape, the growing international ambition and disinformation efforts leveraged by authoritarian regimes are credible threats to democracy globally. For democracies to stay healthy and competitive, their policies and safeguards must champion the free flow of trustworthy information. Resilience against foreign online disinformation is vital to achieving fewer societal divides and a flourishing information environment for democracies during peaceful – and vulnerable – times.

How do the dual trends of increased misinformation in politics and increased socioeconomic inequality contribute to an erosion of trust and confidence in democratic institutions? In an era of massive misinformation, voters bear the burden of separating truth from lies as they determine how they stand on important issue areas and which candidates to support. When candidates engage in misinformation, it uncouples the already weak link among vote intentions, candidate choice, and policy outputs. At the same time, high levels of economic inequality and social stratification may contribute to lower levels of institutional trust, and the correspondingly more insular socioeconomic groups may experience misinformation differently. Social policy, as a policy area intentionally designed to alleviate risk and redistribute resources, thus becomes a special case where the effects of misinformation and socioeconomic inequality may be crosscutting and heightened.