This short article offers a practical introduction to archival research for political scientists working on European politics. Archival documents are increasingly recognized as a relevant data source for process tracing analyses in small-N or mixed methods studies. Previously classified archival documents are exceptionally trustworthy due to their original confidentiality. Their rich and detailed content facilitates the understanding of causal mechanisms. Still, the hurdles for working with archival sources are high for political scientists. Lack of experience, no special training in handling historic documents, and a shortage of textbooks meeting their demands are a few of the problems political scientists planning archival research face. In the article, I highlight the opportunities of archival research and demonstrate how challenges can be overcome. I emphasize that the archival field trip should only be planned once researchers have gained substantive context knowledge. In their preparation, researchers should use all the resources archives offer and develop measurable expectations from theories.

When and why do economic grievances result in support for populist parties? We address a long-standing puzzle in understanding populist voters. Existing studies have produced mixed results about how economic characteristics drive support for populist parties. We argue this is because scholars have overlooked the central importance of internal political efficacy, i.e., a belief in one’s ability to affect political outcomes. Using three pooled waves of the European Social Survey (ESS 2014, 2016, and 2018) with over 80,000 individual observations over time, we find that the economic determinants of populist support are contingent on internal political efficacy. Although there are reasons to think that the combined effect of economic circumstances and efficacy may be stronger on support for the populist left because of their stronger emphasis on social justice, we do not find evidence of this with the limited observations of the populist left in our sample. Critically, our findings contrast with the simplified and theoretically unsatisfying explanations of populist support we often encounter in the literature that are based solely on economic dissatisfaction. Instead, our results imply that recent trends in European politics are not only about economic issues but also about a voter’s belief in having agency and competence to affect change.

Jean Blondel’s personal and scientific biography deserves to be illustrated, as it can in many ways also be an illustration of the laborious making of a genuinely European (though not only) political science from the ashes of World War 2, and the failures (uncertainties) of pre-WWII political science. Here it will briefly be recalled how an enthusiastic and innovative institution builder gained a central place in the making of the new European political science, and how Blondel coupled this with his tireless exploration of new fields of comparative politics, while being at the same time a generous mentor of PhD students and younger scholars and, for many, a great friend.

Simulations, understood as complex role plays, are nowadays widely used in (university) teaching to actively engage students and promote content-specific interactive learning, understanding, and communication. There is a growing debate about the functions and benefits of simulations in the university teaching context. Simulating the EU is not yet as common as simulating the UN, but the use of EU simulations gradually increases. In this paper, we discuss several aspects of EU simulations. First, we briefly review the importance of the EU in current European politics, and to its growing complexity, which represents a challenge for teaching and studying European integration. Second, we indicate that simulations address new didactical demands that arose in the context of the Bologna Process and the so-called ‘shift from teaching to learning’. And third, we move beyond the debate of EU simulations as merely an active learning tool, and discuss the (underestimated) role they may play as quasi-experiments, which may constitute a valuable resource both for didactical and European integration research. Together, these three aspects make EU simulations a promising multi-dimensional tool.

Despite increasing access to high quality television (TV) series in the golden age of television, political scientists (and especially scholars of comparative politics) have not systematically considered the possibilities that television series might offer for instruction. This article aims to fill this gap by illustrating the opportunities for teaching political science using TV series and outlining ways of integrating television series into the classroom using selected clips, screening full episodes, or using an entire series as a text. We then illustrate these methods by discussing ways that television series might be used in a typical introductory course on European politics.

European far-right parties have enjoyed mixed success in the past few years. The primary elements in many of these parties’ policy platforms centre on security, terrorism, and foreign persons. Naturally, these platforms are designed to attract electoral support that these actors can parlay into governing positions. Our study offers an important test to ascertain how voters respond to terrorist attacks with respect to centre- and far-right parties. We contend that far-right parties are to likely benefit from terrorist attacks more than centre-right parties. The results from more than 30 European countries, spanning 1975–2013, affirm our hypothesis. The implications for partisanship, governance, and terrorism are explored in this paper as well.

The pedagogical benefits of active learning environments such as simulations within university teaching have been widely acknowledged. This paper starts from the premise that simulations can derive benefits when used as an effective university outreach tool to widen participation in and raise aspirations towards entering higher education. We argue that European Union (EU)-related simulations involving students in secondary education can increase their interest in studying European politics and, more generally, political science and international relations at university level. This is seemingly particularly the case with students predisposed to pursuing a degree in these fields. The paper uses data gathered via a pre- and post-simulation questionnaire completed by pupils attending six secondary schools in 2016 who all participated in one of the three simulations included in the study. Empirical investigation reveals three major effects of simulations. First, the simulations can increase participants’ interest in pursuing university degrees in fields cognate to EU politics. Second, simulations can increase participants’ self-assessed knowledge of EU politics. Third, simulations can increase the importance participants place on understanding the workings of the EU. Taken together, these findings support our claim that EU-related simulations may be used as outreach tools to increase interest in pursuing EU-related subjects at university level. Such an increase is desirable despite—or perhaps precisely because—of the ongoing Brexit process, as the understanding of and engagement with EU politics will remain relevant for current and future generations of British students.

A successful energy transition requires the reallocation of private capital away from fossil fuel assets to greener alternatives. This transition is typically hindered by investors’ focus on today’s returns. In times of crisis, however, credible and unambiguous political signals about the future profitability of green industries can steer investments toward low-carbon assets. Drawing on European Union interventions during the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we present an event study of daily stock market returns following the most salient policy announcements by the European Commission in 2022. Our analysis shows that markets for shares of EU-based energy firms were initially prepared to move capital to cleaner companies, suggesting support for the clean energy transition. However, the short-lived distributional effects materialized only for announcements that could unmistakably be understood as unwavering commitments to the EU’s green renewal, while more ambiguous announcements did not have the same distributional implications. Our findings emphasize that repeated and unambiguous political signals during crisis episodes can create favorable market conditions, at least in the short term, to support capital reallocation toward greener stocks.

Does democratic satisfaction drive voter turnout, or does voting increase satisfaction with democracy? This paper explores the satisfaction-participation nexus in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where democratic dissatisfaction is prominent. It tests preregistered hypotheses using a five-wave panel survey from the Czech 2023 presidential election and a pooled dataset from five CEE countries. Unlike previous studies from Western Europe, it finds evidence for both mechanisms: pre-election satisfaction correlates with participation, but, simultaneously, voters experience a stronger election-related increase in satisfaction than abstainers. Further analyses reveal that the strong increases in satisfaction are driven by election winners and begin already during the election campaign. Our findings highlight the specificities of the satisfaction-participation link and elections’ legitimizing effects in newer democracies.

What qualifies as a political event is a core question for social and historical research. This article argues that the use of temporal structures in narratives of political and social developments contributes significantly to the making and unmaking of events. We show how arguments that draw upon history play a particularly important role in transforming the everyday unfolding of politics into discernable events with a clear time bracket. Through this lens, we investigate the 2016 Brexit referendum as an event that has triggered extensive debates about both Europe’s experiences of the past and political expectations for its future. Conflicting assessments of history are crucial for understanding how and when Brexit became an event of European significance and why it then ceased to be so. This case also enables us to distinguish more clearly between the agent-centered focus on the event itself, and the analytical ex-post assessment as a critical juncture. Methodologically, the article demonstrates the value of a multi-perspective approach for qualitative analyses with a focus on Brexit narratives articulated across several EU countries and the United Kingdom.

It is well known that politicians speak differently when campaigning. The shadow of elections may affect candidates' change in tone during campaigns. However, to date, we lack a systematic study of the changes in communication patterns between campaign and non-campaign periods. In this study, we examine the sentiment expressed in 4.3 million tweets posted by members of national parliaments in the EU27 from 2018 to 2020. Our results show that (1) the opposition, even populists and Eurosceptics, send more positive messages during campaigns, (2) parties trailing in the polls communicate more negatively, and (3) that the changes are similar in national and European elections. These findings show the need to look beyond campaign times to understand parties' appeals and highlight the promises of social media data to move beyond traditional analyses of manifestos and speeches.

Some scholars warn about democratic disaffection of young people potentially leading to processes of ‘democratic deconsolidation’. Conversely, others interpret young people's preference for non-conventional forms of participation as a manifestation of democratic renewal. We surveyed respondents from nine European countries and analysed differences in attitudes of opposition to democracy across age groups and how these preferences shape political mobilization. Our findings show that the youngest adult group is no less supportive of liberal democracy than older age groups. Second, although attitudes of opposition towards democracy decrease political mobilization, this association is independent of age. Thus, young people's critical views of democracy rarely translate into apathy for democracy. Finally, our results provide insights into intra-generational democratic attitude differences by showing how young people's individual attributes are likely to crystallize into different value configurations and patterns of democratic engagement over time but within specific contexts.

Recent studies take increasingly refined views of how socioeconomic conditions influence political behaviour. We add to this literature by exploring how voters' prospective evaluations of long-term economic and social opportunities relate to electoral contestation versus the stabilization of the political-economic system underpinning the knowledge society. Using survey data from eight West European countries, we show that positive prospects are associated with higher support for mainstream parties (incumbents and opposition) and lower support for radical parties on all levels of material well-being. Our results support the idea that ‘aspirational voters’ with positive evaluations of opportunities (for themselves or their children) represent an important stabilizing force in advanced democratic capitalism. However, we also highlight the importance of radical party support among ‘apprehensive voters’, who are economically secure but perceive a lack of long-term opportunities. To assess the implications of these findings, we discuss the relative importance of these groups across different countries.

In this article, we explore the consequences of the increasing presence of both left- and right-wing populist parties in government, critically reflecting on the recent scholarship on the topic, underlining promising venues for future research and outlining a conceptual framework which constitutes the background of this special issue entitled ‘Populism in Power and its Consequences’. Our main contribution is empirical, since – by reflecting on the various articles hosted in the special issue – we assess the impact of populist parties in government on politics, polities and various policy domains. We also provide an account of potential moderating factors of the influence of populists in government, focus on different ideological underpinnings of types of populisms (left-wing and right-wing) and discuss their relevance. We conclude by identifying four possible scenarios for European populist parties in governments: radicalization, compromise and moderation, splintering, or loss.

Scholars have long been concerned with the implications of income inequality for democracy. Conventional wisdom suggests that high income inequality is associated with political parties taking polarized positions as the left advocates for increased redistribution while the right aims to entrench the position of economic elites. This article argues that the connection between party positions and income inequality depends on how party bases are sorted by income and the issue content of national elections. It uses data from European national elections from 1996 to 2016 to show that income inequality has a positive relationship with party polarization on economic issues when partisans are sorted with respect to income and when economic issues are relatively salient in elections. When these factors are weak, however, the author finds no relationship between income inequality and polarization.