Open-mindedness requires us to be receptive to new evidence that contradicts our own views. Laurie Paul (2021) argues that there are situations in which we should, in fact, avoid exposure to putative evidence, as it may undermine our rational abilities. One example she discusses is the sensus divinitatis (SD) as a transformative experience. If an atheist agrees to be exposed to this experience, he may become a theist and, by his pre-transformation atheistic standards, irrational. Paul contends that we have valid reasons to avoid encountering putative evidence in these circumstances. This paper will argue that there are rational strategies to help us determine whether to expose ourselves to transformative experiences like the SD.

Ambridge, Pine, and Lieven (2014; AP&L) identify three problems with universal grammar (UG), namely: linking, data coverage, and redundancy, and argue for an alternative approach to child language acquisition. Behme (2014) aims to make a stronger case against UG. She attempts to show, by combining AP&L’s arguments with evidence from developmental psychology and formal linguistics, that UG should be rejected. In this commentary, I argue that Behme’s article does not present strong enough evidence to reject UG. Although Behme has pointed out some problems for UG theorists to consider, she fails to pinpoint where UG has really gone wrong. I then try to make clear what the fatal problem with UG is.

The promise of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) lies in its capacity to support or replace human decision-making based on a superior ability to solve specific cognitive tasks. Applications have found their way into various domains of decision-making—and even find appeal in the realm of politics. Against the backdrop of widespread dissatisfaction with politicians in established democracies, there are even calls for replacing politicians with machines. Our discipline has hitherto remained surprisingly silent on these issues. The present article argues that it is important to have a clear grasp of when and how ADM is compatible with political decision-making. While algorithms may help decision-makers in the evidence-based selection of policy instruments to achieve pre-defined goals, bringing ADM to the heart of politics, where the guiding goals are set, is dangerous. Democratic politics, we argue, involves a kind of learning that is incompatible with the learning and optimization performed by algorithmic systems.

The study aimed to analyse the European experience of investigating criminal offences in the field of official activity and the peculiarities of its adaptation to the Ukrainian context. The study employed a combination of case study methods, formal legal analysis, content analysis, comparative legal analysis, contextual analysis and PESTEL (political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal) analysis. The analysis of international experience was conducted in the context of European Union member states that have successfully established effective systems for investigating crimes in the public sector, including Germany, France and Poland. The study found that the approaches and strategies implemented in Ukraine have several shortcomings that significantly reduce the effectiveness of criminal investigations, including a widening gap between the number of registered offences and the number of notices of suspicion served. The reason for the identified discrepancy is the lack of coordination between the subjects of criminal investigations, as well as the lack of transparency of the investigation process and accountability of the parties involved. To overcome these shortcomings, the study recommended adapting the German experience in the field of round-the-clock interaction between the subjects of a criminal investigation, which guarantees quick access to information and prompt permission to conduct investigative actions. Adaptation of the French experience in conducting investigations was recommended to ensure cross-control of the investigation subjects and improve the efficiency of their work. The Polish experience of utilizing electronic resources in criminal proceedings was recommended to enhance interdisciplinary cooperation among the parties involved in the investigation. Adopting the best international practices can be used to enhance the detection statistics of criminal offences and increase public confidence in the country’s system for investigating and prosecuting criminal misconduct in office.

Proof is a fundamental problem facing those who experience discrimination in the workplace. Statutory discrimination law in Australia typically relies on an individual claimant proving their case, without a shifting burden of proof. Using age discrimination as a lens to facilitate analysis, and drawing on innovative findings from a multi-year, mixed methods empirical study of the enforcement of age discrimination law in Australia and the UK, this article offers the first empirically-informed assessment of what difference a shifting burden of proof would make to Australian discrimination law. It argues that while a shifting burden of proof may be important in finely balanced cases, and should be adopted for that reason, it is insufficient to overcome the limits of individual enforcement, and the dramatic information disparities between workers and employers. It offers important additional strategies or tools that might also help address the problem of proof, to better advance equality.

The problem of unconceived alternatives poses a challenge to believing even our most successful scientific theories. Such theories are typically accepted because they explain the available evidence better than any known rival, but such ‘inference to the best explanation’ cannot reliably guide us to the truth unless the truth is among the set of possibilities we have considered. The problem of unconceived alternatives suggests that we have compelling historical grounds to doubt that this crucial condition is satisfied when we theorize about otherwise inaccessible natural domains. Because the historical evidence suggests there are probably many serious alternatives to our own foundational theories that remain presently unconceived despite being well-confirmed by the evidence we have, we should doubt that some of even our most successful scientific theories are in fact true or even close to the truth. After presenting this problem in its original scientific context, I go on to argue that it poses at least as compelling a challenge to our confidence in any particular conception of God and/or divinity. I draw some fairly radical further theological consequences, and I suggest that the problem may ultimately force us to embrace a far more epistemically humble appraisal of our knowledge of God and divinity itself.

Systematic reviews and meta-analyses are often considered the highest level in evidence hierarchies, and therefore are often drawn upon when considering changes in policy. Despite journals implementing measures aiming to enhance the quality of systematic reviews they publish, the authorship raise concerns about the quality of existing and ongoing systematic reviews, particularly relating to transparency and bias minimisation. Building on the current guidelines, standards and tools, we suggest a ‘meta checklist’ which aims to maximise methodologically sound, unbiased and reproducible reviews of the best scientific quality while considering feasibility throughout the process.

We simplify our lives by learning from others. I focus on instances where we learn from our peers by receiving evidence that they have evidence for a hypothesis. I refer to this type of learning as learning from others’ evidence. I exclusively consider cases where we do not learn what the other agent’s evidence is; we only receive evidence that such evidence exists. I approach learning from others’ evidence by exploring the following slogan, popular in epistemology:

I am interested in the limitations of the slogan, focus on the impact of non-epistemic values on it, and argue for the following main thesis:

In arguing for the thesis, I draw on and expand insights from the philosophy of science. There are instances where our peers’ reasoning, commitments, and evidence (see Douglas 2000) are not rationally acceptable to us due to differences in non-epistemic values. Building on this, I contend that in such cases, we cannot (adequately) apply the slogan.

Rationally speaking, receiving testimony from an epistemic authority seems better than receiving testimony from anyone else. But what explains this?

According to the Preemptive Reasons View (PRV), the difference is one in kind, i.e., authorities provide you with preemptive reasons, whereas everyone else provides you with evidence. In this paper, I develop a novel problem for the PRV. In a nutshell, the problem is that the PRV cannot account for why there are cases in which the opinions of epistemic apprentices should count for something too. I conclude by offering a new reason for endorsing the Authorities-as-Advisors View (AAV). According to the AAV, testimony always provides you with evidence; it is just that relying on the say-so of an epistemic authority provides you with better evidence than relying on the say-so of anyone else.

The best strategy for getting away with lying is to lie small by only deviating from the truth as much as is necessary to achieve the intended deception. Why then do some demagogues lie big? One set of views has it that the only difference between small and big lies concerns the size of their contents. They claim that the purpose of big lies is the formation of false beliefs in their literal contents via counterfactual reasoning, conspiracy theories, or the illusory truth effect. The negative part of this paper questions these accounts. The positive part proposes a different explanation for why demagogues use big lies and argues that big lies may serve three distinct purposes for demagogues: they reinforce their supporters’ deeply held beliefs, test the loyalty of their close followers, or publicly demonstrate the demagogue’s power. For a big lie to serve these purposes, genuine belief in the lie is not required – in fact, few are likely to believe it. What matters is that the demagogue’s supporters publicly endorse the lie. We contend that they do so, either because they interpret them as motivational statements or use them to express or justify their shared emotions or convictions.