We revisit the recently introduced concept of return risk measures (RRMs) and extend it by incorporating risk management via multiple so-called eligible assets. The resulting new class of risk measures, termed multi-asset return risk measures (MARRMs), introduces a novel economic model for multiplicative risk sharing. We point out the connection between MARRMs and the well-known concept of multi-asset risk measures (MARMs). Then, we conduct a case study, based on an insurance dataset, in which we use typical continuous-time financial markets and different notions of acceptability of losses to compare RRMs, MARMs, and MARRMs and draw conclusions about the cost of risk mitigation. Moreover, we analyze theoretical properties of MARRMs. In particular, we prove that a positively homogeneous MARRM is quasi-convex if and only if it is convex, and we provide conditions to avoid inconsistent risk evaluations. Finally, the representation of MARRMs via MARMs is used to obtain various dual representations.

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertainty about the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have been used in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problems of equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment, each subject receives a noisy signal about the true payoffs. This game (inspired by the “global” games of Carlsson and van Damme, Econometrica, 61, 989-1018, 1993) has a unique strategy profile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcome coincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome of the underlying coordination game. In the baseline game, the behavior of the subjects converges to the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that this behavior can be explained by learning. To test this hypothesis, we use a different game with incomplete information, related to a complete information game where learning and prior experiments suggest a different behavior. Indeed, in the second treatment, the behavior did not converge to equilibrium within 50 periods in some of the sessions. We also run both games under complete information. The results are sufficiently similar between complete and incomplete information to suggest that risk-dominance is also an important part of the explanation.

This paper is concerned with multi-object, multi-unit auctions with a budget constrained auctioneer who has noisy value estimates for each object. We propose a new allocation mechanism, the endogenous reference price auction, with two key features. First, bids are normalized across objects using “reference prices.” Second, reference prices are set endogenously using information extracted from the bids submitted. We report on an experiment showing that a simple endogenous process mitigates value inaccuracies and improves three performance measures: the seller’s profit, allocative efficiency and total surplus. These results have important implications for large auctions used in practice.

A rich history of theoretical models in finance shows that speculation can lead to overpricing and price bubbles. We provide evidence that, indeed, individual speculative behavior fuels overpricing in (experimental) asset markets. In a first step, we elicit individual speculative behavior in a one-shot setting with a novel speculation elicitation task (SET). In a second step, we use this measure of speculative behavior to compose dynamic, continuous double auction markets in line with Smith et al. (Econometrica 56(5):1119–1151, 1988). We find significant higher overpricing in markets with traders who exhibited more speculative behavior in the individual SET. However, we find no such differences in overpricing when we test for alternative explanations, using a market environment introduced by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (Econometrica 69(4):831–859, 2001) where speculation is impossible. Taken together, our results corroborate the notion that speculation is an important factor in overpricing and bubble formation if market environments allow for the pursuit of capital gains.

In this methodological study we analyze price adjustment processes in multi-period laboratory asset markets with five distinct fundamental value (FV) regimes in a unified framework. Minimizing the effect of between-treatment variations we run markets with deterministically decreasing, constant, randomly fluctuating and—as main innovation—markets with deterministically increasing FVs. We find (i) efficient pricing in markets with constant FVs, (ii) overvaluation in markets with decreasing FVs, and (iii) undervaluation in markets with increasing FVs. (iv) Markets with randomly fluctuating fundamentals show overvaluation when FVs predominantly decline and undervaluation when FVs are mostly upward-sloping. Finally, we document that (v) bid-ask spreads and volatility of price changes are positively correlated with mispricing across regimes. The main contribution of the paper is to provide clean comparisons between distinct FV regimes, in particular between markets with increasing FVs and other regimes.

In 1988 Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (henceforth SSW) introduced a very influential model to test the efficiency of experimental asset markets. They and many subsequent studies observe that bubbles are robust to many treatment changes. Instead, bubbles are avoided only when subjects are experienced in the same setting, when the dividend-process is experienced by subjects beforehand, or when the fundamental value-process (FV) is presented in a well understandable context to reduce subjects’ confusion. We extend this line of research and show that even marginal changes in the experimental instructions/procedure can eliminate bubbles in the SSW-model. In particular, we show that mispricing is significantly reduced and overvaluation is eliminated completely (i) when the fundamental value process is displayed in a graph instead of a table or (ii) when subjects are asked about the current fundamental value at the beginning of each period. From a questionnaire conducted at the end of the experiment we infer that these treatment changes help to improve subjects’ understanding of the FV-process. We conclude that all bubble reducing factors have one common feature: they allow subjects to understand the non-intuitive declining FV-process of the SSW-model better and thus reduce subjects’ confusion about the FV-process.

We run laboratory experiments to analyze the impact of prior investment experience on price efficiency in asset markets. Before subjects enter the asset market they gain either no, positive, or negative investment experience in an investment game. To get a comprehensive picture about the role of experience we implement two asset market designs. One is prone to inefficient pricing, exhibiting bubble and crash patterns, while the other exhibits efficient pricing. We find that (i) both, positive and negative, experience gained in the investment game lead to efficient pricing in both market settings. Further, we show that (ii) the experience effect dominates potential effects triggered by positive and negative sentiment generated by the investment game. We conjecture that experiencing changing price paths in the investment game can create a higher sensibility on changing fundamentals (through higher salience) among subjects in the subsequently run asset market.

We use a comprehensive new dataset of asset-class returns in 38 developed countries to examine a popular class of retirement spending rules that prescribe annual withdrawals as a constant percentage of the retirement account balance. A 65-year-old couple willing to bear a 5 percent chance of financial ruin can withdraw just 2.31 percent per year, a rate materially lower than conventional advice (e.g., the 4% rule). Our estimates of failure rates under conventional withdrawal policies have important implications for individuals (e.g., savings rates, retirement timing, and retirement consumption), public policy (e.g., participation rates in means-tested programs), and society (e.g., elderly poverty rates).

We examine how media reports influenced trading volumes and order imbalances on the Sydney Stock Exchange (SSX) from 1901 to 1950, focusing on wool market reports as a substitute for broader financial advice in the absence of a specialised investment press. Given wool's status as Australia's primary export and its integration with various sectors, we construct a weekly media sentiment index based on news about wool sales and auctions from the Sydney Morning Herald. Our findings reveal that positive news about the wool market correlates with increased trading volumes and reduced order imbalances on the SSX. This relationship persisted during significant events such as the UK government's wool purchase plans, the 1929 Wall Street Crash, World War II-related trading restrictions, and the short selling ban.

Stock market bubbles arise as a joint monetary and financial phenomenon. We assess the potential of monetary policy in mitigating the onset of bubbles by means of a Markov-switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression model estimated on US 1960–2019 data. Bubbles are detected and dated from the regime-specific interplay among asset prices, fundamental values, and monetary policy shocks. We rationalize the empirical evidence with an Overlapping Generations model, able to generate a bubbly scenario with shifts in monetary policy, and where agents form beliefs over transition dynamics. By matching the VAR impulse responses, we find that procyclicality and financial instability align with high equity premia and the presence of asset price bubbles. Monetary policy tightening, by increasing real rates, is ineffective in deflating bubble episodes.

Financial literacy is a dangerous illusion. The article builds on existing critiques, notably the work of Lauren Willis, to show that the discourse of financial literacy education raises fundamental epistemological issues about the nature of financial markets and financial behaviour. The difficulties of achieving financial literacy are ill conceived simply as the outcomes of market imperfections. Instead, structural inequalities, financial reform, and the nature of financial assets preclude consumers from achieving adequate levels of financial competence and the claim that they can do so diverts attention from the causes of unequal economic outcomes.

Variable annuities are products offered by pension funds and life offices that provide periodic future payments to the investor and often have ancillary benefits that guarantee survival benefits or sums insured on death. This paper extends the benchmark approach to value and hedge long-dated variable annuities using a combination of cash, bonds and equities under a variety of market models, allowing for dependence between financial and insurance markets. Under a simplified case of independence, the results show that when the discounted index is modelled as a time-transformed squared Bessel process, less-expensive valuation and reserving is achieved regardless of the short rate model or the mortality model.

Despite its importance as a financial centre, the historical literature dedicated to the Swiss financial industry remains scarce. Analyses focusing on cantons and cities of the country are even more limited in number. This is unfortunate and is, in all likelihood, linked to the reluctance of financial institutions to share information in a country where banking secrecy has been at the core of the past success of these institutions. Despite this willingness to share as little as possible, some archival funds have gradually become available, most notably after businesses went bankrupt, changed hands, or simply disappeared. The present article relies on these sources to analyse the evolution of the Geneva stock exchange during the interwar period, which saw a gradual decline of its activity. Independent brokers strived to keep their oligopoly over banks. At the same time, Swiss German banks tried to penetrate the canton-controlled marketplace by using their federal rights and strength to become unavoidable actors. They could ultimately help local bankers gain direct access to the Geneva stock exchange, obliterating the power of brokers who were left with no other choice than to appeal to the Canton of Geneva to defend their position.

A previously unknown pricing anomaly existed for a few years in the late 1840s in the British government bond market, in which the larger and more liquid of two very large bonds was underpriced. None of the published mechanisms explains this phenomenon. It may be related to another pricing anomaly that existed for much of the nineteenth century in which terminable annuities were significantly underpriced relative to so-called ‘perpetual’ annuities that dominated the government bond market. The reasons for these mispricings seem to lie in the early Victorian culture, since the basic economic incentives as well as laws and institutions were essentially the familiar modern ones. This provides new perspectives on the origins and nature of modern corporate capitalism.

British government bonds formed the deepest, most liquid and most transparent financial market of the nineteenth century. This article shows that those bonds had long periods, extending over decades, of anomalous behavior, in which Consols, the largest and best known of these instruments, were noticeably overpriced relative to equivalent securities which offered the same interest rate and the same guarantee of payment. This finding and similar ones for other comparable pairs of British gilts appear to provide the most extreme counterexamples documented so far to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and to the Law of One Price, and point the way to further investigations on the origins and nature of the modern economy.

This paper proposes a model of network interactions in the interbank market. Our innovation is to model systemic risk in the interbank network as the propagation of incentives or strategic behavior rather than the propagation of losses after default. Transmission in our model is not based on default. Instead, we explain bank profitability based on competition incentives and the outcome of a strategic game. As competitors' lending decisions change, banks adjust their own decisions as a result: generating a “transmission” of shocks through the system. We provide a unique equilibrium characterization of a static model, and embed this model into a full dynamic model of network formation. We also determine the key bank, which is the bank that is crucial for the stability of the financial network.

This paper examines two interrelated issues in commodity markets, namely,the cyclical relationship between stocks and commodities and the function ofcommodity and agribusiness indexes in portfolios. A high negativecorrelation has existed between stock and commodity prices over the past 140years. Moreover, the two markets have alternated in price leadership with29-32-year cycles. The recent price dominance in agricultural commoditiesstarted in 2000, a result supported by the empirical results of theportfolio allocation analysis. For a risk-averse investor, irrespective ofthe period analyzed, placing funds in agribusiness and/or agriculturalcommodity indexes was sound investing.

Motivated by repeated price spikes and crashes over the last decade, weinvestigate whether the growing market shares of futures speculatorsdestabilize commodity spot prices. We approximate conditional volatility andanalyze how it is affected by speculative open interest. In this context, wesplit our sample into two equally long subperiods and document whether thespeculative impact on conditional volatility increases. With respect to sixheavily traded agricultural and energy commodities, we do not find robustevidence that this is the case. We thus conclude that the financializationof raw material markets does not make them more volatile.

Tontines and life annuities both insure against longevity risk by guaranteeing (pension) income for life. The optimal choice between these two mortality-contingent claims depends on personal preferences for consumption and risk. And, while pure tontines are unavailable in the twenty-first century, the first longevity-contingent claim (and debt) issued by the English government in the late seventeenth century offered a choice between the two. This article analyzes financial and economic aspects of King William's 1693 tontine that have not received attention in the literature. In particular, it compares the stochastic present value (SPV) of the tontine vs the life annuity and discusses characteristics of investors who selected one versus the other. Finally, the article examines the issue of whether high reported tontine survival rates should be attributed to anti-selection or fraud. In sum, this article is an empirical examination of annuitization decisions made by actual investors in the late seventeenth century.

In 1899, James Keene, a prominent bear, and Roswell Flower, a well-known bull, both attempted to manipulate the share price of Brooklyn Rapid Transit (BRT), a young commuter railway company. Flower and Keene were stock ‘operators’, who used pools of cash from like-minded investors to push share prices higher or lower. In their efforts to garner profits, BRT operators claimed insider status, planted rumors in the press, used leverage to accumulate large positions, manipulated borrowing costs and camouflaged trades. The events of 1899 can shed light on current market dynamics, and we draw parallels between the predatory trading strategies used in 1899 and those of today.