Using Wine Spectator’s Top 100 lists for 1988–2025, this note applies Bai–Perron structural break tests to regional and country shares and identifies three distinct periods: 1988–1997, 1998–2015, and 2016–2025. Real prices decline across phases, with the sharpest drop in the most recent period, while scores remain stable and concentration falls sharply between the first two periods and then levels off. Turnover also declines in the most recent period, indicating reduced year-to-year movement in regional representation. Robust regressions confirm that prices are lower in periods with lower concentration. The findings extend earlier JWE studies by providing a longer horizon and a structural break perspective on long-run changes in representation and pricing.

This article challenges the traditional view of the linear causality of technological globalization in the history of modern predictive meteorology. According to this linear narrative, telegraphy, by enabling near-instantaneous communication over vast distances, was the causa efficiens that directly and inevitably produced large-scale weather forecasting. However, the role of Jesuit scientists in East Asia as pioneers of cyclone warning systems not only demonstrates that the linear narrative is too simple but invites a rigorous examination of the relationships between prior knowledge networks and technological infrastructures. This article contends that the expansion of technological networks does not inexorably imply the expansion of knowledge networks. There was not, therefore, a unidirectional causal relationship but a concomitant two-way interaction; that is, there was a coextension of knowledge and technological networks, where both Jesuit scientists and telegraph companies benefited from each other and shared common goals confronting a global threat—cyclones. This offers a new perspective not only on the history of meteorological services but also of science globalization.

Recent literature argues that with ever‐increasing levels of supranational constraints governments have less ‘room to manoeuvre’; therefore, voters will place less weight on policy outcomes in their voting decisions. The question that remains less explored is how voters fill this accountability gap. We argue that, in this context, voters may move away from outcome‐ to input‐oriented voting. Fulfilling their promises becomes less vital for incumbents as long as they exhibit effort to overturn an unpopular policy framework. We test this argument against a survey experiment conducted in the run‐up to the September 2015 election in Greece, where we find a positive impact of the incumbent's exerted effort to challenge the status quo of austerity on vote intention for SYRIZA – the senior coalition government partner at the time – despite the failed outcome of the government's bailout negotiations.

Recent political changes in established democracies have led to a new cleavage, often described as a juxtaposition of ‘winners’ and ‘losers of globalization’. Despite a growing interest in subjective group membership and identity, previous research has not studied whether individuals actually categorize themselves as globalization winners or losers and what effect this has. Based on survey data from Germany, we report evidence of a division between self‐categorized globalization winners and losers that is partially but not completely rooted in social structure and associated with attitudes towards globalization‐related issues and party choices. We thereby confirm many of the assumptions from prior research – such as that (self‐categorized) losers of globalization tend to hold lower levels of education and lean towards the radical right. At the same time, the self‐categorizations are not merely transmission belts of socio‐structural effects but seem to be politically consequential in their own right. We conclude that the categories of globalization winners and losers have the potential to form part of the identity component of the globalization cleavage and are important for understanding how political entrepreneurs appeal to voters on their side of the new divide.

This paper focuses on what from a global perspective must be seen as one of the most significant social movements during the post-war era: the transnational anti-apartheid movement. This movement lasted for more than three decades, from late 1950s to 1994, had a presence on all continents, and can be seen to be part of the construction of a global political culture during the Cold War. The paper argues that the history of the anti-apartheid struggle provides an important historical case for the analysis of present-day global politics—especially in so far that movement organizations, action forms, and networks that were formed and developed in the anti-apartheid struggle are present in the contemporary context of the mobilization of a global civil society in relation to neoliberal globalization and supra-national political institutions such as the World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank.

Salamon argues that the nonprofit sector is the core or “center” of civil society. He correctly diagnoses the nonprofit sector’s problems but his proposal to “hold the center” through sectoral renewal and a partnership model of state-nonprofit relations is problematic. This is the case in part because the effects of economic globalization are reducing nation-state autonomy. In addition, fragmentation of social identity in a postmodern era challenges sectoral legitimacy, while devolution and localization of social welfare responsibilities reduce nonprofit effectiveness. On the basis of U.S. evidence, I argue that, rather than trying to hold the center, we should decenter the nonprofit sector—away from dominant institutions, powerful groups, and privileged places—and join the margins in an effort to weave a new, more humane and inclusive social contract.

The international aid system forms a powerful structural force impacting organizational landscapes and civil societies all over the world in complex ways we do not yet understand. Dominant NGO research has failed to properly address this crucial issue, because of a conceptual, theoretical, and ideological tradition that is itself embedded in this very same system’s normative, rhetorical agenda. This paper suggests some conceptual and theoretical approaches that should encourage more comparative research on the role of the development NGOs in shaping national and global civil societies.

To illuminate the obstacles to the development of a global civil society, the experience of the most developed transnational social movement—the environmental movement—in the most developed supranational political system—the European Union—is considered. National differences are shown to be persistent and there is little evidence of Europeanization. It is argued that the impediments to the development of a global civil society are yet greater and that, despite the advent of antiglobalization protests, global civil society remains an aspiration rather than an accomplished fact.

Since third sector research emerged as a fully fledged inter-disciplinary academic field during the late 1980s, a separation has usually been maintained—in common with many other social science disciplines—between communities of researchers who are primarily concerned with the study of the third sector in rich Western countries and those who work on the third sector in the so-called ‘developing world’. While internationally focused researchers tend to use the language of ‘non-governmental organizations’, those in domestic settings usually prefer the terms ‘non-profit organization’ or ‘voluntary organization’, even though both sub-sectors share common principles and are equally internally diverse in terms of organizations and activities. While there has long been common-sense logic to distinguishing between wealthier and poorer regions of the world based on differences in the scale of human need, the ‘developed’ versus ‘developing’ category can also be criticized as being rather simplistic and unhelpfully ideological. As the categories of ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ countries become less clear-cut, and global inter-connectedness between third sectors and their ideas grows, this paper argues that we need to reconsider the value of maintaining these parallel worlds of research, and instead develop a more unified approach.

International advocacy strategies devised for the political environment in which World Bank policy is decided are often not suitable for advocacy on broader financial policy and trade issues. Advocacy in these “new” agendas challenges prevailing models, which depict NGOs as mobilizing powerful governments and international organizations to influence a government’s behavior. The patterns of international NGO political activity are diverse, sometimes restraining the power of international rules and authorities over individual governments, and require a new or broader model.

An overview of recent trends in research on the Indian nonprofit sector is presented. The material is not exhaustive of all research that has been conducted, but instead discusses effects of globalization on the literature. As used here, globalization implies the worldwide rise of economic liberalism, universal trust in political democracy, the advent of cultural universalism, relative erosion of the power of nation-states, and global embracing of capitalism and commodity culture. The following distinct effects of globalization are discussed: diverse policy debates on nongovernmental organization (NGO) roles in development, challenges to the credibility of India ’s most popular and debated theory of nonprofits, the emergence of a large volume of literature on environmental and women’s movements and organizations, and the shifting of attention to the study of NGOs. A deliberate effort is made to identify the backgrounds of some of the authors discussed in the article to direct attention to differences in content of the writings of NGO officials, activists, scholars, policy analysts, development consultants, Westerners, and Indians.