Chapter 1, “Introduction,” welcomes you to day 1 of your new life as an upgrader. In this introduction we not only provide an overview of the book’s thesis for better problem solving and more effective technological advancement, we start to draw out the contours of what it means to be an Upgrader. This loosely nit cohort of changemakers has rejected both the inadequacy of the status quo and the destructiveness of innovation. Here, you’ll begin to learn what it means to solve some of the most urgent problems facing our society today through the lens of upgrades. We’ll also begin to provide examples of ways that innovations have fallen flat, or blown up completely, in the past. Crucially, upgraders aren’t just backseat drivers in the journey of social change, they are forward looking experts who are often able to see the dangers of pending innovations before they occur. In your life as an upgrader, you’ll not only be able to avoid these missteps yourself, but you’ll be able to see the innovation traps so many others are poised to fall into.

It would be ‘convenient’ to have a climate solution, where technological innovations fix the problem without any change to current institutions, structures, and lifestyles. However, even though we have some interesting options at lab scale, innovation must be scaled up to make a difference, and it is impossible between now and 2050 for the ‘convenient’ solution to be built at the necessary scale. In addition, there can be no physically meaningful offsets because trees take too long to grow and there are no realistic emissions-negating technologies. This book’s journey to zero emissions reduces technological risk to a minimum by assuming that only technologies that already exist at scale can help, and that they will be deployed only at rates comparable with recent history. This is not ‘convenient’ in that it involves some societal change and therefore we must find the courage to act. However, we can still have a high quality of life, and expand many of the activities we most value.

Hydraulic improvement aimed to abolish recurrent flooding in wetland commons and generate an environment capable of supporting intensive cultivation. In practice, however, the interventions of Dutch engineer Cornelius Vermuyden and his collaborators created new flooding in unfamiliar patterns and places. As communities were left more exposed to risk and less able to adapt or recover, a fraught hydro-politics rippled out of drainage in Hatfield Level, pivoting on disputes over risk and responsibility. Displacing customary methods of water management, improved hydraulic systems generated institutional as well as environmental disruption. In 1635, a new sewer commission was established to manage Hatfield Level as a hydrological unit defined by improvement. Lacking legitimacy, it struggled to control flow, contain disorderly commoners, or compel cooperation from improving landowners. Wetland communities negotiated new risks by adapting customary practices, launching petitioning campaigns, and high-profile destruction of improved infrastructure during the English civil wars. In this context, water management became highly politicised and precariously balanced.

Wetlands have deep geological histories, stories of bedrock, sediment, and sea rise. But the direction and speed of flow has been shaped just as surely by human interests and intervention. This chapter asks how wetland commons were used, managed, and disputed in the centuries and decades prior to improvement projects. Moving from the action of ice sheets and mosses to national legislation and daily work, it examines how environmental and political scales intersected. By the late sixteenth century, communities in the northern fens faced amplified flood risks and conflict over shared commons. But these challenges did not necessarily strengthen intervention by state-sanctioned institutions capable of coordinating at a larger scale. A less linear and more fragmented picture emerges in the northern fens, where environmental politics pivoted on rights and responsibilities defined by local custom. Fen custom was reproduced by communal decision-making and participatory acts of walking, remembering, and working. It formed a flexible fabric, adapted in response to dynamic waterways and porous boundaries and negotiated through confrontations on riverbanks as well as courtrooms.

How were seventeenth-century projects of wetland improvement remembered and revived in the centuries that followed? What remnants of wetlands past persist in popular memory, troublesome spirits, floodwaters, and nature reserves? This chapter traces afterlives of the turbulence and tumult generated by fen projects. In doing so, it weaves together the key strands of this book. First, new intellectual and political tools were needed to define and implement wetland improvement, reconceiving the scale of environmental thought and action in early modern England. Second, customary politics proved a powerful force in the negotiation of improvement as commoners intervened in the flow of water, the exercise of property rights, and the practice of sovereignty. Finally, coercive projects of environmental change expanded cracks in the exercise of central authority, becoming entangled in civil war conflict and imperilling the stability of improvement. It concludes by asking what conflict over early modern wetlands can tell us about the environmental politics of the Anthropocene.

Like a puppy playing with the long stick which is the risk-uncertainty conundrum, we chew energetically on the risk end, letting the uncertainty end drag in the dust. The stick is shaped, I argue, by Newtonian humanism. It combines the scientific and humanist stances that have co-evolved in modern times, constituting a commonsensical, internally inconsistent, worldview. And that view bends the analysis of the political world toward controllable risk, sidestepping or silencing unruly uncertainty.

Bankers rely on sophisticated risk models when they place their bets, informed by what they understand to be the rational beliefs they and others hold about the world. In a financial crisis, however, on a moment’s notice those beliefs can morph into panics, revealing unacknowledged uncertainties that had existed all along (section 1). What bankers, traders, government officials, and many of us do all too rarely is to acknowledge the pervasiveness of an uncertain future that we may intuit but cannot know. Without firm knowledge about the future, actors are guided by confidence-instilling conventions. Social conventions, such as risk-management models, were widely believed in and adopted to control uncertainty. These models generated endogenously a systemic crisis (section 2). The complementarity of the small world of risk with the large world of uncertainty is reflected in economic practices such as accounting and arbitrage (section 3). The Federal Reserve has relied heavily on story-telling (section 4). Going beyond the analysis of finance this chapter ends by discussing the denial of the risk-uncertainty conundrum by the reigning theory in the field of international political economy (section 5).

Aristotle defines hybris as a way of mistreating (dishonouring) others. But he also emphasises its psychology, in ways that chime very well with the understanding of the concept in earlier literary sources. As well as indicating a failure to show other people the respect they deserve, hybris is a way of thinking too much of oneself. This affects one’s estimation of the role that luck plays in all human endeavour: the classic Aristotelian case is that of the rich, ‘lucky fools’ who think that their material good fortune is a sign that they excel in all respects; but ancient hybristai in general tend to develop the belief that they are invulnerable to the vagaries of fortune. In this way, hybris regularly entails a failure to deal adequately with risk. At the same time, it bears a relation to the myth of meritocracy, by which the fortunate convince themselves that their success is deserved.

What happened when people did not pay their debts? Debts Unpaid argues that conflicts over small-scale unpaid debts were a stress test for the economic order. To ensure the wheels of petty commerce continued to turn in Mexico, everyday debtors and creditors had to believe that their interests would be protected relatively fairly when agreements soured. A resounding faith in economic justice provided the bedrock of stability necessary for the expansion of capitalism over the longue durée. Introducing the two-hundred-year period of massive economic transformation explored throughout the book, this chapter presents the text’s key historical and theoretical interventions from the late eighteenth century to the first decade of the twenty-first. As the capitalist credit economy grew, especially through modern financial institutions, ordinary people used new financial tools and navigated increasingly opaque and impersonal credit relations. This Introduction outlines the dynamics of change and the challenges and opportunities they posed for the world of small-scale debtors and creditors.

The power struggle between debtors and creditors in the 1860s and 1870s signalled a time when face-to-face economic relationships showed signs of strain. Economic life was expanding in more impersonal ways, and debt litigation was increasing as debtors and creditors alike found themselves navigating risk without the long-standing close social ties that once characterised their relationships. Chapter 2 studies legal conflicts and legal codes to understand the risks people took when making contractual agreements and illuminates how they decided to trust each other. It shows debtors attempting to evade their obligations in myriad ways and depicts creditors transmitting their anxieties to the courts through the use of providencias precautorias (precautionary petitions) to sequester goods or people before the initiation of a formal civil suit. Examining legal codes from mediaeval Iberia to nineteenth-century civil law, this chapters shows how jurists, working in a long tradition, attempted to balance the interests of both parties. Although creditors generally prevailed in legal conflicts, the prospects of debtors were on the rise.

Decision theory and decision making are multidisciplinary topics. Decision theory includes psychology, especially cognitive psychology, because decisions are cognitive processes. Decision theory also includes math, especially probability, as people often make decisions based on likelihood. Decision making is an applied topic pertaining to business, engineering, science, politics, other disciplines, and of course to personal decisions.

Descriptive models of decision theory explain decisions as cognitive processes, how and why people make the choices they do. Normative decision models describe how people should conceptualize a decision. Prescriptive models include mathematically based analyses that provide actionable solutions to real-world problems.

Decisions are made in one of three environments. Under certainty, the decision maker can make a choice and be sure what the outcome will be. Under risk, the decision maker will make a choice knowing in advance the probabilities of various outcomes. Under uncertainty, the possible outcomes and probabilities are unknown.

This chapter develops a view that casts moral heroism as a specific kind of moral achievement and argues it is superior to the virtue approach to moral heroism. I begin the discussion with J. O. Urmson’s account of moral heroism as overcoming fear, registering the limitations of that account before moving on to Gwen Bradford’s account of achievement as such, which centers on overcoming difficulty. She defends a view of difficulty that consists in the expending of effort, rather than in the surmounting of complexity. Her highly developed account is a good model for analyzing moral achievement, yet it is in need of significant modification in order to function in a specifically moral context. In order to give an account of moral achievement, I argue that Bradford’s key notion of difficulty should be replaced by sacrifice. Moral heroism consists in making high-stakes sacrifices. I develop an account of what sacrificing consists in, identifying features of actions that constitute sacrifices. I show how this concept offers us an account of moral heroism as a kind of moral achievement. I then argue that it significantly outperforms the virtue approach according to the desiderata from Chapter 2: accuracy, related phenomenon, and fitting responses.

The purpose of our book is to chronicle and analyze Morgan’s interventions in financial crises, telling the story of how he learned the art of last resort lending by trial and error, and finding its relevance to issues that last resort lenders still face in the early twenty-first century. We classify Morgan’s last resort loans into three types.

This chapter provides an overview of young people with mental health needs and the development of forensic mental health and youth justice services for young people. The provision of inpatient and community forensic child and adolescent mental health services is outlined in more detail, including referral criteria, characteristics of the young people who access the service and outcomes of the provision.

This chapter introduces the reader to the big picture of what analytics science is. What is analytics science? What types does it have, and what is its scope? How can analytics science be used to improve various tasks that society needs to carry out? Is analytics science all about using data? Or can it work without data? What is the role of data versus models? How can one develop and rely on a model to answer essential questions when the model can be wrong due to its assumptions? What is ambiguity in analytics science? Is that different from risk? And how do analytics scientists address ambiguity? What is the role of simulation in analytics science? These are some of the questions that the chapter addresses. Finally, the chapter discusses the notion of "centaurs" and how a successful use of analytics science often requires combining human intuition with the power of strong analytical models.